Jasmine T. Akbarali

The applicant husband sought temporary sole custody and a s. 30 assessment, while the respondent wife sought summary judgment for permanent relocation to England with the children, or alternatively, an interim order to that effect, along with child and spousal support.

The court dismissed the husband's motions for temporary sole custody and a s. 30 assessment.

The wife's motion for summary judgment on permanent relocation was also dismissed, but she was granted interim sole custody and permission to return to England with the children, subject to conditions including a $10,000 security deposit and obtaining a mirror order in England.

The court also ordered a Voices of the Child report, with costs shared equally, and continued supervised access for the husband.

An expedited trial for custody, access, and mobility issues was set for January 2019.

The defendant Coseco Insurance Company brought a motion seeking to separate the issue of consent (whether Kyriakos Constantinidis had his mother's consent to drive) from the damages determination in a motor vehicle accident claim.

Coseco proposed three options: bifurcate the jury trial, strike the jury notices and bifurcate a non-jury trial, or order a mini-trial under Rule 20.

The motion was opposed by Sofia Constantinidis.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction to bifurcate a jury trial without consent, declined to strike the jury notices as the consent issue was suitable for a jury, and determined it could not order a mini-trial under Rule 20 as that discretion rests with the motion judge.

All relief sought by Coseco was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a series of arbitration awards concerning parenting issues for the parties' four-year-old child, E. The awards included E's registration on the Korean Family Registry, the requirement to hire a transfer facilitator for child exchanges, and the arbitrator's costs decision.

The court also addressed preliminary motions for fresh evidence.

The appeal was dismissed in its entirety, with the court upholding the arbitrator's decisions, finding no palpable and overriding errors of fact or errors in principle.

The fresh evidence motions were largely dismissed, applying the Palmer test, due to issues of hearsay, reliability, and statutory prohibition.

This endorsement addresses outstanding issues from a family law trial, including the precise calculation of retroactive and prospective child and spousal support, the set-off of support arrears against an equalization payment, and whether post-judgment interest should accrue on the equalization payment.

The court adopted the applicant's methodology for support calculations, which assigned full responsibility for the children's section 7 expenses to the respondent.

Retroactive support arrears owed by the respondent were set off against the equalization payment owed by the applicant.

The court declined to award post-judgment interest on the equalization payment, finding it just given the equalization payment's origin in a non-interest-bearing debt owed by the respondent to a corporate entity.

The court addressed costs following a summary judgment motion where the plaintiff, Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation No. 2051, largely succeeded in having three debt instruments (a promissory note and two mortgages) declared oppressive and significantly reduced in value against the third party, Georgian Clairlea Corporation ("Georgian").

The plaintiff sought costs as the successful party, while Georgian claimed contractual costs under the mortgages.

The court found the plaintiff to be the successful party and rejected Georgian's claim for contractual costs, citing Georgian's oppressive conduct as a "special circumstance" justifying deprivation of such costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs up to its November 2017 offer to settle and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, totaling $150,453.20, after a minor reduction for excessive pre-trial costs and unused expert reports.

During a family law trial, it was discovered that the applicant had communicated with her counsel about her evidence and the issues in the case while under cross-examination.

The court found that this improper communication fatally wounded the trial process and prejudiced the respondent's ability to conduct a fair cross-examination.

As no other curative measures would suffice without prejudicing the applicant, the court declared a mistrial.

The court also ordered terms, including the immediate listing of the matrimonial home for sale and the withdrawal of Statements of Arrears filed with the Family Responsibility Office.

The moving party, assignee of the developer, sought summary judgment to enforce three debt instruments against the respondent condominium corporation.

The condominium corporation argued the instruments were oppressive due to inadequate disclosure to purchasers.

The court found the disclosure regarding the service unit mortgage and parking unit mortgage was confusing and insufficient, breaching the reasonable expectations of the purchasers.

The court reduced the principal amounts of both mortgages to reflect fair value and reasonable expectations.

The court also found a promissory note for land transfer tax was void for lack of a borrowing by-law and oppressive as it circumvented the developer's statutory obligation for first-year budget deficits.

The court awarded the condominium corporation amounts for common expense arrears, a first-year budget deficit, and reserve fund payments, and declined to appoint a receiver.

This was a costs endorsement following an insurance coverage trial in which the defendant insurer was successful in having the first action dismissed entirely.

The court held that costs were to be fixed under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and r. 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, guided by fairness, reasonableness, indemnity, reasonable expectations, and the complexity and importance of the issues.

Although the insurer’s bill included work relating to a second action and an earlier related action, the court found 65% of the total bill properly attributable to the first action.

No additional deductions were warranted for an unproceeded summary judgment motion, settlement with the receiver, or an expert report.

Costs of $179,372.03 inclusive of HST and disbursements were awarded on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiffs brought two actions against their insurer for business interruption and property losses following an Indian meal moth infestation and the subsequent receivership of related companies.

In the first action, the court found the claimed losses were not 'direct losses' under the policy and that the receivership was not a covered peril.

In the second action, the court held that the property loss claim was barred by the one-year contractual limitation period, but the rolling business interruption claim beginning one year before the action was commenced could proceed.

