James A. Ramsay

During a criminal trial, the Crown sought to elicit from its witness in chief that she had given a previous inconsistent statement because she was afraid of the accused.

The defence objected, arguing this constituted impermissible oath-helping.

The court ruled that eliciting the fact of a previous inconsistent statement in chief does not constitute oath-helping, as it detracts from rather than bolsters the witness's truthfulness.

However, the court held that the explanation for the previous statement should generally wait for cross-examination and re-examination.

The Crown was permitted to elicit the fact of the previous statements and the timing of the witness's change of heart.

The accused was sentenced for robbery, assault with a weapon, and uttering threats.

The court considered the appropriate credit for pre‑sentence custody under s. 719 of the Criminal Code following the Truth in Sentencing Act amendments.

The judge held that the loss of statutory remission for pre‑trial detention does not automatically justify enhanced credit beyond the standard 1:1 ratio.

Enhanced credit may be granted only where the specific circumstances of the detention justify it.

Increased credit was granted in this case due to unusually harsh remand conditions involving prolonged cell confinement during a correctional officers’ work refusal.

A costs endorsement following a family law trial concerning child support issues.

The successful party sought recovery of trial costs.

The court held that the successful party was entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis and fixed the amount payable.

The costs were deemed to have been incurred for the purpose of obtaining child support, allowing enforcement through a support deduction order.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to multiple counts of trafficking in methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The offender supplied large kilogram quantities of methamphetamine to an undercover police officer and was found with additional kilograms during the execution of search warrants.

The court rejected the defence claim that the offending was driven by a serious opioid addiction, finding instead that the offender was an experienced and sophisticated wholesaler motivated by profit.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for large-scale drug trafficking at a high level of the supply chain, the court imposed a global sentence of 12 years' imprisonment along with firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture.

A family law trial addressing parenting access and child support following the separation of unmarried parents.

The applicant father sought access to the parties’ two children, while the respondent mother opposed unsupervised contact due to a pattern of threats, intimidation, and abusive conduct by the father, including criminal convictions for uttering death threats and breach of recognizance.

The court found the father lacked insight into his conduct and that his behaviour had caused significant emotional harm and fear to the mother and children.

Concluding that even supervised access had failed due to the father’s non‑compliance, the court ordered that the father have no access and no decision‑making or informational rights regarding the children.

The court also fixed retroactive child support in a lump sum and ordered ongoing support based on an imputed income.

During a jury trial for second degree murder, the defence brought a Corbett application seeking to restrict cross‑examination of the accused on prior convictions should he testify.

The accused had an extensive criminal record containing numerous recent offences, including robbery, break and enter, and breaches of court orders.

The court balanced probative value against the risk of prejudice and propensity reasoning.

Convictions for assault and assault with a weapon were excluded due to their similarity to the charged offence and the risk that the jury might improperly infer a violent disposition.

Other convictions, including robbery, were permitted because of their relevance to credibility and because exclusion would create a misleading picture of the accused’s criminal history.

The applicants successfully obtained an order for the assessment of their former lawyers’ accounts and subsequently sought $47,000 in costs of the application.

The court held that the claimed partial indemnity costs were excessive and included unreasonable rates and items constituting solicitor overhead.

The court further found that the bulk of the expense resulted from numerous serious allegations of misconduct against the lawyers that were ultimately dismissed and which unnecessarily complicated the proceeding.

In the circumstances, the court declined to award any costs of the application.

The court also clarified that the ordered assessment concerned the original solicitor’s bills rather than a review of a prior assessment and directed that any costs ordered by the assessor against the lawyers be set off against amounts owed by the client.

The applicant father sought child support after the parties’ adult child began residing with him while pursuing post-secondary education.

The respondent mother sought credit for retroactive child support based on increases in the father’s historical income and reimbursement for orthodontic expenses previously paid.

The court determined that the father had underpaid support during the period the child resided with the mother and granted the mother a credit for retroactive support and section 7 expenses.

After assessing the parties’ respective incomes and the child’s contribution toward education costs, the court ordered the mother to contribute to the three years of post-secondary education, subject to deduction for the credit.

The respondent was ordered to pay $4,000 in child support in instalments and partial indemnity costs.

In a child protection proceeding, the society sought Crown wardship without access in relation to a young child who had been apprehended due to malnourishment and remained in foster care with significant special needs.

The parents had been given time under a prior temporary wardship order to become capable of caring for the child but had not demonstrated progress.

The mother failed to file an answer or plan of care, and the father’s proposed plan relied on returning the child to the care of both parents without addressing the mother’s deficits or the child’s significant needs.

Pending the status review, the court considered the child’s best interests and the need for stability and permanency.

The court ordered that parental access be suspended temporarily to minimize disruption to the child and encourage timely participation in the proceeding.

The Children's Aid Society moved for summary judgment on an application for Crown wardship with access for a 12-year-old child with high needs.

The child had been in care due to the mother's health issues and the child's challenging behaviours.

The court found that the mother lacked the resources to care for the child and that no placement short of permanent foster care was viable.

