James Garnet Battin

The applicants, paternal grandparents, sought urgent interim orders for sole decision-making authority for one grandchild (M.M.) and shared decision-making for another (J.H.), or alternatively, contact with both children.

The court dismissed the decision-making claims, finding no urgency and that such orders would undermine the mother's (E.L.H.) ongoing cooperation with the Children's Aid Society (CAS) and parental autonomy.

However, the court granted the applicants interim contact with both children, finding urgency due to the disruption of a long-standing relationship and the likelihood of continued conflict without a court order.

Specific terms were imposed to mitigate adult conflict during exchanges.

This case involved urgent motions regarding the temporary relocation of children following the parents' recent separation.

The applicant father sought to prevent the children from moving from Woodstock, Ontario, while the respondent mother sought to dismiss his motion, which would allow her to relocate with the children to Manitoba.

The court found that the relocation was initially a joint family plan that was disrupted by the separation.

Considering the children's best interests, their young age, the mother's established plan in Manitoba (new home, job, school), and the father's unformulated parenting plan in Woodstock, the court permitted the temporary relocation to Manitoba.

The court also ordered interim parenting time for the father and access to information regarding the children's health, education, and welfare.

This motion concerned parenting time and decision-making authority for two children.

The applicant mother sought an interim order for sole decision-making and supervised parenting time for the respondent father, citing his substance abuse.

The respondent father denied the allegations and sought a return to previous unsupervised arrangements, later proposing a transitional supervised schedule.

The court, relying on independent evidence from the Voice of the Child Report and Children's Aid Society, found the father's alcohol use to be a significant concern impacting his parenting ability.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making authority and ordered supervised daytime parenting time for the father, along with alcohol prohibition and drug/alcohol screening.

The parties were encouraged to cooperatively expand parenting time as the father demonstrates abstinence, with a right for the father to seek court review after four months if no agreement is reached.

The Applicant brought a motion for an interim parenting order.

The Respondent challenged the Ontario court's jurisdiction, asserting that British Columbia was the proper forum after she moved there with the children.

The court determined that the children's habitual residence remained in Ontario at the commencement of the application, as their removal was without the Applicant's consent or acquiescence, and there was no undue delay in commencing proceedings.

The court rejected the Respondent's argument that a British Columbia protection order established habitual residence there.

Applying the balance of convenience test under the Children's Law Reform Act, the court concluded that Ontario was the more appropriate forum to exercise jurisdiction.

This case involved a motion and cross-motion for interim custody of a child.

The applicant father sought sole or shared custody, while the respondent mother sought sole custody with supervised access for the father.

The court considered the father's extensive criminal record, history of drug involvement, and relapse, as well as his derogatory comments about the mother to the child.

Given the child had been in the mother's primary care for approximately five years, the court found it in the child's best interests to maintain the status quo.

The mother was awarded interim primary parenting time and sole decision-making responsibility.

The father was granted supervised parenting time on alternate weekends at his parents' residence, with his parents acting as supervisors to ensure the child's safety and prevent emotional harm.

Child support was also ordered based on the father's imputed income.

Father sought an urgent motion for interim sole custody of the parties' young daughter, alleging serious concerns regarding mother's ability to appropriately and safely parent.

Mother sought an interim joint custody order with a shared residential schedule.

The court found that while there were verified concerns regarding mother's home maintenance and supervision practices documented by Children's Aid Society, the most recent independent evidence from the child's physician and the transferee protection agency indicated stabilization since mother's relocation to reside with her father.

The court granted an interim joint custody order with a structured shared residential arrangement, requiring both parents to complete parenting programming and mother to engage in additional supports recommended by the protection agency.

Both parents brought urgent motions during the COVID-19 pandemic seeking sole custody of their two children.

The respondent father withheld the children from the applicant mother following his access time on May 4, 2020, contrary to an interim order dated December 23, 2019.

The father alleged various concerns including the mother's alleged drug use, housing instability, poor school attendance, and the presence of a potentially dangerous individual in the mother's sister's home.

The court found that urgency was established based on the father's breach of the court order and the need for a structured arrangement to prevent further upheaval.

However, the court determined that the father failed to establish sufficient evidence of immediate risk to the children's safety to justify the change in custody.

The court ordered the children returned to the mother's primary care with an expanded and structured access schedule for the father.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a trial where the applicant successfully obtained a termination of his spousal support obligation.

The applicant sought $3,500 in costs, a reduction from his initial bill, acknowledging the respondent's financial hardship.

The respondent opposed, arguing divided success, misleading financial information from the applicant, and her own financial hardship.

The court found the applicant to be the successful party, noting his reasonable offer to settle which the respondent unreasonably rejected.

Despite the respondent's hardship, the court awarded the applicant $3,500 in costs, finding the amount reasonable and consistent with principles of indemnity, proportionality, and hardship avoidance.

The applicant sought to vary a spousal support order, terminate ongoing support, and eliminate arrears following his retirement, arguing a material change in circumstances and "double recovery" issues regarding his employment pension.

The respondent opposed, citing economic hardship and the applicant's failure to apply for other pensions.

The court found a material change due to retirement, disallowed double recovery of the pension, imputed income to the respondent for intentional underemployment, and terminated spousal support effective September 1, 2019, fixing arrears at zero.

The respondent was ordered to reimburse the applicant for payments made after August 27, 2019.

In this high-conflict custody and access case, the applicant mother sought sole custody of two children, alleging abuse and neglect by the respondent father and his common-law partner.

The respondent father and his partner sought sole custody, claiming the children were victims of abuse while in the mother's care.

After an extensive trial involving multiple witnesses and expert evidence, the court found that the respondent father and his partner had engaged in parental alienation of the children against their mother.

