Julie Santarossa

A registered massage therapist (later unregistered) was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault and mischief.

The Crown alleged that over a period from 2013 to 2021, the defendant engaged in unwanted touching of complainants' genitalia and breasts during massage treatments, as well as improper draping and exposure.

The defendant denied all allegations, claiming any touching was accidental or consensual.

The trial involved extensive evidence from multiple complainants, expert testimony regarding professional massage therapy standards, and a successful similar fact application.

The court found the defendant guilty of eight counts of sexual assault and one count of mischief, while acquitting on two counts where the evidence did not meet the beyond reasonable doubt standard.

This decision concerns the prosecution of five members of the 2018 Canadian World Junior Hockey Team for sexual assault.

The complainant, E.M., alleged that after consensual sexual activity with Michael McLeod, she was sexually assaulted by McLeod and his teammates in a London hotel room.

The accused maintained that E.M. was a willing and active participant.

The court found significant inconsistencies and reliability issues in the complainant’s evidence, including contradictions with video evidence and other witness testimony.

The court concluded that the Crown had not proven the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt for any of the accused and acquitted all five.

The judgment provides a detailed analysis of the law of consent, credibility, and the use of myths and stereotypes in sexual assault trials.

This decision addresses the Crown's application to admit a text message as hearsay evidence under the principled exception in a high-profile sexual assault prosecution.

The court reviews the necessity and reliability requirements for hearsay, ultimately finding that the reliability threshold is not met and dismissing the application.

The ruling provides a detailed application of the Supreme Court’s guidance in R. v. Bradshaw and R. v. Charles on the dangers of hearsay and the use of corroborative evidence.

The Crown sought to admit a text message sent by Brett Howden to Taylor Raddysh as past recollection recorded, an exception to the hearsay rule.

The court reviewed the requirements for admissibility, including reliability, timeliness, absence of memory, and the witness’s ability to vouch for the accuracy of the record.

The court found that while the first three requirements were met, Mr. Howden could not vouch for the accuracy of the text message, as he had no memory of sending it and could not confirm its truthfulness.

As a result, the application to admit the text message as past recollection recorded was denied.

This decision addresses a defence motion for a mistrial after a jury note alleged unprofessional conduct by defence counsel, raising concerns about jury impartiality.

The court reviews the legal principles governing mistrials, including the presumption of jury impartiality, the test for reasonable apprehension of bias, and the discretion to discharge jurors or declare a mistrial.

The court finds that the fairness of the trial has been compromised and grants the motion for a mistrial, emphasizing that such a remedy is reserved for the clearest of cases where no other remedy will suffice.

This decision concerns a summary conviction appeal by Patrick Godin from his conviction for sexual assault.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the third prong of the W.(D.) analysis, specifically by not considering the totality of the evidence, including contradictions between the complainant’s testimony and that of other witnesses.

The appeal judge found that the trial judge’s reasons were adequate, addressed the relevant issues, and gave proper deference to credibility findings.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a sexual assault trial, the Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence from multiple complainants, arguing it demonstrated a pattern of conduct and modus operandi, and that its probative value outweighed potential prejudice.

The defendant opposed, citing insufficient similarities and the risk of collusion.

The court granted the application, finding significant, non-generic similarities across complainant accounts that made innocent coincidence improbable.

The judge determined the evidence was reasonably capable of belief and that the risks of moral and reasoning prejudice were attenuated in a judge-alone trial, allowing the evidence to be used to rebut potential defences, prove the actus reus, and bolster complainant credibility.

The appellant was convicted of kidnapping, assault, assault with a weapon, uttering death threats, and a human trafficking offence.

He appealed his convictions, arguing that the trial judge improperly used s. 276 of the Criminal Code to disregard all of the complainant’s evidence regarding her work as a sex worker and made errors in assessing her credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by effectively excluding a broad area of evidence related to the complainant's sex trade involvement without providing notice or an opportunity for submissions, which constituted a significant breach of procedural fairness and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

The court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The applicant, J.Y., charged with sexual assault and mischief, sought a stay of proceedings for one sexual assault count (count 11) on the grounds of abuse of process.

The applicant argued that police assurances of no charge led him to participate in a College of Massage Therapists of Ontario (CMTO) disciplinary process, providing information that was later disclosed to the Crown and complainant, compromising his right to silence and trial fairness.