Summary judgment was granted for Crown wardship with access to maintain the child's relationship with her family.

The applicants sought an order under the Solicitors Act directing the assessment of legal accounts rendered by their former counsel.

The application was brought more than twelve months after the accounts became final and after the accounts had been paid by a court‑appointed receiver pursuant to earlier court orders.

The court held that a prior review by a court‑appointed fee assessor did not bar a statutory assessment under the Act.

Considering the substantial amount of the bills, the relatively short delay beyond the statutory period, and the fact that payment had been made by a receiver rather than the client personally, the court found special circumstances justifying an assessment.

An order was granted directing that the ten monthly bills be assessed in Toronto.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend the statement of claim to substitute the correct limousine company and driver as defendants after initially naming the wrong company and a John Doe driver.

The proposed defendants opposed the amendment on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The court considered whether the amendment constituted the correction of a misnomer under s. 21(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

Finding that the statement of claim clearly intended to sue the owner and driver of the limousine involved in the accident and that the insurer for both entities had knowledge of the claim, the court held the amendment corrected a misdescription rather than adding a new party.

The court also declined to exercise its discretion to refuse the amendment, finding no inordinate delay and no prejudice to the responding parties.

Following an unsuccessful summary judgment motion brought by third parties against defendants on a third party claim, the defendants sought costs.

The court held that the defendants were successful and entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis.

One responding party argued that another third party should bear any costs payable because it had refused to make admissions of fact that would have permitted it to exit the action.

The court found the refusal to provide admissions unreasonable but questioned its jurisdiction to order one party to pay another party’s motion costs.

Costs were fixed against both responding parties in specified amounts payable within 30 days.

Following a successful summary judgment motion, the moving parties sought full indemnity costs fixed at $33,000 based on alleged misconduct by the opposing party and a prior settlement offer.

The court held that the opposing party’s conduct did not warrant sanction and that the purported settlement offer did not qualify as a Rule 49 offer and was not a genuine attempt to resolve the litigation.

The court found the claimed costs disproportionate to the amount at stake and the work required.

Applying a reasonable proportionality assessment, the court fixed partial indemnity costs at $9,000.

Third parties brought motions for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a third party claim arising from alleged groundwater contamination caused by a leaking pesticide storage tank.

The moving parties argued they had no responsibility for maintenance of the tank or liability for any leak.

The responding defendants argued that liability among the supplier, distributor, and related agents depended on unresolved contractual relationships and factual findings.

The court held that discovery had not yet occurred and that the evidentiary record was incomplete.

Given the need to assess contractual arrangements and credibility, the court found the motion premature and concluded the issues required a full trial.

A law firm sued the parents of a former client seeking payment of approximately $84,000 in legal fees incurred in the client’s family law litigation.

The parents brought a motion for summary judgment arguing they were not contractually bound to pay the fees.

The plaintiff alleged the parents had provided an indemnity based on their conduct and statements during meetings that were tape recorded.

The court held that the evidence, including the retainer agreement, written acknowledgements, and transcripts of the meetings, did not establish that the parents had undertaken an indemnity or guarantee to the law firm.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the action.

Following a successful application for spousal support, the applicant sought costs of the proceeding.

The court found the matter to be straightforward and confirmed that the applicant was the successful party.

Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure was not engaged because none of the settlement offers triggered its application.

The respondent increased the applicant’s legal costs by alleging a conflict of interest against opposing counsel and later abandoning that claim.

The court fixed costs at $15,000 and ordered that the amount be treated as costs incurred to obtain support, enforceable through a support deduction order.

Following a motion to vary terms of a separation agreement relating to child support, the applicant sought costs.

The court found that both parties achieved a degree of success.

While the respondent should have made financial disclosure earlier, the applicant acted unreasonably by deliberately breaching the separation agreement requirement to deposit funds into the child’s RESP.

Considering the conduct of both parties, the court declined to award costs.

The applicant sought spousal support following a long-term marriage of approximately 30 years.

The court considered the parties’ financial circumstances, including the applicant’s employment history, assets received on separation, and pension income, as well as the respondent’s pension and consulting income.

The court found that the applicant was not significantly disadvantaged by the marriage or its breakdown and that many of her current financial difficulties resulted from personal career decisions.

Nevertheless, recognizing the parties’ joint family venture and income disparity during the marriage, the court determined that some spousal support was appropriate.

Support was fixed based primarily on the respondent’s pension income rather than his post-separation consulting income.

The applicant sought to vary terms of a separation agreement relating to child support, including retroactive support, contribution to alleged extraordinary expenses, and revised support arrangements while the child attended university.

The court found material changes in circumstances, including increased income and amendments to the Child Support Guidelines, warranting variation of the child support provisions.

Retroactive child support was awarded from the date of the application rather than the earlier date requested because the applicant had voluntarily accepted increased payments without commencing proceedings.

The court declined to order contribution to the child’s cell phone expenses, finding them neither extraordinary nor required under the agreement.

Ongoing support was structured as reduced monthly child support combined with proportional contributions to post-secondary education expenses.