Janet E. Mills

The Plaintiff brought an urgent motion for the judge's recusal based on a reasonable apprehension of bias, alleging predisposition against the Plaintiff and/or her counsel.

This motion followed a mistrial declared due to counsel's conduct (displaying an image of Charles Manson to the jury while a witness testified).

The Plaintiff also sought to have the matter remitted for a new trial before a new judge, which the court noted was superfluous as it was already precluded from hearing the new trial.

The court addressed the recusal motion specifically concerning the outstanding costs issue from the aborted proceeding.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no substantial and serious grounds to support an allegation of a reasonable apprehension of bias, and awarded costs to the Defendant on a substantial indemnity basis, noting the motion was brought with the sole purpose of avoiding a costs decision.

The respondents sought damages arising from an interim injunction obtained by the applicant, alleging it was an excessive overreach and caused them financial harm by preventing a property sale.

The court found that proper notice was provided for the initial injunction hearing, and it did not proceed on an *ex parte* basis.

While some facts were not disclosed by the applicant, the court determined these omissions were not material to the necessity of the injunction, which was granted to maintain the status quo and protect the public interest in remediating provincially significant wetlands.

The respondents had also consented to the injunction's continuance after the initial period.

As the respondents eventually remediated the property, the merits of the underlying application for a permanent injunction were never judicially determined.

The court dismissed the respondents' motion for damages, exercising its discretion due to the respondents' inequitable conduct and the applicant's role as a public body acting in the public interest.

This endorsement addresses the admissibility of extensive hearsay evidence, particularly statements attributed to children, presented via affidavit in a family law trial.

The court reiterated that while evidentiary rules may be flexible for children's best interests, the hearsay rule is not relaxed for trial affidavits.

It emphasized the "necessity and reliability" test for admitting children's hearsay, finding that the impugned statements lacked sufficient procedural and substantive reliability, especially given the children's vulnerabilities and the absence of independent corroboration.

The court largely disallowed the admission of the contested hearsay evidence.

The Crown sought a preservation order under the Civil Remedies Act for currency previously seized by police.

The respondent argued the motion was an impermissible collateral attack on a prior Disposition Order under s. 490 of the Criminal Code that had ordered the funds returned to him.

The court rejected this argument, finding that an order under s. 490 only establishes the right to regain property after a criminal investigation and does not preclude civil forfeiture proceedings.

The preservation order was granted.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion to transfer a Small Claims Court application commenced by the defendant, Go To Loans Inc., to the Superior Court.

The defendant's application sought to discharge the plaintiff's PPSA lien against a vehicle over which the defendant asserted a repair and storage lien.

The court held that while the Small Claims Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate RSLA liens, it lacks jurisdiction to discharge a PPSA lien, which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Superior Court.

However, rather than transferring the Small Claims Court matter without consent, the court exercised its inherent jurisdiction to transfer the plaintiff's Superior Court action to the Small Claims Court, allowing the defendant the opportunity to amend its application.

The accused, charged with sexual assault against his former spouse, sought directions on whether affidavits filed by the complainant in their family law proceedings constituted 'records' under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown argued the affidavits contained personal information and required scrutiny under the s. 278 regime.

The court held that the affidavits were not records, as they were voluntarily filed in public adversarial proceedings, meaning the complainant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in them.

Consequently, a s. 278.93 application was not required for their use.

The applicant landlord sought a declaration that the respondent tenant breached a commercial lease and that the lease was validly terminated, seeking vacant possession.

The tenant sought a declaration that the lease was not validly terminated or, alternatively, relief from forfeiture.

The court found that the tenant committed numerous and ongoing breaches, including making significant structural alterations without prior approval or building permits, and installing heavy equipment without consent.

The court held that the landlord properly terminated the lease and that the tenant's deliberate and flagrant conduct disentitled it to the equitable remedy of relief from forfeiture.

The landlord's application was granted and the tenant's application was dismissed.

The applicant mother brought the parties' child from Quebec to Ontario without notice, alleging coercive control and extreme COVID-19 isolation by the respondent father.

She sought to have the Ontario Superior Court assume jurisdiction over parenting matters under s. 23 of the Children's Law Reform Act, arguing the child would suffer serious harm if returned.

The court declined to assume jurisdiction, finding that s. 23 is intended for international cases involving non-signatories to the Hague Convention, not domestic inter-provincial disputes where the Quebec Superior Court is equally bound to consider the child's best interests.

The application was stayed pending a decision from the Quebec court on whether it would decline jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs brought a motion requiring the defendants, as Estate Trustees, to pass the accounts.

After six adjournments, the plaintiffs requested a further deferral to address unanswered questions.

The court declined to prolong the matter, noting the depletion of estate assets, and dismissed the motion on a without prejudice basis.

The plaintiffs also consented to dismiss the claim against one defendant.

The court awarded costs of $5,100 for the dismissed claim and $16,156.27 for the motion to the defendants, payable forthwith by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiff acted as an agent in Korea for the defendant.

After their relationship deteriorated, the parties signed a Payment Agreement acknowledging outstanding commissions owed to the plaintiff.

The defendant partially paid but then ceased payments.

The plaintiff sued for the remaining balance.

The court found the Payment Agreement to be a binding contract and awarded the plaintiff USD $232,330.44.

The defendant's counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty was dismissed due to a lack of evidence of damages.

