James Murray Butson

The applicant mortgagee sought an order setting aside tenancy agreements entered into by the mortgagor with tenants at a residential property and sought leave to issue a writ of possession.

The court dismissed the application against two respondents (upstairs tenants) who had established a legitimate tenancy predating the mortgagor's default.

With respect to unnamed basement tenants, the court found insufficient evidence to satisfy the three-part test under section 52 of the Mortgages Act for setting aside a tenancy agreement.

The court declined to grant a writ of possession as section 48 of the Mortgages Act prohibits possession of rental units except in accordance with the Residential Tenancies Act.

Instead, the court issued an order requiring the mortgagor and basement tenants to provide full particulars of the tenancy agreement by October 31, 2025, allowing the applicant to renew its application if appropriate.

The court awarded costs to the upstairs tenants.

The plaintiff, Extend Financial Ltd., sought summary judgment against the defendant, Saeid Naeimi-Manesh, for default on a Home Equity Line of Credit and associated mortgage.

The defendant denied entering the mortgage, alleging fraud and collusion by his former employer and solicitor.

The court found no credible defense, confirming the mortgage was duly signed, funds advanced, and default occurred.

The defendant's claims were determined to be against third parties, not the plaintiff.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff, along with costs.

The Toronto-Dominion Bank (TD) brought an application for immediate possession of a condominium due to default on a charge.

The registered owner, Sandra Andrade, and an occupant, Sesanarine Singh, are involved in a separate fraud dispute over the property.

Singh claims beneficial ownership via a trust agreement and argues TD had actual notice of his interest, which would affect TD's priority.

The court found triable issues regarding Singh's beneficial interest and, crucially, whether TD had actual notice of it.

The application for immediate possession was not granted; instead, the court directed a trial of an issue solely on the question of TD's actual notice.

Interim orders were made for Singh to make ongoing mortgage and condo fee payments, and case conferences were directed for both the TD-Singh dispute and the Andrade-Singh dispute.

The Plaintiff sought summary judgment for an outstanding debt secured by a charge.

The Defendant did not attend the motion or file any materials in response.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the Defendant's prior admissions in her Statement of Defence regarding the charge, payment terms, standard charge terms, default, and maturity.

The Defendant's allegations of the charge being paid out by a third mortgagee were unsubstantiated by evidence.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the Plaintiff.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for an outstanding debt secured by a charge/mortgage.

The defendant did not attend the motion or file responding materials, despite having filed a Statement of Defence and having had previous counsel.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the defendant's admissions in her Statement of Defence and her failure to provide evidence to support her claim that the charge had been paid out by a third mortgagee.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment that ordered payment on a mortgage and granted a writ of possession.

They argued the motion judge erred in rejecting their defence of unconscionability and in granting summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the motion judge's analysis.

The court affirmed that the mortgage renewal was discretionary, no agreement to renew on original terms existed, and the doctrine of unconscionability was inapplicable as there was no new contract to set aside.

The court also found summary judgment appropriate as there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The defendant, Karen Patino-Ramirez, brought an urgent motion to set aside four default judgments and stay their enforcement, primarily focusing on one judgment concerning two Oakville properties.

The plaintiff, CMI High Yield Opportunity Fund, opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion to set aside the default judgment, finding no arguable defence on the merits regarding the mortgage default or the validity of a forbearance agreement.

However, the court acknowledged an arguable defence concerning certain administrative fees charged by the plaintiff and ordered a mechanism to resolve this issue, staying enforcement of the judgment and writ of possession on the matrimonial home until the fee dispute is resolved.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants, seeking payment on a Charge/Mortgage of Land and a writ of possession.

The defendants alleged a credit balance and argued that the plaintiff's actions regarding mortgage renewal were unconscionable.

The court found no merit in the defendants' arguments, concluding that the Charge had expired without renewal and was in default.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff, along with an order for a writ of possession.

The Bank of Nova Scotia (BNS) brought an application to reinstate a charge/mortgage on title to lands, which had been erroneously discharged during incomplete refinancing negotiations.

The respondents, the homeowner and a second mortgagee, did not challenge the error or the outstanding debt, though the homeowner raised concerns about increased interest rates.

The court, applying sections 159 and 160 of the Land Titles Act and its equitable jurisdiction, found it unjust for BNS to lose its priority due to an error that caused no prejudice to the respondents.

