Julius H. Grey

The appellant challenged a Superior Court of Quebec decision concerning the federal election in the electoral district of Terrebonne.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard the appeal and delivered an oral judgment the same day.

A majority allowed the appeal and annulled the federal election held on April 28, 2025, in Terrebonne.

Reasons were reserved, including on costs.

A professional comedian appealed a discrimination finding after a human rights tribunal held that his comedy routines mocking a public figure with a disability violated the right to the safeguard of dignity under the Quebec Charter.

The majority of the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the three elements of a discrimination claim under s. 10 of the Quebec Charter had not been established.

The majority found that the distinction was not based on a prohibited ground since the comedian had not targeted the complainant because of his disability but because he was a public figure.

Even if based on a prohibited ground, the majority held that the comedian's comments did not incite others to vilify the complainant or to detest his humanity, nor were they likely to lead to discriminatory treatment.

Four dissenting justices would have dismissed the appeal, finding that the comments constituted a discriminatory interference with the complainant's right to dignity as a child with a disability whose harm was broadly disseminated and deeply harmful.

A naturopath was charged with criminal negligence causing death and unlawful act manslaughter after a patient died of endotoxic shock following an intravenous nutrient injection administered at her clinic, contrary to Quebec's Medical Act.

The trial judge acquitted the accused on both charges after a 39-day trial, finding the intravenous injection was not objectively dangerous in the circumstances and that the accused's conduct did not constitute a marked departure from the reasonable person standard.

The Court of Appeal set aside both acquittals, substituted a conviction for unlawful act manslaughter, and ordered a new trial on the criminal negligence charge.

The Supreme Court majority (5-2) allowed the appeal and restored the acquittals, holding that objective dangerousness is not an independent element of the actus reus of unlawful act manslaughter and that the Court of Appeal improperly replaced the trial judge's factual findings.

The dissent would have ordered a new trial on both charges, finding the unlawful injection was inherently objectively dangerous regardless of the accused's training.

The Court dismissed the appeal from both the committal order and the surrender order in an extradition case involving child-abduction charges sought by the United States.

The majority held the extradition judge exceeded her limited committal role by weighing defence and exculpatory evidence instead of applying the prima facie committal test and the presumption of reliability of the record of the case.

At surrender, the Minister reasonably considered both the possible defence issue and the children’s best interests and reasonably concluded surrender was not unjust or oppressive under the Extradition Act.

On an appeal from Quebec, the Court addressed whether a fatal injury suffered when a tree fell onto a vehicle was damage caused by an automobile under the provincial no-fault automobile insurance statute.

The Court reaffirmed a broad, remedial interpretation of the statute and held that a traditional fault-based causation analysis does not govern this scheme.

It concluded that use of a vehicle as a means of transportation is sufficient at minimum to engage the statutory definition of accident, even where the vehicle’s role is not active.

Because the claim fell within the statutory scheme, the civil action in damages was barred and compensation had to be sought through the public insurer.

The appellate judgment was set aside and the dismissal of the action was restored.

The parties divorced in 1984 and the husband was ordered to pay spousal support, which was varied to $2,000 per month in 1991.

In 2008, the husband applied to terminate spousal support, citing his retirement and a market downturn that negatively impacted his assets.

The trial judge reduced support to $1,500 per month, and the Court of Appeal further ordered that support be gradually reduced and terminated.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the wife's appeal and restored the 1991 order.

The Court held that the husband failed to establish a material change in circumstances under s. 17(4.1) of the Divorce Act because he provided no evidence of his financial circumstances at the time of the 1991 order, nor did he prove that his investment losses were crystallized rather than temporary market fluctuations.

The appellants, foreign nationals and a permanent resident, were detained under security certificates issued pursuant to the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).

They challenged the constitutionality of the IRPA's certificate scheme, which allows for detention and deportation based on secret evidence not disclosed to the named person.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the procedure for determining the reasonableness of a certificate infringes section 7 of the Charter because it denies the named person the right to know the case to meet, and is not saved by section 1.

The Court also found that the lack of prompt review for the detention of foreign nationals infringes sections 9 and 10(c) of the Charter.

The Court struck down the offending provisions but suspended the declaration of invalidity for one year to allow Parliament to amend the law.

The appellant, an orthodox Sikh student, was prohibited by his school board from wearing a kirpan to school on the basis that it violated the school's code of conduct prohibiting weapons.

The student and his father proposed an accommodation to wear the kirpan sealed inside his clothing, which the school board rejected.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the absolute prohibition infringed the student's freedom of religion under section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Court found that the infringement could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter, as the absolute prohibition did not minimally impair the student's rights given the low risk of violence when the kirpan is worn under strict conditions.

The school board's decision was declared null.

The appellants, Orthodox Jews, set up succahs on the balconies of their co-owned property to fulfill a religious obligation during the festival of Succot.

The respondent syndicate of co-owners requested their removal, citing a declaration of co-ownership that prohibited constructions on balconies.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the declaration infringed the appellants' freedom of religion under the Quebec Charter.

