John E. Callaghan

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment after the defendant failed to repay four loan advances totalling $53,000 made between July and October 2024.

Applying Rule 19 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the deemed admissions established a breach of the loan agreements and granted judgment for the full principal amount.

The claim for punitive damages was dismissed for lack of evidence.

Substantial indemnity costs were also refused as no reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous conduct was established.

Partial indemnity costs of $2,500 were fixed in the absence of a bill of costs.

In this post-verdict decision following a 20-day jury trial in a historical sexual assault case, the court addressed four issues: (1) whether to amend the statement of claim to reflect the jury's verdict exceeding the pleaded amounts; (2) whether to set aside or reduce the $1,000,000 punitive damages award against the estate; (3) whether the defendant organization should be held severally rather than jointly liable; and (4) the appropriate pre-judgment interest rates.

The plaintiff was awarded $400,000 in general and aggravated damages, $940,000 for past income loss, and $50,000 for future counselling, with the jury apportioning liability 75% to the estate and 25% to the organization.

The court upheld the jury verdict in all respects, granting the amendment to the pleading, refusing to interfere with the punitive damages award, maintaining joint and several liability, and awarding pre-judgment interest at 5% on non-pecuniary damages from June 1992 and 2% on pecuniary damages from June 1992, calculated bi-annually.

This is a costs endorsement following a trial in a commercial dispute involving unpaid accounts.

The plaintiff was partially successful in its claim, recovering $430,809, while its claim for additional amounts based on oral agreements was dismissed.

The defendants' counterclaim was entirely dismissed.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff as the successful party, fixing costs at $150,000 in fees and $62,210.53 in disbursements on a partial indemnity basis.

The court rejected arguments for cost shifting based on a Rule 49 settlement offer that was less than the judgment and declined to impose sanctions based on allegations of impropriety made by either party.

The defendants brought a motion to strike two Fresh as Amended Claims filed by the self-represented plaintiff.

The plaintiff had purported to amend her claims on April 1, 2025, claiming consent from the defendants pursuant to Rule 26.02(b).

However, the defendants denied providing consent.

The court found that the plaintiff had misused prior consents from 2020 and 2021 that were unrelated to the 2025 amendments, constituting an abuse of process.

The court struck the Fresh as Amended Claims but granted limited leave to amend the original pleadings to include certain new relief provisions (Charter damages and mandatory orders) that did not introduce new facts beyond the limitation period.

The court also adjusted the schedule for pending summary judgment motions and awarded costs to the defendants.

The plaintiff, a German-trained lawyer with a PhD in law, sued his former family law counsel for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from their representation in a motion to change a parenting order.

The plaintiff alleged the defendants failed to investigate the facts, warn him of the case's weaknesses and cost risks, and ensure he understood the legal advice.

The defendants represented the plaintiff in a motion to change a 2012 consent order that limited his parenting time with his two sons.

The motion was based on a claimed material change in circumstances—the plaintiff's new employment with reduced travel requirements.

The motion was dismissed by Justice McWatt, who found no material change in circumstances because the plaintiff testified at trial that his new job required international travel, contradicting his affidavit and employer's letter.

The court dismissed the negligence and fiduciary duty claims, finding the defendants met the standard of care, the plaintiff was aware of the risks, and he would have proceeded with the motion regardless of advice.

The defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's amended statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant with Asperger's syndrome, challenged the constitutionality of the exclusion of mental illness from the medical assistance in dying (MAID) regime under the Criminal Code.

The court found that the claim lacked the necessary factual foundation, specifically the allegation that the plaintiff had undergone a MAID assessment and been denied based on mental illness.

The court struck the amended statement of claim but granted leave to amend within 90 days, requiring the plaintiff to adduce evidence of a triable issue relating to denial of MAID based on Asperger's syndrome.

A motion to review an assessment officer's decision regarding costs awarded to a self-represented litigant in a solicitor assessment proceeding.

The applicant, an architectural designer, sought compensation for lost opportunity costs incurred while preparing for and attending a 42-day assessment hearing.

The assessment officer awarded $90,000 for the applicant's time, despite the applicant providing no corroborating evidence of specific lost contracts or delayed projects.

The respondent law firm challenged the award on the ground that there was insufficient evidentiary foundation demonstrating actual lost opportunity.

The court found that while the assessment officer was entitled to infer lost opportunity costs, the award failed to properly apply the legal test requiring a "modest" or "reasonable" fee for self-represented litigants.

The court reduced the award to $40,000.

The plaintiffs sought costs in relation to an ex parte Mareva, Norwich and preservation order obtained against the defendants and for responding to a motion to set aside the order.

Farhad Eshfagh, who was partially successful in having the Mareva injunction lifted, also sought costs.

The court declined to award costs at the interlocutory stage, finding it premature to do so given that the matter remains ongoing and no final determination on the merits has been made.

The court rejected claims for substantial indemnity costs, finding no reprehensible or scandalous conduct warranting such an award.

Costs were ordered to be in the cause, to be determined at trial.

