Janet E. Mills

The plaintiff, Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC), brought a debt collection action against Winston Ang in Halton Region.

The court found no logical connection to Halton Region and, following the precedent in The Toronto-Dominion Bank v. The Other End Inc. et al., 2025 ONSC 85, ordered the matter transferred to Toronto Region.

The motion for summary judgment was adjourned sine die, and a related 2023 action against Mr. Ang was dismissed without costs and without prejudice.

The decision addresses a motion by MGW Home Designs Inc. to restore a construction lien action to the trial list after it was administratively struck, and a cross-motion by Domenic Pasqualino to discharge the lien and dismiss an adjudicator’s order.

The court applies the Reid Factors to determine whether to restore the action, finds no abuse of process by MGW, and upholds the enforceability of the adjudicator’s order pending final determination.

The court also addresses the interplay between adjudication and lien proceedings, limitation period issues, and awards substantial indemnity costs to MGW.

The applicant, a tenant, sought declarations that the Town of Milton's Short-Term Rental (STR) by-law was ultra vires and inapplicable to his property, and that its enforcement infringed his Charter rights (Sections 7 and 15).

He also sought substantial monetary damages for emotional distress and lost income from operating an STR.

The court dismissed the application in its entirety, finding no legal or factual basis for claims against the landlords, no conflict between the STR by-law and the Residential Tenancies Act, and no Charter breaches.

The court confirmed the Town's authority to regulate STRs and that the applicant's Airbnb operation constituted an STR business subject to the by-law and fire safety regulations.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The defendant, BDA Inc., brought a motion to reduce the bond filed as security in a construction lien matter, arguing that funds paid to its lawyers in trust, pursuant to an ODACC adjudication determination, should be credited against the lien amount.

The plaintiff, High Tech Power Inc., opposed the full reduction, contending that funds held in trust by the defendant's counsel were not "paid" to the lien claimant and thus could not stand as security.

The court ruled that funds held in a lawyer's trust account on behalf of the client do not constitute payment to the lien claimant and cannot be considered security for the lien, as they do not ensure the flow of money as intended by the Construction Act.

The motion for a full reduction was dismissed, and the bond was reduced only by the amount High Tech Power Inc. had consented to.

The plaintiff, severely injured in a correctional facility assault, sought leave to amend his statement of claim to identify anonymous correctional officers and lift a statutory stay to pursue claims against them, alleging bad faith.

The court denied leave to add the officers, finding no reasonable prospect of success on the bad faith claim.

While the plaintiff demonstrated good faith in bringing the action, the officers' actions, though negligent, did not meet the high threshold for bad faith, which requires intent or conscious wrongdoing.

The court also denied leave to include a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the individual officers, as the Crown generally owes no fiduciary duty to inmates, and no personal duty was pleaded.

Leave was granted for a minor amendment to plead specific conduct from an investigation report.

The applicant sought a declaration that a foreign ex parte divorce obtained by the respondent in Pakistan was invalid and should not be recognized in Ontario.

The court found that the parties lacked a real and substantial connection to Pakistan for divorce purposes, and the respondent had obtained the divorce through material misrepresentations and without proper service, constituting fraud and a breach of natural justice.

The applicant's motion was granted, declaring the Pakistani divorce invalid.

The respondent's cross-motion to amend her pleading to seek spousal support was granted on consent.

The plaintiff, Mira Kovacevic, sought payment of $576,133.77 for caregiver and attendant care services allegedly provided to the defendants, Slobodan Griva and Milena Griva, following a motor vehicle accident, plus $50,000 in punitive damages.

The defendants did not attend the trial, which proceeded on an uncontested basis with the plaintiff's affidavit evidence.

The court found the plaintiff's timesheets and invoices to be exaggerated or fabricated and not credible.

While acknowledging an agreement for $2,000 per month for services, the court determined the plaintiff had already been overcompensated.

The claim for general damages was dismissed.

The punitive damages claim was also dismissed, as no actionable wrong was proven, and allegations made in pleadings are subject to absolute privilege.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed in its entirety, with no order as to costs.

