Jay Naster

A corporation engaged in construction work pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death following a swing stage collapse that killed four workers and seriously injured another.

The incident occurred when six workers and a site supervisor were on a swing stage with only two lifelines available, and three of the four deceased had marijuana in their systems.

The court imposed a fine of $200,000 plus a 15% victim fine surcharge of $30,000, considering the corporation's financial circumstances, prior good character, and the statutory factors for corporate sentencing under the Criminal Code.

Following a merits hearing where the Respondents were found to have perpetrated a fraud on investors and breached their duties as investment fund managers, the Ontario Securities Commission held a hearing to determine sanctions and costs.

The Commission found that the Respondents' conduct was egregious and caused significant financial losses to investors.

The Commission ordered the termination of the Respondents' registrations, permanent and temporary market prohibitions, and director/officer bans.

Additionally, the Commission ordered administrative penalties totaling $1.3 million, disgorgement of $6.74 million in profits obtained from the non-compliance, and costs of $435,000 against the individual respondents.

The moving parties brought a motion challenging the jurisdiction of a single Commissioner to complete a sanctions hearing after the term of the other panel member expired.

The moving parties argued that proceeding before a single member violated the audi alteram partem principle and the quorum requirements of the Securities Act.

The Commission dismissed the motion, finding that section 4.4(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act permits the remaining member to complete the hearing and give a decision, and that section 32 of the SPPA resolves any conflict with the Securities Act's quorum requirements in favour of the SPPA.

Addendum reasons addressing the applicable evidentiary protections for the examination of a witness pursuant to a letter of request issued in connection with foreign antitrust litigation in the United States.

The applicant argued that the Canada Evidence Act should govern the examination because the foreign order contemplated evidence taken in accordance with Canadian law.

The respondent submitted that protections under the Ontario Evidence Act should also apply.

The court held that both the Canada Evidence Act and the Ontario Evidence Act, together with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, apply, ensuring the witness benefits from all available statutory protections against self-incrimination.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission brought a motion seeking to disclose testimony compelled from the respondent, Irwin Boock, during an SEC investigation to his co-respondents in an OSC administrative proceeding.

Boock opposed disclosure, relying on an undertaking by Staff that the evidence would not be used in the OSC proceeding and an ethical wall would be maintained.

The Commission held that the undertaking restricted Staff's use of the evidence but did not prevent its disclosure to co-respondents, who are entitled to full disclosure of relevant information to make full answer and defence.

The Commission also found that compelling the testimony and disclosing it did not violate Boock's Charter rights against self-incrimination, as the proceeding was regulatory, not criminal.

Disclosure to the co-respondents was ordered, while Staff was directed to maintain the ethical wall.

The Ontario Securities Commission approved a settlement agreement concerning the respondents' involvement in an 'overtrade' of Bioscrypt Inc. shares.

Paradigm Capital Inc., acting as an agent for a private placement, facilitated secondary market trades for a mutual fund manager who had been solicited for the private placement.

This resulted in shares being sold by persons with knowledge of an undisclosed material fact to persons without such knowledge.

The Commission found this conduct contrary to the public interest, reprimanded the respondents, imposed trading restrictions, and ordered settlement payments and costs.

Following his criminal conviction for insider trading, the Ontario Securities Commission held a hearing to determine whether to impose public interest sanctions against the respondent under s. 127 of the Securities Act.

The respondent, while an officer and director of a reporting issuer, had sold shares with knowledge of undisclosed material negative assay results, avoiding significant losses.

The Commission found his conduct egregious and a breach of fiduciary duty.

To protect the capital markets, the Commission ordered a 15-year cease trade order and a 15-year ban on acting as a director or officer of any reporting issuer, with limited carve-outs for personal trading.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's reduction of a fine imposed on the respondent for insider trading.

The respondent had traded shares of a junior mining company while possessing undisclosed material facts, avoiding significant losses.

The Court of Appeal held that the phrase 'by reason of the contravention' in s. 122(4) of the Securities Act does not require the Crown to prove the direct effect of the non-disclosure on the market price, but simply means the loss was avoided by virtue of the insider engaging in the impugned trading.

The Court also held that shares not beneficially owned by the respondent should not be included in the loss avoided calculation.

Despite correcting the legal interpretation, the Court upheld the $2,000,000 fine imposed by the appeal judge.

The Crown appealed from an order directing a new trial after a second degree murder conviction arising from a co-accused homicide and robbery scenario.

The Court held that a secondary party may be convicted of manslaughter under both s. 21(1) and s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code even where the principal is guilty of murder, provided the accused lacked the mens rea for murder but met the objective fault standard for manslaughter.

The Court further held that the jury charge was inadequate because it failed to clearly explain that the respondent could be guilty of manslaughter although the principal was guilty of murder.

The curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) did not apply.

The appeal was dismissed and the order for a new trial was confirmed.