Carmine Scalzi

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to collect on a $500,000 promissory note.

The defendants failed to file responding materials on time, citing a conflict of interest and an internal corporate deadlock, and sought an adjournment on the eve of the motion.

The court refused the adjournment, finding the defendants' internal disputes did not constitute a defence to the debt, and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff for the full amount claimed.

The plaintiff mortgagee sought possession of mortgaged premises and requested interim terms at a case conference pending the return of the main motion.

The defendants contested the court's jurisdiction to make interim orders at a scheduling case conference.

The court held that Rule 50.13(6) and Rule 1.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a judge to make interlocutory orders on terms at a case conference, provided notice is given.

The matter was adjourned to a brief hearing to determine the interim terms.

The applicant municipal council sought an order under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act to allow conflicted councillors to participate in litigation decisions.

A ratepayer had sued eight of the nine councillors personally for $210 million, leaving the council without a quorum to manage the litigation.

The court granted the order to ensure the municipality could function, but imposed a condition requiring the conflicted councillors to obtain judicial approval before agreeing to any settlement of the litigation, analogous to the process for parties under disability.

A case conference was held regarding an application by a purchaser for the return of a $430,000 deposit from a failed real estate auction, and a related action by the auctioneer for its commission.

The court ordered a consent interpleader allowing the auctioneer's counsel to pay the deposit into court.

The court also set a timetable for a cross-application by the auctioneer and stayed the related action pending the outcome of the applications.

A commercial landlord brought an application seeking interpretation of a lease and additional rent for a basement area occupied by the tenant’s assignee following insolvency proceedings.

The court examined the lease language, surrounding negotiations, and principles of contractual interpretation under Sattva.

It held that the basement was not part of the leased premises, but the lease rent was calculated on a per‑square‑foot basis.

The tenant’s assignee was therefore liable to pay rent for the basement based on the lease rate for its square footage from the date of assignment.

The landlord’s separate claim for rectification of the lease to reflect greater square footage of the upper floors was dismissed because the landlord had expressly waived the contractual right to remeasure the premises.

The defendant brought an urgent motion to set aside a default judgment and the noting in default in a mortgage enforcement action, and sought a stay of a writ of possession after the sheriff had already executed the writ and removed the family from the property.

The moving party asserted that funds would shortly become available from a third party to pay out the mortgage and requested a brief stay.

The court found there was insufficient evidence that the promised funds would be advanced and noted the moving party had known about the order for weeks without taking appropriate procedural steps.

The court emphasized the diligence of the mortgagee and the protections afforded to mortgagees in enforcement proceedings.

The requested stay was refused and the writ of possession remained operative, subject to a limited opportunity to repurchase the property upon immediate payment.

A self‑represented party brought a motion opposing confirmation of interim and final reports prepared by a court‑appointed receiver in a partnership dissolution proceeding and sought leave to commence legal proceedings against the receiver and its president.

The court found the moving party had possessed copies of the receiver’s reports for at least five years before bringing the motion.

Any potential claim against the receiver was therefore barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court also held that the equitable doctrine of laches applied given the extensive delay and prejudice to the respondents.

The motion was dismissed and costs were awarded to the respondents.