The court determined that while the mother had used inappropriate physical discipline on one historical occasion, the allegations of ongoing abuse and neglect were not substantiated.

The court found that the respondent father and his partner had deliberately created a narrative of abuse, exposed the children to litigation details, relocated the family to distance the children from their mother, and systematically undermined the mother-child relationship.

The court reversed custody to the mother and ordered supervised access for the father and his partner.

A child protection trial involving three children where the Children's Aid Society sought findings that the children were in need of protection due to physical harm and risk of physical harm.

The respondent father (M.A.R.) and his partner (T.E.) were alleged to have exposed the children to excessive alcohol use, domestic violence, and inappropriate physical discipline.

The mother (E.M.T.) was aware of the abuse but failed to disclose it in prior custody proceedings.

The court found the children had suffered actual physical harm and were at risk of further physical harm, but dismissed the claim for risk of emotional harm.

The children were placed in the mother's care subject to supervision with discretionary access to the father through the Society.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Children's Aid Society of Oxford County brought a protection application regarding two children and subsequently sought leave to withdraw the application without costs.

The respondent father opposed the withdrawal on a without-costs basis, seeking costs of $31,870.41 inclusive, arguing the Society had failed to properly investigate and acted incompetently.

The court dismissed the costs claim, finding the Society had conducted an adequate investigation, acted reasonably and with due diligence throughout the proceedings, and appropriately reassessed its position as circumstances evolved.

The court held that the Society's conduct did not meet the threshold for a costs award against a child protection agency.

A motion for recusal brought by respondent M.A.R. during a child protection trial.

M.A.R. alleged that the judge's examination of a Children's Aid Society worker regarding her training during a voir dire on the admissibility of children's statements, and the incorporation of two answers into the ruling, created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The motion was dismissed.

The court found that the judge's questions were appropriate, routine, and consistent with the expanded role judges have in child protection proceedings where the best interests of children are at stake.

This is a costs decision following a two-day trial in a motion to change child support.

The applicant sought to terminate child support for one child and suspend it for another, claiming a change in circumstances due to health issues preventing continued employment.

The respondent opposed the motion and sought recovery of section 7 expenses.

The court found a change in circumstances for 2016 but imputed income on the applicant from 2017 onward based on intentional underemployment.

The respondent was substantially more successful at trial.

The court awarded costs of $8,500 (inclusive) to the respondent, accounting for divided success on less dominant issues and the applicant's unreasonable conduct regarding disclosure and failure to provide an offer to settle.

A paternal aunt sought to be added as a party to a child protection proceeding to pursue permanent custody of the youngest child, who had been placed in her care pursuant to an interim order.

The motion was opposed by all parties, including the child's father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the aunt had provided appropriate care and had a viable plan, adding her as a party was premature, unnecessary to determine the issues, would unduly delay proceedings, and was not in the child's best interests at that stage of the protection application.

The court emphasized that the paramount purpose of the legislation is family reunification and that the aunt's change in position and manner of bringing the motion had created unnecessary conflict.

A costs decision following a trial on the merits regarding a prohibition on changing children's surnames.

The respondent sought to change the children's surnames from "Schaafsma" to "Schaafsma Eaton" following a prior custody order.

The applicant brought an application seeking to prohibit the name change or, alternatively, to require a hyphenated surname.

The application was dismissed, permitting the respondent to proceed with the name change applications to the Registrar General.

The court awarded costs to the successful respondent in the amount of $11,085 inclusive.

This is a costs decision following a seven-day family law trial concerning access to children and child support.

The respondent sought costs of $26,266.74 following trial.

The court found divided success on the main issues: the respondent succeeded on section 7 expenses and her primary position on access subject to children's wishes, while the applicant succeeded on child support arrears and his primary claim for counselling to rebuild the parent-child relationship.

The court declined to award costs, finding that both parties behaved equally unreasonably on the central issue of access and that neither party had properly constituted settlement offers under the Family Law Rules.

Motion to change child support brought by the payor seeking to vary his child support obligation and adjust arrears.

The payor claimed a significant change in circumstances due to mental health issues arising from his employment at a correctional facility, which led to his involuntary hospitalization and subsequent departure from that employment.

The court found a change in circumstances for 2016 but determined the payor was intentionally underemployed from 2017 onward.

Income was imputed at $60,000 based on the payor's previous employment with the Canada Border Services Agency, which remained available to him.

Child support was varied accordingly, with reduced amounts during periods when children attended school away from home.

Section 7 expenses for post-secondary education were partially awarded, with a proportional split of 67% to the payor and 33% to the recipient.

The applicant sought an order prohibiting the respondent, the sole custodial parent, from changing the surnames of two children from Schaafsma to Schaafsma Eaton.

The respondent sought to add her surname to the children's existing surname.

The court applied the best interests of the child test and considered factors including the respondent's motivation, the children's existing use of the hyphenated name, the relationship between the children and the non-custodial parent, and the applicant's failure to meet financial support obligations.

The court found that the respondent had no improper motive, that the children already identified as Schaafsma Eaton at school, and that the name change would not harm the children or their relationship with their father.

The application was dismissed, permitting the name change to proceed, with a prohibition on any further name changes.

A voir dire on threshold necessity was held to determine whether out-of-court statements made by three children to third parties could be admitted as hearsay evidence in a child protection proceeding.

The applicant sought to tender the statements for the truth of their content.

The court heard expert evidence from a forensic and clinical psychologist regarding the children's ability to testify and the potential impact of doing so on their mental health.

The court found that reasonable necessity was established for the two younger children based on evidence of emotional harm and developmental limitations, but not for the older child who was capable of testifying with appropriate accommodations.