Julien Chouinard

The accused was involved in a motor vehicle accident where he backed into the complainant's vehicle, caused damage, and drove away without leaving his name and address.

He was acquitted at trial, but the Crown appealed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the presumption of intent to escape civil and criminal liability under section 233(3) of the Criminal Code applies upon proof of any one of the three enumerated elements (failure to stop, failure to give name and address, or failure to offer assistance).

The Crown's appeal was allowed and the conviction was restored.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision that set aside the accused's conviction for attempted rape and ordered a new trial.

At trial, the judge held an in camera hearing under s. 142 of the Criminal Code and excluded evidence of the complainant's post-offence sexual conduct.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by excluding the post-offence conduct on the basis that it was irrelevant in principle, rather than properly weighing its necessity for a just determination of fact as required by s. 142(1).

The appellant union grieved the dismissal of an employee after a bank deposit disappeared while in his care.

The arbitrator substituted a suspension for the dismissal and ordered reinstatement.

The employer successfully applied to quash the award, and the Court of Appeal affirmed.

On appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Court held that the collective agreement did not contain a specific penalty for the infraction, as the employer's right to impose a range of penalties at its discretion did not constitute a specific penalty under s. 157(d)(ii) of the Canada Labour Code.

The appeal was allowed and the arbitrator's award restored.

The respondent was a passenger in a stolen car and was charged with possession of stolen goods.

The trial judge disbelieved the respondent's testimony that he did not know the car was stolen and convicted him.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction, holding that some evidence of control was necessary to establish possession under the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, confirming that a measure of control is a constituent and essential element of possession under the Code.

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) was charged under the Criminal Code with broadcasting an obscene film.

The CBC argued that as a Crown corporation, it enjoyed Crown immunity from criminal prosecution.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the CBC acts as an agent of the Crown when lawfully executing its powers under the Broadcasting Act, it steps outside its agency role when it exercises its powers in a manner inconsistent with the Act.

Because broadcasting an obscene film is prohibited by regulations under the Broadcasting Act and the Criminal Code, the CBC was not acting as a Crown agent and is subject to criminal prosecution.

The appellant, a Quebec police officer, pursued a taxi driver into New Brunswick after observing what he believed to be dangerous driving.

When the driver refused to stop and attempted to flee, the officer fired warning shots and then shots at the vehicle's tires.

The officer was convicted of careless use of a firearm.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored his acquittal, holding that a peace officer in fresh pursuit across a provincial border retains their status for the purpose of the protection afforded by s. 25(4) of the Criminal Code, and that the force used was not excessive.

The accused was convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud based on a confession obtained after police repeatedly denied him the right to consult a lawyer.

The trial judge admitted the confession, but the Court of Appeal excluded it, finding the denial of counsel created an atmosphere of coercion that raised a reasonable doubt about voluntariness.

The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court quashed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal's difference of opinion with the trial judge on the factual effect of the police refusals did not raise a question of law.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

At trial, the judge precluded defence counsel from cross-examining a key Crown witness about an outstanding murder charge laid against him by the same police department.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal by applying the curative proviso.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that cross-examination of a Crown witness concerning an outstanding indictment is proper to show possible motivation to seek favour with the prosecution.

The Court concluded that the curative proviso could not be applied because it could not be said that the jury would necessarily have reached the same verdict had the cross-examination been permitted.

The respondents claimed $1,100,000 under a marine insurance policy issued by the appellant, a Yugoslav company, for a jewellery case lost during transit to Montreal.

The appellant challenged the Federal Court's jurisdiction, arguing that marine insurance falls under provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights, making section 22(2)(r) of the Federal Court Act ultra vires.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that marine insurance is an integral part of maritime law and falls within Parliament's jurisdiction over navigation and shipping.

The Court affirmed the Federal Court's jurisdiction ratione materiae and ratione personae, dismissing the appeal.

Two non-union longshoremen complained to the Canada Labour Relations Board that their respective unions breached the duty of fair referral under s. 161.1 of the Canada Labour Code.

