Alexandrea Grant

The respondent mother brought a motion to vary a temporary parenting order to require the applicant father's parenting time to be supervised.

The father brought a cross-motion for make-up parenting time and police enforcement of the existing order, alleging the mother repeatedly denied his parenting time.

The court dismissed the mother's motion, finding no cogent evidence that the child was at risk of harm in the father's care.

The court granted the father's cross-motion, awarding make-up parenting time and ordering police enforcement under section 36 of the Children's Law Reform Act due to the mother's repeated breaches of the parenting order.

The parties settled a motion to change regarding child support by way of a consent order, but left the issue of costs for the court to determine.

Both parties sought costs, arguing the other had acted unreasonably and claiming they were the successful party.

The court declined to award costs to either party, applying the general principle that costs are rarely awarded following a negotiated settlement because the court lacks the objective benchmarks necessary to assess relative success or reasonableness.

The parties resolved all issues except parenting time and child support for their six-year-old child.

The respondent sought equal parenting time on a 2/2/3 schedule, while the applicant opposed, citing concerns about after-school care and the respondent's support network.

The court found that both parents were capable and loving, and that transitioning to equal parenting time was in the child's best interests.

The court ordered a 2/2/3 shared parenting schedule.

The court also rejected the applicant's argument that the respondent was intentionally underemployed, finding his reduced hours accommodated his parenting time.

The applicant was ordered to pay $532 per month in child support based on the shared parenting arrangement.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking an order that the parties' seven-year-old child attend school in person and participate in an after-school program.

The respondent father argued the child should attend school online due to the COVID-19 pandemic, claiming the child had a weakened immune system.

The mother also sought to vacate a prior consent order prohibiting her new partner from being present during her access time.

The court ordered that the child attend school in person, finding no medical evidence to support the father's claims and adopting recent jurisprudence that governments, not courts, are best positioned to assess pandemic risks in schools.

The court also vacated the access prohibition regarding the mother's partner, noting that child protection authorities had not verified any concerns, but required a phase-in schedule to introduce the partner to the child.

The applicant sought an uncontested divorce based on affidavit evidence.

The court dismissed the application without prejudice because the applicant failed to file a clearance certificate as required by Rule 36(4) of the Family Law Rules, failed to provide clear evidence regarding the respondent's prior marital status under Rule 36(5), and omitted the commissioning date on the amended affidavit.

The court also noted the requirements under section 12 of the Divorce Act for granting an earlier effective date for a divorce.

The applicant succeeded on all relief sought in cross-motions, including interim custody, an order dispensing with the respondent's consent for the children's schooling, and the dismissal of the respondent's motion to compel the children's delivery to Arizona.

The court found the applicant to be a clear winner and entitled to costs, noting that the applicant had made a timely and comprehensive offer to settle that was more favourable than the outcome.

The respondent was ordered to pay the applicant's costs on a full indemnity basis.

The applicant sought interim custody of the parties' two children under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The respondent challenged the Ontario court's jurisdiction, arguing the children should be sent to Arizona.

The court found it lacked jurisdiction under s. 22(1)(a) and (b) as the children were not habitually resident in Ontario and lacked a real and substantial connection.

However, under s. 40(b), the court made an interim custody order in the applicant's favour, finding it in the children's best interests to remain with the primary caregiver.

The court stayed the application, ordering the respondent to commence proceedings in Qatar (the children's habitual residence) by October 1, 2016, failing which he would be deemed to acquiesce to Ontario's jurisdiction.

The respondent's motion to send the children to Arizona was dismissed.