The Court established a subjective test for freedom of religion, requiring only that a claimant sincerely believe in a practice that has a nexus with religion.

The Court found that the impairment of the appellants' religious freedom was serious, while the intrusion on the respondent's property and security rights was minimal.

The Court also rejected the argument that the appellants had waived their religious rights by signing the declaration of co-ownership.

The appellants, contractors and construction workers, were charged with hiring employees without required competency certificates or working without them, contrary to the Quebec Construction Act.

They challenged the constitutionality of the Act, arguing that the requirement to join one of five designated union groups to obtain a competency certificate violated their freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter, specifically the negative right not to associate.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

A majority held that while s. 2(d) includes a negative right not to associate, the legislation did not infringe this right as it did not impose ideological conformity, or alternatively, any infringement was justified under s. 1 of the Charter given the complex history of labour relations in the Quebec construction industry.

The applicant brought a motion for a rehearing of a custody appeal, arguing that the respondents failed to serve an intervener from the court below with the application for leave to appeal and notice of appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, finding that the intervener did not qualify as a 'party' requiring service under the applicable rules.

Furthermore, the applicant was aware of the lack of service prior to the original hearing and failed to demonstrate any potential failure of justice that would justify a rehearing.

The appellants appealed a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that reversed the trial judge's order awarding them custody of the child.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal from the bench, finding no error by the trial judge, and restored the original order granting custody to the adoptive grandparents.

The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of provisions in Quebec's Referendum Act that limited spending by independent individuals and groups during a referendum campaign.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions infringed the freedoms of expression and association guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

While the objective of ensuring fairness and equality in the referendum process was pressing and substantial, the strict limits on independent spending failed the minimal impairment test.

The Court found that the exceptions for unregulated expenses were too restrictive and amounted to a near-total ban on independent political expression.

The impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of a municipal surtax on non-residential buildings imposed by the City of Montreal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the surtax is a direct tax raised for provincial purposes within the meaning of s. 92(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court found that the taxes fall into the category of true land taxes.

The applicant was found in civil contempt for failing to pay $25,000 in support arrears and was sentenced to four months in prison.

He applied to the Supreme Court of Canada for interim release pending his application for leave to appeal the committal order.

A single judge of the Court granted the motion, finding that the criteria for a stay under section 65.1 of the Supreme Court Act were met, as there was a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured the applicant.

The applicant was released on the condition that he not exercise access to his children during the release period.

The appellant challenged his extradition to the United States after a murder conviction and exposure to the death penalty, arguing that surrender without assurances under Article 6 of the Canada-U.S. Extradition Treaty violated ss. 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The majority held that s. 12 did not directly apply to extradition because any punishment would be imposed by the foreign state, and that the proper inquiry under s. 7 was whether surrender would sufficiently shock the Canadian conscience or be fundamentally unacceptable.

Applying that framework, the Court concluded that extradition to a U.S. jurisdiction with substantial procedural protections for brutal murder offences did not violate fundamental justice, and that s. 25 of the Extradition Act validly left the matter to ministerial discretion.

The Court also held that natural justice did not require an oral hearing before the Minister.

The appeal was dismissed and the extradition order confirmed.

The respondent, a nursing assistant, challenged regulations requiring her to pass a French language test to obtain a professional permit, arguing they were discriminatory and contained an unauthorized subdelegation of power.

The regulations exempted candidates with three years of secondary instruction in French.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the issue was not moot despite legislative amendments, as the government had an interest in the validity of its regulations.

The Court concluded the regulations were not discriminatory under the Charter of human rights and freedoms because they did not impair the right to full equality, and the subdelegation to a testing committee was purely administrative and authorized by statute.

The respondent moved to dismiss the appellant's appeal in the Court of Appeal for failure to file a factum within the fixed delay.

A judge of the Court of Appeal granted the motion pursuant to art. 505 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the exercise of the judge's discretion was not reasonable given the circumstances.

The appellant was granted a peremptory delay of ten days to serve and file his factum.

The appellant appealed judgments declaring that the provisions regarding English instruction in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the French language (Bill 101) were inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that sections 72 and 73 of Bill 101 are inconsistent with section 23 of the Charter and are of no force or effect to the extent of the inconsistency.

The Court found that the limits imposed by Bill 101 on minority language educational rights could not be justified under section 1 of the Charter, as section 23 was specifically drafted to remedy the type of regime established by Bill 101.

The appellant, a Polish citizen, claimed Convention refugee status after overstaying his visitor's visa in Canada.

The Minister determined he was not a Convention refugee, and the Immigration Appeal Board refused to allow his application for redetermination to proceed under s. 71 of the Immigration Act, 1976.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed his application for review.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the appellant argued the Board applied too strict a test.

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the correct test under s. 71 is whether it is more likely than not (a balance of probabilities) that the applicant will be able to establish his claim at a full hearing, rejecting the lower threshold of a 'seriously arguable' case.