John Douglas Ewart

The appellants owned vacant land in the Township of Havelock-Belmont-Methuen and placed a recreational motor home on their property.

The Township sought a declaration that this was a non-permitted use under its Comprehensive Zoning By-Law and an injunction prohibiting the placement of any vehicle for human habitation.

The application judge granted the Township's application.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in interpreting the by-law to include recreational motor homes, which were not expressly prohibited.

The court also found that providing electrical power to the motor home was insufficient evidence of intended habitation without actual habitation, and that the injunction was overly broad as it prohibited all vehicles, including cars.

The appellant appealed the Director's refusal to issue an environmental compliance approval for a hauled sewage disposal site.

The parties reached a settlement agreement that included a draft amended approval with stringent conditions, a two-year expiry date, and an action plan for environmental monitoring.

The Tribunal found the settlement consistent with the purpose of the Environmental Protection Act and in the public interest, directing the issuance of the amended approval and dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed the Director's refusal to issue an Environmental Compliance Approval for a hauled sewage disposal site.

Following mediation, the parties reached a tentative settlement.

The Tribunal issued a procedural order scheduling a one-day hearing to review the settlement agreement and hear from participants, and set deadlines for filing materials.

At a pre-hearing conference regarding an appeal of the Director's refusal to issue an Environmental Compliance Approval for a hauled sewage disposal site, the Tribunal considered requests for party and participant status.

The Township of Algonquin Highlands was granted party status.

Several individuals and a property owners' association were granted participant status, while one individual's request was deferred as she intended to be a witness.

The Tribunal also set a schedule for mediation and the hearing.

The plaintiffs, who are farmers, entered into a three-year lease agreement to farm the defendant's land.

The defendant repudiated the lease after the first year, claiming she signed it under duress and that the plaintiffs breached the agreement by failing to provide specific fertilizer application records.

The court rejected the duress defence, finding the defendant signed voluntarily and allowed the plaintiffs to farm the land for eight months.

The court also found that the alleged breach regarding fertilizer records did not amount to substantial non-performance justifying termination.

The plaintiffs were awarded damages for lost profits for the remaining two years of the lease.

The respondents purchased a property to convert into a commercial business and experienced a five-year delay in obtaining necessary permits from the appellant municipality.

The trial judge found the municipality liable in negligence for the unreasonable conduct of its Chief Building Officer and awarded damages for business losses.

On appeal, the municipality challenged the negligence finding and the damages award, arguing the respondents failed to mitigate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the municipality acted unreasonably and that the respondents were not required to mitigate by spending money they did not have due to the municipality's conduct.

The respondents commenced construction of an addition to their home without a building permit.

After a stop work order was issued, they applied for a permit but were refused due to deficient drawings.

The Township applied for an injunction and demolition order.

Despite multiple opportunities over four years, including a review by the Building Code Commission which confirmed the drawings were deficient, the respondents failed to submit compliant drawings.

The court granted the Township's application for an injunction and demolition order, but stayed the order for 90 days to give the respondents one final opportunity to comply.

The Plaintiffs sought costs after successfully obtaining partial summary judgment, which found a municipal by-law's fee schedule for fill material to be ultra vires.

The Defendant argued for no costs due to divided success or a reduction in quantum.

The court found that success was not divided, as the Plaintiffs succeeded in striking down the fee structure, and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, after reviewing and deducting certain legal fees and disbursements.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment to determine if a municipal by-law prescribing permit fees for the importation of fill material was, in substance, an ultra vires tax.

The court found that the defendant municipality failed to establish a nexus between the fees charged and the actual or estimated cost of administering the regulatory scheme, despite being given an additional opportunity to provide evidence.

Consequently, the fee schedule was declared ultra vires as an unauthorized tax and was severed from the by-law, with the remainder of the by-law remaining in full force and effect.

The plaintiffs sought costs following a successful six-day trial where they recovered over $292,000 in damages and interest from the defendant municipality.

The plaintiffs had made three formal offers to settle, all of which were exceeded at trial.

They requested partial indemnity costs until their first offer, and substantial indemnity thereafter, totaling $235,418.99.

The defendant opposed the requested hourly rates and argued for lower costs based on proportionality and the public significance of the issues.

The court found the plaintiffs' counsel's hourly rates reasonable, noting the defendant's "high-handed and dismissive" conduct prolonged the litigation.

The court held that the principle of indemnity substantially outweighed proportionality and the public interest argument, awarding the plaintiffs the full amount of costs requested.

The plaintiffs sued a municipality after their efforts to convert a former residence and group home into a tourist outfitting business were repeatedly delayed and burdened by changing building and zoning requirements.

The court held that the municipality owed a duty of care in the operational administration of building permits and rezoning, and breached that duty through unreasonable, inconsistent, and procedurally unfair conduct by its chief building official, compounded by the municipality's failure to supervise and its refusal to allow a later official to assist with permit closure.