The court granted the plaintiffs relief from forfeiture for inadequate proofs of loss and dismissed the insurer's abuse of process and vitiation defences.

The respondent husband brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the applicant wife's claims to set aside their 2009 and 2012 separation agreements, arguing there was no genuine issue for trial, the claims were an abuse of process, and the equalization claim was statute-barred.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding genuine issues for trial regarding unconscionability, duress, and inadequate financial disclosure.

The court also denied the husband's requests to bifurcate the trial and for security for costs, and ordered him to answer various undertakings and refusals from questioning.

The applicant sought a determination of his rights under a settlement agreement, specifically requesting an order that the respondents execute an unamended standard LawPro release.

The respondents argued the release required amendments to carve out their continuing action against a non-settling defendant and to exclude the applicant's obligations as a bare trustee.

The court found it had jurisdiction under Rule 14.05(3)(d) to interpret the agreement.

Applying principles of commercial contract interpretation, the court held that the parties' agreement contemplated a modified release tailored to the specific litigation, and ordered the execution of the respondents' amended version.

The applicant appealed an arbitrator's decision in a loss transfer dispute finding its insured 100% at fault for a motor vehicle accident under Rule 14(2) of the Fault Determination Rules.

The arbitrator had relied on the Highway Traffic Act to interpret the phrase 'fails to obey a stop sign'.

The Superior Court determined the standard of review was reasonableness and found the arbitrator's interpretation and application of the rules, which excluded tort considerations like the other driver's speed, were reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a trial of an oppression application and breach of contract action regarding a real estate development project, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The court found that neither party achieved substantial success, as the applicant failed to prove damages for failure to fund the project, while the respondents were found to have acted oppressively.

Given the divided success and the fact that both parties' versions of events were largely rejected, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The applicant previously succeeded in an application for conversion and unjust enrichment against the respondents, including a principal towing company and its agent.

The court subsequently increased the damages award against the principal by 13% to account for taxes payable on the deemed forced sale of the converted vehicles.

The sole remaining issue was whether the agent was also liable for this 13% increase.

The court held that there was no principled basis to separate the agent's liability from that of the principal, finding the agent equally responsible for the full amount owing to the applicant.

The Attorney General of Ontario applied for civil forfeiture of a property used as a Hells Angels clubhouse and various Hells Angels paraphernalia under the Civil Remedies Act.

The court found the property was both an instrument of unlawful activity, as it was used as a safe haven to plan crimes, and proceeds of unlawful activity, as its mortgage was paid using dues funded by criminal acts.

The court also found that official Hells Angels paraphernalia were instruments of unlawful activity used for intimidation.

The owners failed to establish the responsible or legitimate owner exceptions.

The court rejected arguments that a prior federal plea bargain rendered the provincial forfeiture clearly not in the interests of justice, and ordered forfeiture of the property and official paraphernalia, along with costs against the owners.

The appellant appealed a decision finding his conduct in connection with a family business was oppressive and removing him as a director, officer, and trustee.

The appellant had emptied the company's bank account, attempted to exclude his daughters from the account, and used corporate funds for personal purposes.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that the appellant breached his fiduciary duties.

The court held that the remedy of removing him from his roles was appropriate and consistent with the parties' reasonable expectations, given his conduct and the divisive family relationship.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment of $2.75 million obtained against him.

The court applied the five-factor test from Mountainview Farms Ltd. v. McQueen.

The court found that the defendant had deliberately evaded service and ignored the proceedings until enforcement was imminent in Hong Kong.

The court declined to consider the merits of the defence due to the defendant's conscious decision not to participate.

The motion was dismissed, and costs of $40,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

Two condominium corporations brought applications to amend their declarations to remove provisions that expressly permitted short-term transient rentals.

The corporations argued the provisions were inconsistent with the Condominium Act, 1998, the applicable zoning by-law, and a restrictive covenant on title.

The court dismissed the applications, finding no inconsistency.

The declarations did not impermissibly grant rights but rather defined the scope of use restrictions, and the inability of the boards to make rules restricting short-term leasing was mandated by the Act's requirement that rules be consistent with the declaration.

The court held that any desired changes to the declarations should be pursued through the owner approval process under section 107 of the Act, rather than by alleging an inconsistency under section 109.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment seeking the release of $500,000 held in escrow following a share purchase agreement.

The defendants brought cross-motions seeking an interpleader order and a portion of the funds for uncollectible accounts receivable.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to bring their motion after setting the action down for trial, finding it was an efficient step.

The court held that partial summary judgment was appropriate as the issue could be resolved on uncontested facts.

The court found that the defendants failed to provide the required notice under the escrow agreement, entitling the plaintiffs to the return of the full escrow amount plus interest.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision allowing the respondents' action for copyright infringement to proceed following a status hearing under Rule 48.14.

The appellants argued the Master erred in law by only considering prejudice that accrued during the period of delay for which the respondents were at fault, and in finding no non-compensable prejudice.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Master applied the correct test, properly accepted ongoing settlement discussions as a reasonable explanation for much of the delay, and correctly limited the prejudice analysis to the period of blameworthy delay.