He also cited unreasonable pre-charge delay.

The court found a significant impairment of the applicant's right to a fair trial and that the state's reversal of its decision not to charge, without new evidence, undermined the integrity of the judicial process.

Finding no alternative remedy, the court granted the stay of proceedings for count 11.

The accused challenged a search warrant and sought to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a s. 8 violation.

The court found the information to obtain (ITO) the search warrant was flawed, containing a false assertion and relying on speculative and stale information, thus rendering the search unlawful and a breach of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court determined that the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in the admission of reliable evidence.

Consequently, the evidence was excluded, leading to the dismissal of all charges against both accused.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a conveyance and operation with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or greater than the legal limit.

The defence argued that the defendant's Charter rights were violated and sought exclusion of evidence.

The court found the defendant was impaired but not "operating" the vehicle as defined by the Criminal Code, specifically lacking "care or control" because the presumption of operation was rebutted by the defendant's credible testimony of a multi-pronged plan not to drive.

The Crown failed to prove actual care or control beyond a reasonable doubt, as there was no realistic risk that the defendant would have driven.

Consequently, the charges were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after a joint trial.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's misapprehension of video surveillance evidence, which was believed to be uninterrupted but contained significant gaps.

The Court of Appeal found this misapprehension material and central to the trial judge's reasoning for conviction, thus warranting setting aside the convictions.

However, the Court declined to enter an acquittal, determining that the verdict was not unreasonable given other circumstantial evidence, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault with a weapon against his wife and son.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) framework, improperly shifted the burden of proof, and failed to adequately address inconsistencies in the Crown's evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof, adequately explained his credibility findings, and reasonably addressed material inconsistencies in the testimony.

The appellant, Darryl Reid, appealed his conviction for assaulting his domestic partner, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence and failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. W.(D.).

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the appellant's testimony and accepting the complainant's, despite her demonstrable lies and motive to fabricate, were inadequately articulated and suggested a misapplication of the burden of proof.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The accused, Brandon Nunn, charged with possession of fentanyl for trafficking, brought an application to exclude evidence (fentanyl tablets) under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Crown conceded violations of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the police unlawfully detained the accused, conducted an unreasonable search, and profoundly violated his right to counsel by forcing him to choose between medical treatment for pepper spray exposure and his constitutional rights, and by questioning him after he requested a lawyer.

Applying the R. v. Grant framework, the court determined that the egregious state conduct and significant impact on the accused's liberty, privacy, and dignity interests outweighed society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

Consequently, the fentanyl evidence was excluded.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless use of a firearm.

After experiencing multiple break-ins, the appellant armed himself with a loaded BB gun to confront suspected trespassers on his property.

He chased a suspect down a public alleyway and banged on a neighbour's door while holding the firearm.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's actions constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable person and that the defences of defence of property and citizen's arrest were not available because his actions were not reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, refusing to provide a breath sample, and resisting a peace officer.

The defence admitted the actus reus of all three offences but contested mens rea.

The accused consumed three glasses of wine while taking Champix (varenicline), a smoking cessation medication, resulting in pathological intoxication characterized by extreme impairment, aggression, and memory loss.

Expert evidence established that the combination of Champix and alcohol can produce exaggerated intoxication effects at low alcohol levels.

The accused was unaware of this drug-alcohol interaction and could not reasonably have known of it.

The court found the presumption of voluntary intoxication was rebutted and acquitted the accused on all charges.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order.

The appellant challenged the reliability of co-conspirator evidence and argued that extradition would violate his Charter rights under sections 6(1) and 7.

The Court of Appeal upheld the committal and dismissed the judicial review application, finding that the reliability of witness evidence is a matter for the receiving jurisdiction, that the possible sentence would not shock the conscience, and that the Minister's decision to defer to US proceedings was reasonable and justified under the Cotroni factors.

The accused was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking and breaches following his arrest on June 14, 2006.

The court conducted a blended voir dire and trial to determine whether the arrest was lawful and whether evidence obtained from a search incident to arrest should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused moved to exclude evidence based on alleged breaches of s. 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The court found that the arrest was unlawful and the detention arbitrary, as the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds based on an unreliable confidential informant tip and minimal corroborating observations.

The court excluded the evidence seized, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.