The court limited pre-judgment interest to three years due to the plaintiff's unreasonable delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The plaintiffs, CRH Canada Group Inc. and intervenor Nelson Aggregates, sought an interlocutory injunction against the Ontario Aggregate Trucking Association, Ontario Dumptruck Association, and several individuals.

The defendants were blocking access to the plaintiffs' business facilities to compel an increase in haulage rates and impose a fuel surcharge.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test, finding a serious issue to be tried in nuisance and unlawful interference with private property rights, irreparable harm due to economic impact and difficulty in collecting damages, and that the balance of convenience strongly favored the plaintiffs.

The defendants did not appear or file materials.

The injunction was granted, prohibiting blockades and interference with access, while affirming the defendants' right to lawful, peaceful protest.

The plaintiff, Savanta Inc., and co-defendant GEI Consultants, Inc. (GEI), brought a motion to stay portions of the defendants' counterclaim and for Savanta to discontinue parts of its statement of claim.

The motion was based on a forum selection clause in a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) that Savanta argued required disputes to be adjudicated in Massachusetts.

The defendants, Thomas and Teresa Hilditch, contended that Savanta had attorned to the jurisdiction of the Ontario Superior Court.

The court found the SPA's jurisdiction clause to be "non-exclusive" meaning it did not preclude Ontario from adjudicating the disputes.

Applying the Muscutt factors for forum non conveniens, the court determined that Ontario was the most convenient forum for all issues, emphasizing the risk of multiplicity of proceedings and conflicting decisions if the matters were split between Ontario and Massachusetts.

The motion to stay or discontinue was denied, and the plaintiff and GEI were ordered to pay costs to the defendants.

The applicant was largely successful on a motion regarding child support and financial disclosure.

The respondent conceded the applicant's entitlement to costs, leaving only the quantum to be determined.

The court found that the respondent engaged in bad faith by persistently refusing to provide full and frank financial disclosure, thereby unnecessarily driving up litigation costs.

The applicant also beat her offer to settle.

Consequently, the court awarded the applicant costs on a full recovery basis in the amount of $70,000, characterized as child support for enforcement purposes.

The parties resolved all issues except parenting time and child support for their six-year-old child.

The respondent sought equal parenting time on a 2/2/3 schedule, while the applicant opposed, citing concerns about after-school care and the respondent's support network.

The court found that both parents were capable and loving, and that transitioning to equal parenting time was in the child's best interests.

The court ordered a 2/2/3 shared parenting schedule.

The court also rejected the applicant's argument that the respondent was intentionally underemployed, finding his reduced hours accommodated his parenting time.

The applicant was ordered to pay $532 per month in child support based on the shared parenting arrangement.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's applications to remove the respondent as an estate trustee and compel the closing of a real estate transaction, the court determined costs.

The court found that the applicant's unilateral actions necessitated the litigation and that he should be personally liable for costs, rather than the estate.

The respondent was awarded costs fixed at $15,000 plus disbursements and HST on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff, a disbarred lawyer, brought an action against the Law Society of Ontario and several of its employees, alleging various torts and Charter breaches related to his disciplinary proceedings.

The LSO defendants brought a motion to strike the Statement of Claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the LSO defendants were protected by statutory immunity under the Law Society Act and that the plaintiff failed to plead material facts to support his claims of bad faith, misfeasance in public office, Charter breaches, intrusion upon seclusion, and defamation.

The court also found the action to be an abuse of process as a collateral attack on the disciplinary tribunal's decisions.

The Statement of Claim was struck without leave to amend.

Following a nine-day trial where the plaintiff's claim was dismissed, the successful defendants sought costs.

The defendants had made a valid Rule 49 offer to settle for $50,000, entitling them to partial indemnity costs up to the offer date and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

However, due to significant deficiencies in the defendants' Bill of Costs, including a lack of itemized dockets and disbursement invoices, the court exercised its discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to fix costs at $120,000 all-inclusive.

The applicant mother sought permission to relocate with her seven-year-old child to Lebanon.

The mother had sole custody and was the primary caregiver, but struggled financially in Canada and wished to return to her family support system in Lebanon.

The respondent father opposed the move, fearing he would lose contact with the child.

The court applied the newly amended relocation provisions of the Divorce Act.

While acknowledging the mother's financial vulnerability and the father's history of coercive control, the court ultimately dismissed the application.

The court found that the mother's proposed parenting plan was too vague, failed to adequately facilitate the father's parenting time, and that relocating to Lebanon posed safety and security risks that were not in the child's best interests.

The parties engaged in a high-conflict family law trial to determine a final parenting plan, child support, and spousal support.

The mother sought to maintain the status quo of limited parenting time for the father, while the father sought equal parenting time.

The court found a history of family violence primarily by the father, but noted he had taken steps to improve his parenting.

Applying the best interests of the child test under the Divorce Act, the court ordered the children to reside primarily with the mother while granting the father increased, but not equal, parenting time.

The father was ordered to pay child support, and while the mother was found entitled to spousal support, the quantum was set to zero due to the primacy of child support.

The plaintiff brought an action for damages arising from a motor vehicle incident where he abruptly stopped to avoid downed guy wires caused by the defendants' snow plow.

The plaintiff claimed to have suffered electrocution and permanent, debilitating headaches.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence unreliable and uncorroborated, concluding he suffered only soft tissue injuries that resolved within two years.

The defendants' motion to dismiss the non-pecuniary claims for failing to meet the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act was granted.

The claims for past and future income loss were also dismissed as the plaintiff had been fully compensated by prior benefits.