43 total
The court excluded a highly prejudicial in-dock identification and modified a witness exclusion order.
During a murder trial, the defense requested a voir dire regarding an in-dock identification made by a witness, Margaret Warner, to Cst.
Melo, and a potential breach of a witness exclusion order.
The court declined to continue the inquiry into the in-dock identification, finding it lacked probative value and was highly prejudicial, thus excluding it from trial.
The court also found no breach of the witness exclusion order by Cst.
Melo but modified the order to remove Cst.
Melo's exemption due to concerns about witness contact regarding identification.
Composite sketches were excluded for prejudicial effect, but video use during examination-in-chief was permitted.
This endorsement addresses two evidentiary issues during a first-degree murder trial: the admissibility of composite sketches and the proper conduct of examination-in-chief of a critical Crown witness.
The court ruled the composite sketches inadmissible due to low probative value, misleading potential, and prejudicial effect, and prohibited their use by both the Crown and co-accused.
Regarding the examination-in-chief, the court found the Crown's questions were not leading or a disguised impeachment, but cautioned against overly broad questions that merely ask if video evidence matches recollection.
The court dismissed an application to exclude a lay witness's identification evidence comparing individuals in a surveillance video to those she observed at a murder scene.
This endorsement addresses the admissibility of identification evidence from a lay witness, Margaret Warner, during a first-degree murder trial.
The accused sought to prohibit the Crown from leading evidence where Ms. Warner identified individuals in surveillance video as the same individuals she observed at the scene of the shooting.
The court dismissed the application, finding that Ms. Warner's observations, even if considered opinion, were admissible as lay opinion evidence due to her unique position to assist the trier of fact through personal observation.
The court also rejected the argument that the evidence constituted an inadmissible 'in-dock identification', noting that Ms. Warner was not identifying the accused but rather comparing individuals in the video to those she observed at the scene.
Deficiencies in the evidence were deemed suitable for cross-examination and potential limiting instructions to the jury.