F.L. Myers

Following summary judgment concerning sham property transfers designed to defeat creditors, the successful plaintiff sought full indemnity costs against two defendants based on reprehensible conduct in the litigation and underlying fraudulent dealings.

The court held this was a rare case where the successful party should bear none of the expense of pursuing justice, given the fabrication of a defence, abusive conduct, stalling, and untrue evidence.

Full indemnity costs of $121,523.99 inclusive of disbursements and taxes were awarded jointly and severally against the two defendants who acted in concert.

The court further held that s. 45(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act applied to one defendant’s liability for costs in relation to the properties at issue.

This was a costs decision following dismissal of an application for partition and sale of jointly held property, with a prior order requiring the respondents to pay the applicant $13,000 from any future sale or refinancing.

The applicant sought costs up to the date of the respondents' settlement offer, but the court held the respondents were wholly successful on the real issue: preserving the property's equity and restraining enforcement of bare legal title.

Applying the fair and reasonable costs principles under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, the court fixed the respondents' costs at $13,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court set that amount off against the applicant's prior $13,000 recovery so that the formal judgment would simply declare the respondents' ownership and dismiss the applicant's claims.

The plaintiffs, comprising the estate and family of the deceased, moved for summary judgment on liability in a wrongful death action arising from the defendant's prior first degree murder conviction.

The court held that, under the abuse of process and relitigation principles, a civil defendant will presumptively not be permitted to contest the factual basis of a criminal conviction absent circumstances calling the fairness of the prior proceeding into question.

No such circumstances were raised, and the defendant's limitation argument failed because the action was commenced within two years even on his most favourable assumptions.

Summary judgment on liability was granted, damages were left for later determination, and the supporting damages affidavits were ordered confidential and sealed on consent.

On a Rule 2.1 referral from the registrar’s office, the court considered whether an action arising from unsuccessful attempts to challenge a will was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff had sued additional parties including former lawyers and an official examiner.

The court held the action appeared suitable for the abbreviated Rule 2.1 process and directed that the plaintiff be given notice and an opportunity to file written submissions.

The action was stayed pending the outcome of the written hearing or further order.

In a wrongful dismissal action previously dismissed for delay, the plaintiff filed non-compliant motion materials that did not clearly identify the relief sought or legal basis.

The court held that the proposed motion appeared on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and that it bore the hallmarks of a proceeding suitable for the abbreviated Rule 2.1 process.

The registrar was directed to issue Form 2.1A notice, the scheduled motion date was released, and both the motion and action were stayed pending the written hearing process.

Following settlement of a motion to enforce minutes of settlement in a family-related civil dispute, the court determined costs and priority issues concerning trust funds held by a lawyer.

The court held the motion should not have been necessary, criticizing both the plaintiff's obstruction and former counsel's failure to release an order discharging certificates of pending litigation.

Applying the fair and reasonable costs approach under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, the court fixed the defendants' costs at $55,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The court also subordinated the former lawyers' charging orders to the defendants' costs claim and directed payment out of the plaintiff's share of trust funds.

In a medical malpractice action, the defendant physician sought summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiffs' expert was unqualified to give opinion evidence in Ontario.

A dispute arose at case conference over the sequencing of expert evidence and the production of experts for cross-examination.

The court held the matter was not ripe for determination because the precise issues and evidentiary record for the proposed summary judgment motion remained unclear, including whether expert evidence would ultimately be relied upon.

The court emphasized that once an issue is put forward for summary judgment, each side must have a fair opportunity to adduce and test relevant evidence, subject to the court's proportionality and case-management powers.

The defendants requested the dismissal of the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found the claim appeared patently inappropriate, as it was based on failures to respond to settlement offers and sought relief the court could not award.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice to the plaintiff to provide written submissions as to why the action should not be dismissed, and stayed the action pending the outcome.

The defendant brought a written request under Rule 2.1 to dismiss the plaintiff's professional negligence claim as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, arguing it was statute-barred and barred by res judicata.

The court dismissed the request, finding that the statement of claim stated clear and cogent claims for professional negligence.

The court noted that the application of the Limitations Act and doctrines of res judicata or issue estoppel are matters of evidence and not apparent on the face of the pleading.