This is a costs endorsement following a judgment in which the court found Yahya Dikeni Hashiru liable for unjust enrichment in the amount of $713,089 and Spotless Consultancy Inc. liable for fraud in the amount of $2,726,050 plus punitive damages of $250,000.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs of $100,000 against both defendants.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs of $100,000 against Spotless based on the fraud finding, but awarded only $60,000 against Hashiru on a lesser scale given that the successful claim was for unjust enrichment rather than fraud.

The court also ordered a post-judgment Mareva injunction in aid of execution for 9 months and granted tracing orders regarding two Ghanaian entities.

An insurer sought default judgment against an uninsured defendant following settlement with the plaintiff.

The insurer had taken an assignment of the plaintiff's action and settled for $105,000.

The court considered whether the settlement amount could be used as a proxy for damages in the absence of detailed evidence regarding the plaintiff's injuries and losses.

The court found insufficient evidence to establish the reasonableness of the settlement and declined to grant judgment, allowing the insurer 21 days to file additional evidence.

An appeal from an arbitration decision under the Insurance Act concerning priority of payment of statutory accident benefits.

The claimant, a 25-year-old who suffered severe traumatic brain injury in a motorcycle accident, was deemed catastrophically impaired.

The arbitrator determined that the claimant was principally dependent on his sister, who was insured by the appellant, rather than on his parents or the motorcycle insurer.

The appeal challenged the arbitrator's application of the dependency test, arguing that the arbitrator failed to properly apply all four criteria from the leading case and failed to conduct a precise calculation of the 51% threshold.

The court upheld the arbitrator's decision, finding no error of law or palpable and overriding error in the arbitrator's reasoning and factual conclusions.

The decision concerns a motion to set aside or vary a Mareva injunction, Norwich order, and preservation order obtained ex parte by the plaintiffs in a cryptocurrency mining business dispute.

The court finds a strong prima facie case of fraudulent misrepresentation against most defendants, upholds the Mareva and preservation orders (except as against Farhad Eshfagh), and addresses the standards for full and frank disclosure on ex parte motions, risk of dissipation, and balance of convenience.

The court found for the plaintiff, Hossein Amini-Kouchesfahani, in his civil action against the Toronto Police Services Board for battery and breach of his Charter rights after he was forcibly removed from his taxi and taken to the ground by police.

The court held that the initial stop was lawful, but the subsequent use of force was excessive and unjustified.

The plaintiff was awarded general, aggravated, special, and punitive damages.

This is a costs decision following a successful summary judgment motion.

The defendants, represented by Dave Griffiths and others, succeeded in having the action dismissed based on the ultimate limitation period.

The court considered the parties' bills of costs, the complexity and importance of the case, and the lack of detail in the bills.

Ultimately, the court fixed costs at $80,000, all-inclusive, in favour of the defendants, finding this amount fair, reasonable, and proportionate in the circumstances.

The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action as statute-barred under the 15-year ultimate limitation period in the Limitation Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs, Bruce G. Johnston and Judith A. Walker, claimed wrongful expulsion from their union and denial of full pension benefits.

The court found that all material facts were known or discoverable by 1994/95, and the ultimate limitation period had expired long before the action was commenced in 2021.

The court also rejected arguments based on concealment, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and the expulsion being void ab initio.

This decision grants an interlocutory injunction exempting all existing supervised consumption sites (SCSs) in Ontario from the operation of section 2 of the Community Care and Recovery Act, 2024, pending a final decision on the merits.

The court finds that the three-part test for injunctive relief is met: there is a serious issue to be tried regarding Charter rights, irreparable harm would result from SCS closures, and the balance of convenience favours the applicants.

The ruling details the public health crisis of opioid use, the role of SCSs in harm reduction, and the disproportionate impact of closures on marginalized populations.

This costs endorsement addresses the entitlement and quantum of costs following a successful motion by the defendant.

The court considers the timing of the defendant’s costs submissions, the scale of costs (partial vs. substantial indemnity), the effect of offers to settle, and the conduct of the parties.

The court ultimately awards the defendant $20,490 in costs, finding no basis for a higher scale and that the amount is reasonable and proportionate.

The decision concerns an appeal by the Defendants from an order granting the Plaintiffs certificates of pending litigation (CPLs) over two properties.

The court reviews the factual background, the standard of review, and the legal test for CPLs, ultimately finding no error in the Associate Justice’s decision to grant the CPLs.

The appeal is dismissed.

The court considered whether the assessment of costs following settlement should be conducted by an assessment officer or by a judge.

The plaintiffs sought to have the court fix costs, while the defendants argued for assessment by an assessment officer under Rule 57.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that, as the matter settled before trial and the court had only a cursory knowledge of the facts, the assessment should be conducted by an assessment officer as contemplated by the Rules.

The court encouraged the parties to attempt to resolve costs without assessment if possible.

This penalty decision follows a finding of contempt against Mark Mendl, former counsel to the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (OPSEU), for failing to comply with a court order to produce records and information regarding $3.7 million in union funds.

The court reviews the history of non-compliance, the steps taken by Mendl to eventually purge his contempt, and the aggravating and mitigating factors, including Mendl’s substance abuse and subsequent cooperation.

The court considers the purposes of civil contempt penalties, relevant case law, and the impact of Mendl’s suspension from legal practice.

Ultimately, the court imposes no further penalty, finding that Mendl’s incarceration, suspension, and agreement to pay costs suffice.