The applicant sought a writ of habeas corpus challenging the Correctional Service of Canada's decision to suspend his day parole, alleging procedural unfairness.

The Parole Board of Canada upheld the suspension.

The court dismissed the application, declining jurisdiction based on the "Peiroo exception," which defers to comprehensive statutory review schemes.

The applicant's medical condition was not deemed an exceptional circumstance to bypass this principle.

The respondent was found in contempt for deliberately breaching an interim preservation and non-dissipation order by obtaining mortgages on a property, transferring proceeds to her mother, and transferring another property to her sister.

Despite being given four months to undertake meaningful efforts to purge the contempt, she failed to do so.

The court considered aggravating factors, such as the deliberate and flagrant nature of the breaches and financial benefit, and mitigating factors, including her admission and apology.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $180,000 into court by a specific date, failing which a 15-day custodial sentence would be imposed.

The court also ordered disclosure related to an undisclosed property.

This motion addressed the conflict between the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (MFIPPA) and the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the disclosure of personal information in litigation.

The plaintiff sought to compel the Town of Oakville to disclose the last known addresses of former municipal employees relevant to the case, which the Town refused, citing MFIPPA.

The court ruled that a litigant may obtain a court order for relevant disclosure without first fully exhausting the MFIPPA statutory appeal process, as the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the deemed undertaking rule, provide sufficient privacy safeguards.

The Plaintiff brought an urgent motion for the judge's recusal based on a reasonable apprehension of bias, alleging predisposition against the Plaintiff and/or her counsel.

This motion followed a mistrial declared due to counsel's conduct (displaying an image of Charles Manson to the jury while a witness testified).

The Plaintiff also sought to have the matter remitted for a new trial before a new judge, which the court noted was superfluous as it was already precluded from hearing the new trial.

The court addressed the recusal motion specifically concerning the outstanding costs issue from the aborted proceeding.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no substantial and serious grounds to support an allegation of a reasonable apprehension of bias, and awarded costs to the Defendant on a substantial indemnity basis, noting the motion was brought with the sole purpose of avoiding a costs decision.

The respondents sought damages arising from an interim injunction obtained by the applicant, alleging it was an excessive overreach and caused them financial harm by preventing a property sale.

The court found that proper notice was provided for the initial injunction hearing, and it did not proceed on an *ex parte* basis.

While some facts were not disclosed by the applicant, the court determined these omissions were not material to the necessity of the injunction, which was granted to maintain the status quo and protect the public interest in remediating provincially significant wetlands.

The respondents had also consented to the injunction's continuance after the initial period.

As the respondents eventually remediated the property, the merits of the underlying application for a permanent injunction were never judicially determined.

The court dismissed the respondents' motion for damages, exercising its discretion due to the respondents' inequitable conduct and the applicant's role as a public body acting in the public interest.

This endorsement addresses the admissibility of extensive hearsay evidence, particularly statements attributed to children, presented via affidavit in a family law trial.

The court reiterated that while evidentiary rules may be flexible for children's best interests, the hearsay rule is not relaxed for trial affidavits.

It emphasized the "necessity and reliability" test for admitting children's hearsay, finding that the impugned statements lacked sufficient procedural and substantive reliability, especially given the children's vulnerabilities and the absence of independent corroboration.

The court largely disallowed the admission of the contested hearsay evidence.

The plaintiffs, CRH Canada Group Inc. and intervenor Nelson Aggregates, sought an interlocutory injunction against the Ontario Aggregate Trucking Association, Ontario Dumptruck Association, and several individuals.

The defendants were blocking access to the plaintiffs' business facilities to compel an increase in haulage rates and impose a fuel surcharge.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, finding a serious issue to be tried in nuisance and unlawful interference with private property rights, irreparable harm due to economic impact and difficulty in collecting damages, and that the balance of convenience strongly favored the plaintiffs.

The defendants did not appear or file materials.

The injunction was granted, prohibiting blockades and interference with access, while affirming the defendants' right to lawful, peaceful protest.

