B. Brooksbank

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) regarding a residential property transferred by the defendant to his spouse.

The plaintiffs sought to recover on unsecured demand loans and alleged the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance.

The court applied the Grefford test and found a high probability of success on the debt claim, sufficient badges of fraud to raise a triable issue regarding intent to defeat creditors, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the CPL.

The motion was granted and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The moving party brought a motion to compel the responding party to produce pre-July 2015 plant data and answer written discovery questions pursuant to a prior consent order.

The responding party brought a cross-motion to compel the moving party to answer written questions.

The court ordered the responding party to produce the plant data, with the moving party to pay 50% of the production costs up to $25,000.

The court also interpreted the prior consent order broadly, directing both parties to answer all refused written discovery questions relating to the amended pleadings.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' oppression action after a hybrid trial, the successful defendants sought partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiffs argued that each party should bear its own costs because the defendants' unlawful conduct provoked the litigation.

The court rejected this argument, finding the defendants were entitled to costs.

The court also addressed the novel issue of whether costs for preparing affidavits and cross-examinations for pre-trial motions are recoverable when that evidence is subsequently used in a hybrid trial.

The court held that such costs are recoverable to the extent the work product was material to the trial issues, to encourage the use of hybrid trials.

The court fixed EnGlobe's costs at $200,232.47 and Busseri's costs at $116,321.99.

The plaintiffs, minority shareholders of EnGlobe Corp., brought an action alleging that EnGlobe and its CEO engaged in oppressive conduct and conspired with a third party to freeze their shares during a proxy fight.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the freezing of the shares resulted from a consent order in separate litigation, not from any oppressive conduct or conspiracy by EnGlobe.

The court also held that the claims were barred by cause of action estoppel due to a prior consent dismissal order, and that the oppression claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.