Applying the municipal duty of care framework and negligent misrepresentation principles, the court found the plaintiffs suffered foreseeable economic loss.

The court awarded lost profits for 2012 to 2015, certain professional expenses, and general damages for mental distress and inconvenience, while declining to award most claimed renovation costs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a determination that a municipal by-law imposing permit fees for the importation of fill material constituted an indirect tax and was therefore ultra vires under s. 142 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The court held that the evidentiary record filed by the municipality was insufficient to determine whether a nexus existed between the fee charged and the cost of the regulatory scheme.

Without evidence demonstrating the methodology, cost analysis, or calculations supporting the fee structure, the court could not determine whether the charge was a valid regulatory fee or an impermissible tax.

Invoking the fact‑finding powers under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the guidance in Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court ordered the municipality to file further supplemental materials addressing the nexus between the fees and administrative costs.

The motion was not finally determined and further evidence was required before adjudicating the legality of the by‑law.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking declarations that a municipal fill by-law did not apply to their property containing an abandoned gravel pit and aerodrome.

The court held that the summary judgment process was appropriate and that it could grant judgment adverse to the moving party where the evidentiary record permitted determination of the legal issues.

Interpreting the Municipal Act, 2001 and the Aggregate Resources Act, the court found that the abandoned pit did not fall within statutory exemptions applicable to licensed or operating pits and that the municipal by-law regulating the dumping of fill therefore applied.

The court also rejected arguments that the by-law was constitutionally inapplicable to the aerodrome under interjurisdictional immunity, relying on appellate authority confirming that municipal fill by-laws aimed at environmental protection do not trench on the core of federal aeronautics power.

Partial summary judgment was effectively granted in favour of the municipality on the legal issues raised by the motion.

The appellant contractor's construction lien expired after it failed to set the action down for trial within two years.

The respondent owner brought a motion without notice under section 46 of the Construction Lien Act, resulting in the dismissal of the entire action, including the appellant's breach of contract claims.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that while the lien claims were properly dismissed, the contract claims should not have been summarily dismissed without notice.

The court varied the order to allow the breach of contract claims to proceed, noting that the Act does not mandate the dismissal of non-lien claims upon the expiry of a lien.

The plaintiff brought a partial summary judgment motion seeking declarations regarding the construction of a floating dock and boathouse by his neighbors on a lake.

The neighbors had built the structure without municipal building permits or provincial work/occupancy permits, relying on the municipality's position that it lacked jurisdiction over Crown lands and the province's position that floating structures were exempt.

The court held that the municipality's zoning by-laws and the Building Code Act apply to private individuals constructing on Crown lands covered by water.

Furthermore, the court found that the provincial regulations under the Public Lands Act require work and occupancy permits for such structures, rejecting the government's interpretation as absurd.

The appellant abandoned her appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario endorsed the appeal book, noting the abandonment and fixing the respondents' costs at $4,000 all inclusive.

Following a wrongful dismissal trial in which the plaintiff recovered damages against the municipal employer but failed against several individual defendants, the court determined the appropriate costs consequences.

Applying Rule 49.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of his settlement offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter because the judgment exceeded the offer.

The court assessed reasonable hourly rates for counsel and reduced excessive paralegal time and rates while disallowing law clerk administrative costs.

The successful individual defendants were awarded partial indemnity costs for their defence.

A Sanderson order was granted requiring the municipal defendant to pay the costs of the successful individual defendants given the unusual and confusing factual circumstances that justified joining all defendants in the action.

The appellant, a former municipal building official, was wrongfully dismissed and subsequently charged criminally after the municipality reported alleged missing permit fees to the police.

After being acquitted, he sued for wrongful dismissal and malicious prosecution.

The trial judge awarded damages for wrongful dismissal but dismissed the malicious prosecution claim, finding no initiation or malice by the municipality.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by applying the high threshold for malice applicable to Crown prosecutors to a private defendant, and by making inconsistent findings regarding the municipality's conduct.

A new trial was ordered for the malicious prosecution claim and the quantum of punitive damages.

The appellant appealed a decision declining to quash a municipal by-law.

The municipality had failed to provide proper notification to the appellant that the by-law had been passed.

The application judge found no bad faith on the part of the municipality and no prejudice to the appellant, and thus declined to exercise his discretion under s. 273(1) of the Municipal Act to quash the by-law.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed a decision rejecting their request for a declaration that an access road was a public highway and that the Township was responsible for its maintenance and repair.

The appellants argued that the road's dedication by Ontario and assumption by the Township were apparent from surrounding circumstances, including negotiations and expenditures.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that there was no actual dedication by Ontario and no clear and unequivocal assumption by the Township, as the Township had sought work permits and was compensated by Ontario for maintenance.

The appeal was dismissed.