The plaintiff, Savanta Inc., and co-defendant GEI Consultants, Inc. (GEI), brought a motion to stay portions of the defendants' counterclaim and for Savanta to discontinue parts of its statement of claim.

The motion was based on a forum selection clause in a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) that Savanta argued required disputes to be adjudicated in Massachusetts.

The defendants, Thomas and Teresa Hilditch, contended that Savanta had attorned to the jurisdiction of the Ontario Superior Court.

The court found the SPA's jurisdiction clause to be "non-exclusive," meaning it did not preclude Ontario from adjudicating the disputes.

Applying the Muscutt factors for forum non conveniens, the court determined that Ontario was the most convenient forum for all issues, emphasizing the risk of multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions if the matters were split between Ontario and Massachusetts.

The motion to stay or discontinue was denied, and the plaintiff and GEI were ordered to pay costs to the defendants.

This case concerns an appeal by a creditor, Forty-One Peter Street Inc., from the Trustee's disallowance of its claim in the bankruptcy of John Trevor Eyton.

The claim was based on a debt incurred in 2001, with the last payment in 2016, making it statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court affirmed the Trustee's disallowance, holding that while a statute-barred debt may form the basis for a bankruptcy application, it cannot constitute a provable claim in bankruptcy, as such claims must be recoverable by legal process.

The Master followed appellate court precedents over conflicting Superior Court obiter dicta, emphasizing that allowing such claims would grant an unfair advantage to creditors on otherwise unenforceable debts.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's dismissal for delay in a Simplified Procedure action concerning an alleged breach of a commercial lease.

The action was dismissed after five years due to a combination of prior counsel's inaction, misguided procedural steps including an improperly obtained default judgment, and current counsel's inadvertence in tracking the five-year anniversary.

Applying the Reid Factors, the court found the motion was brought promptly, the delay was largely explained by counsel changes and errors, and the defendants failed to establish non-compensable prejudice.

Emphasizing the policy of resolving disputes on their merits, especially when dismissal results from counsel's error, the court granted the motion, setting aside the dismissal.

No costs were awarded, as the defendants' costs were deemed unreasonable and avoidable.

The plaintiff sought an order to compel the sale of assets (a property, rural land, and vehicles) under Rule 45.01 and 45.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, alleging asset deterioration and seeking payment into court.

The defendants raised a jurisdictional objection, arguing a Master could not vary a judge's preservation order or grant mandatory injunctive relief.

The Master declined jurisdiction, finding that compelling a sale would effectively set aside or vary existing preservation orders made by a judge, and that mandatory orders are exclusively for judges.

Alternatively, the Master found that even if jurisdiction existed, the relief would not be granted as the assets were adequately protected by existing orders and undertakings, and compelling a sale would prejudice the defendants and a non-party (Jonathan Rewa) without a proven claim.

The motion was dismissed.

The debtor brought a motion seeking to prohibit the Royal Bank of Canada (RBC) from cross-examining him on an affidavit filed in a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) motion.

The CPL motion was part of a civil action related to an alleged fraudulent conveyance, which also formed the basis of RBC's bankruptcy application against the debtor.

The court granted the debtor's motion, affirming the `Re Debtor` principle that a petitioning creditor cannot compel evidence from a debtor to prove a disputed bankruptcy application.

The court held that civil procedure rules allowing cross-examination cannot be used to indirectly circumvent substantive bankruptcy law, especially when the debtor disputes the debt and alleged acts of bankruptcy.

The defendant, RBC Life Insurance Company, brought a motion to compel the plaintiff, Michael Scuglia, to attend an examination for discovery and cross-examination on an affidavit.

The plaintiff resisted, arguing that any form of examination would be harmful to his physical and mental health due to existing medical conditions, including a vascular malformation and conversion disorder.

The court reviewed medical evidence from both parties, finding the plaintiff's medical evidence unpersuasive regarding the risk of serious harm.

The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to meet the high onus to be relieved from discovery obligations and granted the defendant's motion, ordering the plaintiff to attend discovery and cross-examination with appropriate accommodations.