The application to reinstate the mortgage was granted.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful summary judgment motion brought by Robin Seligman in a mortgage enforcement action.

Seligman sought costs, as did Sonia Lafontaine and Arthur Froom.

The court awarded costs of $43,196.60, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, to Robin Seligman, to be paid solely by 1285310 Ontario Limited.

The claims for costs by Sonia Lafontaine and Arthur Froom were dismissed, as neither was successful in the underlying motion.

This supplementary endorsement addresses an applicant's request to vary a previous order for the discharge of a charge, which was deemed deficient in form by the Land Registry Office.

Due to an initial filing error, a supporting affidavit was not considered in the prior endorsement.

Upon review of the complete record, the court found no prejudice to any party and granted the variance, ordering the immediate deletion of the specified charge from the property title.

The applicant sought a court order to discharge a mortgage that had been paid but not formally discharged due to an inadvertent error and the applicant's subsequent corporate changes.

The application was brought without notice to the respondent.

The court declined to sign the submitted order because it purported to vary a prior judgment by another judge which was not referenced or explained in the application record.

The applicant was granted leave to submit a supplementary record.

The applicant mortgagee sought an order under s. 52 of the Mortgages Act to set aside a tenancy agreement, arguing it was entered into by the mortgagors after default with the object of discouraging the mortgagee from taking possession or adversely affecting its security.

The court applied a three-pronged test, finding that while the tenancy was entered into after a default (non-payment of municipal taxes), the mortgagors' primary object was to mitigate their financial difficulties from owning two properties, not to harm the mortgagee.

The application was dismissed.

The moving party, Peter Grivogiannis, sought a permanent stay of a third-party claim brought by Pamela Downward, or in the alternative, an order for discovery from Rajan Kaushal.

The motion was based on the alleged non-disclosure of a settlement between Pamela Downward and Rajan Kaushal in the third-party claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the settlement did not significantly alter the litigation landscape and that the non-disclosure was due to inadvertence rather than a deliberate attempt to mislead.

The appellant, a self-represented mortgagor in default, brought three motions in connection with his appeal of a summary judgment order granting the respondent bank possession of mortgaged residential property in Grimsby, Ontario.

The appellant sought appointment of a McKenzie friend, adjournment of the appeal, and directions regarding disbursement of sale proceeds.

The court dismissed all motions, finding no credible evidence of need for a McKenzie friend, rejecting the appellant's attempt to circumvent the bank's statutory obligations under the Mortgages Act regarding distribution of sale proceeds, and noting that complaints about costs must be addressed through assessment officer proceedings.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing her motion to set aside a summary judgment granted in favour of the respondent bank for a shortfall on a repossessed motorcycle.

The appellant claimed her signature on the guarantee was forged by her deceased husband.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the appellant failed to meet her burden of demonstrating grounds to set aside the judgment, provided no expert evidence of forgery, offered no adequate explanation for the two-and-a-half-year delay, and would have caused prejudice to the respondent given the four-year delay in enforcement.

The appellant mortgagee appealed a motion judge's decision granting summary judgment for default under a mortgage but ordering that the judgment be held in abeyance until September 15, 2017, subject to the mortgagors making specified payments.

The appellant contended the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to impose such conditions.

The Court of Appeal found that the order amounted to a stay of execution, which is an interlocutory order from which there is no right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The court determined that jurisdiction properly lay with the Divisional Court.

The Plaintiffs discontinued their action against the Defendant Computershare Trust Company of Canada c/o First National Financial LP ("First National").

First National then brought a motion for costs, seeking $11,094.45.

The remaining Defendants, Mark Hamelin and Tracy Hamelin, supported First National's request.

The Plaintiffs opposed the motion.

The court applied the "justified action test" under Rule 23.05 and Rule 57.01, finding that while the Plaintiffs were justified in initially investigating First National's mortgage, they were not justified in continuing their claim seeking priority over First National's Charge.

The court determined that First National was not a proper party to the action as it did not advance a construction mortgage.

Consequently, the Plaintiffs were ordered to pay First National $6,500.00 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The Hamelins' request for costs for responding to the motion was denied.

The appellants failed to appear for the hearing of their appeal scheduled before the Court of Appeal for Ontario, despite the case being held down until 11:25 a.m.

The appellants had previously requested an adjournment which was refused.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned, and costs were fixed in favour of the respondent.