D.R. O’Connor

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the motions judge erred in her s. 24(2) Charter analysis after finding an unlawful arrest.

The appellant contended that the motions judge's finding of good faith was inconsistent with her finding that the officers lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motions judge accepted the officers' evidence that they believed they had authority to arrest, and it was open to her to consider the high crime area in assessing police conduct under s. 24(2).

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the judge improperly considered the actions of others and failed to impose a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge sentenced the appellant solely for his own conduct and properly considered the request for a conditional sentence.

The appeal was dismissed as the sentence was entirely fit.

The Crown appealed the sentencing judge's refusal to order the respondent to register under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) following a guilty plea for sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by relying on impermissible speculation about the impact of registration on the respondent.

The respondent failed to meet the high statutory threshold of demonstrating that the impact of registration would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest.

A 20-year SOIRA registration order was imposed.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that set aside a destruction order for a pit bull under the Dog Owners' Liability Act.

The appeal judge had interpreted section 4(8) of the Act as requiring the court to find that destruction was necessary for the protection of the public.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the ordinary and natural meaning of section 4(8) is clear and unambiguous: once a pit bull is found to have bitten or attacked, the court is mandated to order its destruction.

The original destruction order was reinstated.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondent for possession of a loaded restricted firearm and breach of a lifetime firearms prohibition order.

The sentencing judge had imposed a global sentence of six years, less pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found the sentences demonstrably unfit given the respondent's incorrigibility, his prior firearms convictions, and his illegal presence in Canada following a deportation order.

The Court allowed the appeal and increased the sentences to 7.5 years for the firearm offence and 1 year consecutive for the breach, less pre-sentence custody.

The respondent was largely successful on the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario awarded costs to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

The appellant challenged both a conviction for sexual assault arising from an incident between inmates in a correctional facility and a subsequent dangerous offender designation resulting in an indeterminate sentence.

The court rejected the argument that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and held there was no basis to disturb the credibility findings.

The ineffective assistance claim failed because, even assuming incompetence, no prejudice or miscarriage of justice was established.

On sentence, the court held that a long-term offender determination does not displace ordinary sentencing principles for the predicate offence and upheld the finding that the appellant met the statutory criteria for dangerous offender designation and could not be managed in the community by less intrusive means.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, noting that the relevant legislation had been amended, meaning the case would not provide guidance for future cases.

Furthermore, the court found no need to elaborate on the principles applied by the summary conviction appeal judge under the previous legislation.

The appellant appealed a 2008 disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which ordered his continued detention in a medium security ward.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the Board's conclusion that the appellant remained a significant threat to public safety.

The Court declined to remit the matter for the imposition of conditions, finding the issue moot because the Board was already conducting a multifaceted hearing that would address the appellant's current circumstances and conditions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a sex trade worker, was convicted of second-degree murder after a client was found stabbed to death in his car.

On appeal, she argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding bad character evidence, improperly allowing cross-examination on her prior assault convictions under a Corbett application, and delivering an unbalanced jury charge that failed to adequately summarize the defence's evidence.

The Court of Appeal agreed with all three grounds, finding that the cumulative effect of the errors prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for negligent misrepresentation.

The trial judge found that the respondent, a potential investor, reasonably relied on assertions from the CEO of the appellant private company regarding its present value.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings on misrepresentation and reliance, and upholding the damages calculation as reasonable.

The appellants appealed an order striking out portions of their statement of claim.

The struck portions alleged that the respondent bank owed a duty of care to the appellants, who were not its customers, to inquire into its customer's activities to ensure the accounts were not used for fraudulent purposes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the facts pleaded did not give rise to a recognized duty of care, nor did they warrant recognizing a new duty of care under the Anns/Kamloops principles.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on the principle in Browne v. Dunn to discount his evidence and in finding him evasive during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in concluding there was a breach of the Browne v. Dunn principle, as the complainant was not cross-examined on significant contradictory details later testified to by the appellant.

The court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's credibility assessments and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a sexual offence, arguing that the trial judge erred in charging the jury on consent and post-offence conduct, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The complainant testified she was passed out during the sexual contact, while the appellant claimed she initiated it.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the jury instructions and held there was ample evidence to support the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for resisting arrest, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a lawful arrest without addressing whether the police used excessive force.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant's actions of pulling his hands and hiding them under his stomach constituted forceful opposition.

The court also held that because the issue of excessive force was not argued at trial as it was on appeal, the trial judge did not err in failing to specifically address it.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding he breached a non-competition provision in a Shareholders Agreement.

The appellant argued this finding was inconsistent with the trial judge's conclusion that he did not breach a fiduciary duty when he left his employment and took a specific client's business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding there was no inconsistency because the Shareholders Agreement required the appellant to relinquish his shares to avoid the non-competition provision, which he failed to do.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80' and appealed, arguing the trial judge erred by using his breathalyzer readings to assess the credibility of his 'evidence to the contrary' (the Carter defence).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying that the Supreme Court's prohibition in Boucher against using breathalyzer results to assess credibility applies only when the Crown relies on the presumption of accuracy.

Because the Crown called the breath technician and relied only on the presumption of identity, the trial judge was entitled to consider the breathalyzer readings in assessing the evidence as a whole.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof, failed to give reasons for rejecting his evidence, failed to self-instruct on a Vetrovec warning for his ex-wife's testimony, and erred in conducting an unassisted handwriting comparison.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence or his cautious approach to the handwriting comparison.

The Crown's cross-appeal on sentence was allowed on consent, adding probation conditions and a SOIRA order.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and home invasion.

The Crown's case relied on statements made by the appellant during a 'Mr. Big' operation, cell phone records, and a tacit admission to a friend.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by permitting prohibited propensity reasoning, ruling that the defence violated the rule in Browne v. Dunn, and instructing the jury on the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no impermissible propensity reasoning, upholding the Browne v. Dunn ruling as fair, and concluding the hearsay instruction caused no prejudice.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal regarding a claim to Casino Rama profits, the successful respondents sought costs on a full or substantial indemnity scale, citing the appellant's conduct and shifting theories.

The Court of Appeal declined to award elevated costs, finding the appellant's conduct was not reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $250,000 for the Chiefs of Ontario and OFNLP, and $75,000 for Ontario.