The plaintiff creditor brought a motion for summary judgment declaring that the defendant Clarke was the beneficial owner of two properties, with legal title held by the defendant Bailey in trust.

Clarke claimed his common law spouse, Reid, was the beneficial owner.

The court found numerous badges of fraud and sham transactions, concluding that beneficial title always remained with Clarke.

As Clarke had assigned himself into bankruptcy while holding beneficial title, the court declared the properties remained vested in his discharged trustee in bankruptcy and ordered the trustee's reappointment to complete the administration of the estate.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 considering the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff failed to make submissions within the required time.

The court found that the plaintiff lacked standing to sue on behalf of the co-plaintiff, named non-suable entities as defendants, and failed to state a cause of action.

The action was dismissed with costs awarded to the Attorney General.

The applicant sought a partition and sale of a property he purchased with his brother-in-law in 1993 under a trust agreement.

The applicant moved out in 1996 and stopped contributing to the mortgage and expenses, leaving the respondents to carry the property for nearly 20 years.

The court dismissed the application for 50% of the proceeds, applying the equitable doctrines of laches, acquiescence, and waiver, finding it would be fundamentally unfair for the applicant to share in the capital appreciation after standing idly by.

The applicant was awarded only the return of his initial $13,000 down payment upon the future sale or refinancing of the property.

The plaintiff brought a motion for written discovery in an action that had already been dismissed by summary judgment in 2011.

The court initiated a written hearing under Rule 2.1.01 to consider dismissing the motion as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Finding that the plaintiff was attempting to re-litigate a matter that had already been finally decided, the court dismissed the motion as an abuse of process.

The applicant commenced an application seeking to compel the Law Society of Upper Canada to bar a convicted criminal from lecturing and seeking damages for the Law Society's alleged failure to assist him in a Workers' Compensation case.

Following a request from the Attorney General, the court reviewed the application under Rule 2.1.01.

Finding the proceeding appeared frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, the court directed the registrar to issue a notice of potential dismissal and stayed the application pending a written hearing.

The parties sought clarification of a previous judgment awarding the plaintiff 17 months' salary in lieu of notice, subject to a 10% contingency deduction for mitigation.

The court clarified that the 10% deduction applies only to the 7-month future loss period following the date of judgment, as the plaintiff had already suffered the damages up to the date of the hearing with 100% certainty.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission initiated a Rule 2.1 process to determine if the plaintiff's action was frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The plaintiff subsequently discontinued her action against the Commission.

The court reviewed the remaining claim against William Osler Health System and found that, read generously, it was not frivolous or vexatious despite irregularities in the pleading.

The action was permitted to continue, and the plaintiff was advised to seek legal assistance to amend her statement of claim.

The applicant developer sought a provisional building permit for a townhouse development, which the City refused, demanding an off-site parkland dedication instead of cash in lieu of land.

The applicant appealed the refusal and applied for a declaration interpreting the municipal bylaw.

The court dismissed the appeal as premature because the applicant lacked final planning approval.

However, the court granted the application for a declaration, finding that under the plain language of the bylaw, the City cannot require an off-site parkland dedication without the developer's agreement.

The defendant requested that the plaintiff's action be dismissed as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01.

The plaintiff's statement of claim sought enforcement of City of Toronto Shelter Standards and a Staff Code of Conduct, but failed to set out facts supporting a legally recognized cause of action.

The court directed the registrar to issue a notice to the plaintiff that it is considering dismissing the action, and stayed the proceeding pending the outcome of the written hearing.

The defendants submitted a detailed six-page written request under Rule 2.1.01(6) asking the registrar to refer the plaintiff's claims to the court to be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The self-represented plaintiff responded with her own submissions.

The court dismissed the defendants' request, holding that requests under Rule 2.1.01(6) must be brief one- or two-line requests focused on the face of the pleadings.

If detailed factual and legal arguments are required, the defendants must bring a motion to strike under other rules.

The court initiated a review under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to determine whether the plaintiff's action should be dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The action largely duplicated a previous action commenced by the plaintiff that had already been stayed.

The plaintiff submitted a revised pleading, but it failed to clarify the claims or explain why the action should not be dismissed.

The court concluded that the action was an improper attempt to continue litigating previously dismissed claims and dismissed the action with costs.