John J. Pirie

A receiver was appointed over a fraudulent investment scheme where the deposits of 24 investors were commingled.

The receiver sought directions on how to distribute the remaining funds, which had a significant shortfall.

One group of investors argued for a pro rata distribution based on original contributions, while another argued for the Lowest Intermediate Balance Rule (LIBR).

The court held that LIBR is the general rule for resolving competing claims to commingled funds unless it is unworkable.

Finding that the receiver could practically calculate the LIBR distributions, the court ordered the funds to be distributed according to LIBR.

The moving parties in a proposed securities misrepresentation class proceeding sought court approval of a third‑party litigation funding agreement prior to certification.

The proposed agreement provided that the funder would pay certain disbursements and indemnify the plaintiffs against adverse costs in exchange for a capped commission from any settlement or judgment.

The court considered the developing law on litigation funding, including concerns about champerty and maintenance, and confirmed that such agreements are not categorically unlawful but require judicial approval.

Finding that the agreement preserved counsel’s independence, protected defendants through security for costs, and promoted access to justice, the court approved the funding arrangement.

In a proposed securities class action alleging misrepresentations in the primary and secondary markets, the plaintiffs sought an order compelling defendants to deliver statements of defence and requested that the certification motion be heard together with a leave motion under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act.

The defendants opposed delivering defences before certification and sought a sequence of motions beginning with the leave motion, followed by Rule 21 motions and then certification.

The court held that pleadings should generally be completed before certification and that ordering the delivery of a statement of defence was not contrary to law or due process.

However, the court limited the requirement to defendants who filed affidavits under s. 138.8(2) of the Securities Act, while permitting other defendants to plead voluntarily without losing the ability to bring Rule 21 motions.

The court further ordered that the leave motion and certification motion be heard together to avoid delay, inefficiency, and serial appeals.

The defendants, eight major financial institutions, successfully defended an appeal of a decision denying certification of a class action regarding mortgage contracts.

The defendants sought their costs of the appeal.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be awarded, asserting the proceeding was a test case and involved a matter of public interest under section 31(1) of the Class Proceedings Act.

The Divisional Court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, finding the case was not a test case, did not raise a novel point of law, and was not a matter of public interest, but rather involved individual commercial mortgage contracts.

The court awarded the defendants modified partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,000 per defendant.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motions to certify eight separate class proceedings against various financial institutions.

The claims alleged that the respondents incorrectly interpreted mortgage provisions regarding partial prepayment rights and early discharge penalties.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the pleadings failed to disclose a cause of action as they relied on implied terms not supported by the express language of the mortgages.

The court also agreed that the proposed classes were overly broad, individual issues overwhelmed any common issues, and a class proceeding would be unmanageable and not the preferable procedure.

The appellants appealed from orders of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the claim in the underlying collection action was not a liquidated claim.

Consequently, the appellant was not a creditor within the meaning of the Bulk Sales Act.

The appellant, the sole shareholder of a bankrupt hotel, appealed a vesting order and an order approving the sale of the hotel's assets by a court-appointed receiver.

The appellant argued that the receiver failed to disclose the identity of the principals behind the purchaser, which tainted the sale process.

The purchaser brought a motion to quash the appeal, arguing it was moot because the vesting order had already been registered on title under the Land Titles Act.

The Court of Appeal held that once a vesting order is registered on title without a stay, its attributes as a court order are spent and it becomes a conveyance, rendering any appeal from the order moot.

The Court also dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding that the identity of the purchaser's principals was not material to the receiver's sale process.