The Board found clear breaches and, under its broad remedial powers in s. 189, ordered the unions to admit the complainants to membership and to establish proper referral rules.

The Federal Court of Appeal set aside the membership orders, finding the Board exceeded its jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeals, holding that the Board's remedial authority under s. 189 is broad enough to permit such orders in special cases to remedy the adverse consequences of the unions' failure to comply with the Code.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal that allowed the respondent to amend his writ of summons and declaration to substitute a company name for his own, even though the prescription period had expired.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reasons of the Court of Appeal that the amendment was not contrary to the ends of justice.

The appellants appealed decisions regarding the enforcement of non-criminal federal statutes, specifically the Fisheries Act and the Narcotic Control Act.

The issues concerned whether a provincial Attorney General or any other person is entitled to lay an information charging a violation, and whether the provincial Attorney General is entitled to prosecute.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, finding no constitutional question and agreeing with the New Brunswick Court of Appeal's conclusions on statutory construction.

The appellants challenged a Quebec Court of Appeal judgment that authorized a writ of evocation against the Canada Labour Relations Board.

The Board had found that two subsidiaries of a television broadcaster were federal undertakings subject to the Canada Labour Code.

The Supreme Court held that s. 18 of the Federal Court Act did not strip the Superior Court of its superintending power when the Board's decision concerned constitutional division of powers rather than administration of federal law.

On the merits, the Court found that selling sponsored air time and producing programs and commercials did not constitute broadcasting activities, and the subsidiaries' operations were not vitally or integrally related to the parent broadcaster's federal undertaking.

The appellants granted the respondent a lease with an option to purchase, as well as a second option to purchase abutting lands.

The lands were in an area of subdivision control.

When the respondent attempted to exercise the options, the appellants refused to close, arguing that the agreement violated s. 29 of The Planning Act because they retained the fee in the abutting lands subject to the unexercised option.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the grantor of an option does not retain the fee in the optioned lands, as they have bound themselves to dispose of the lands to the optionee and have no further control over their alienation.

The appeal was dismissed and specific performance was granted.

The Province of Ontario and the predecessor in title of Boise Cascade Canada entered into an agreement in 1905 to develop hydro-electric power on the Rainy River.

The agreement required the company to supply the Town of Fort Frances with electrical power at a rate not exceeding $14 per horsepower per annum.

The agreement created a reserve of 4,000 horsepower for use on the Canadian side.

The Town's energy consumption eventually exceeded the 4,000 horsepower reserve.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the company's obligation to supply power to the Town at the fixed price of $14 per horsepower per annum was limited to the 4,000 horsepower reserved under the agreement.

The respondent credit union was assessed for business taxation under s. 7(1)(b) of The Assessment Act.

The assessment was confirmed by the Assessment Review Court but set aside by the District Court, which found the credit union's preponderant purpose was to provide loans to members at low cost, not to make a profit.

The Divisional Court and Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming the 'preponderant purpose' test and concluding that the credit union was not carrying on a business for the purpose of the Act.

The Canadian Wheat Board sought to recover damages from the respondent for delivering infested grain out of a terminal elevator, contrary to the Canada Grain Act.

The Board pleaded statutory breach rather than negligence, arguing the breach gave rise to absolute liability.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the civil consequences of a statutory breach should be subsumed in the law of negligence.

The Court rejected the notion of a nominate tort of statutory breach and found that since no negligence was pleaded or proven, the action must fail.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, expressing substantial agreement with the dissenting reasons of MacDonald J.A. in the court below regarding errors in the charge to the jury.

The accused was charged with second degree murder.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury on constructive murder under s. 213 of the Criminal Code based on evidence of forcible confinement.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding that the jury was instructed on an uncharged offence (first degree murder).

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that s. 214 merely classifies murder for sentencing purposes and does not create distinct substantive offences, meaning the jury was properly instructed on the elements of murder under ss. 212 and 213.

The Attorney General of Nova Scotia appealed a decision of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal which found that the powers of the Nova Scotia Residential Tenancy Board were ultra vires the province as trenching on s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada, in a brief oral judgment, dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and granted the motion to quash, with Estey J. dissenting.