James Garnet Battin

Following a trial regarding parenting time where the respondent was successful in obtaining an order for supervised access, the respondent sought costs of $10,960.

The applicant argued against a costs order due to her limited income from ODSP and her role as the primary caregiver.

The court found the applicant had acted unreasonably during the litigation but acknowledged her financial circumstances and the potential impact on the child.

The court awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs of $4,800, payable at $200 per month.

This trial concerned the issue of parenting time for the father (respondent) with the parties' three-year-old daughter.

The mother (applicant) sought an order for no parenting time, alleging highly abusive and stalking behaviours by the father.

The father sought supervised access to develop a relationship with his daughter, alleging the mother had unjustly denied him access through fabrications.

The court conducted a detailed credibility assessment, finding the mother's evidence inconsistent and lacking corroboration, while the father's evidence was found to be clear, convincing, and cogent.

The court concluded that the mother had unreasonably withheld the father's parenting time and that it was in the child's best interests to commence supervised access.

The accused, Jessica Haynes, was charged with assault after spraying her neighbour with a garden hose.

The court found the elements of assault proven beyond a reasonable doubt but dismissed the charge based on the common law doctrine of de minimis non curat lex.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding the severity of the assault to be highly exaggerated and inconsistent with video evidence and other witness testimony, concluding the act was of a trifling nature that did not warrant a criminal sanction.

The Children's Aid Society of Oxford County brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that the children were in need of protection and a final custody order under s.102(1) of the CYFSA in favour of the maternal grandmother, T.K., with access to the parents.

The father, J.P., opposed the custody order, seeking a further supervision order, while the mother, V.B., did not oppose the children remaining with T.K. The court found the children continued to be in need of protection due to the parents' substance use and instability, and granted the summary judgment, terminating the supervision order and placing the children in T.K.'s sole care and custody, with supervised parenting time for both parents.

The accused was tried on three historical sexual assault counts and one count of assault with a weapon arising from alleged incidents involving the complainant.

The court held that credibility and reliability were central, applied the W.(D.) framework, and found the accused's evidence could not be rejected.

The court also found material inconsistencies and reliability concerns in the complainant's evidence, considered the surrounding family access dispute as relevant context, and concluded the Crown failed to prove the offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The applicants, paternal grandparents, sought urgent interim orders for sole decision-making authority for one grandchild (M.M.) and shared decision-making for another (J.H.), or alternatively, contact with both children.

The court dismissed the decision-making claims, finding no urgency and that such orders would undermine the mother's (E.L.H.) ongoing cooperation with the Children's Aid Society (CAS) and parental autonomy.

However, the court granted the applicants interim contact with both children, finding urgency due to the disruption of a long-standing relationship and the likelihood of continued conflict without a court order.

Specific terms were imposed to mitigate adult conflict during exchanges.

This case involved urgent motions regarding the temporary relocation of children following the parents' recent separation.

The applicant father sought to prevent the children from moving from Woodstock, Ontario, while the respondent mother sought to dismiss his motion, which would allow her to relocate with the children to Manitoba.

The court found that the relocation was initially a joint family plan that was disrupted by the separation.

Considering the children's best interests, their young age, the mother's established plan in Manitoba (new home, job, school), and the father's unformulated parenting plan in Woodstock, the court permitted the temporary relocation to Manitoba.

The court also ordered interim parenting time for the father and access to information regarding the children's health, education, and welfare.

The appellant grandparent appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to be added as a party to child protection proceedings concerning his grandchild.

The appellant argued the motion judge failed to apply the five-part test for adding parties and failed to give reasons for denying alternative relief for participant status.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge substantively considered the relevant factors and correctly concluded that adding the appellant was not in the child's best interests, as it would unduly prolong proceedings and the appellant lacked a viable competing plan.

The court also held that the appellant did not meet the statutory precondition of providing continuous care for six months to qualify for participant status.

The applicant father brought an emergency motion to enforce an existing access order after the respondent mother arbitrarily withheld the child based on unsubstantiated allegations of sexual abuse.

The court found the mother's actions were motivated by spite and undermined the parenting order.

The court granted the father's motion, ordered the enforcement of the existing parenting order, dismissed the mother's emergency motion, and awarded costs to the father.

This motion concerned parenting time and decision-making authority for two children.

The applicant mother sought an interim order for sole decision-making and supervised parenting time for the respondent father, citing his substance abuse.

The respondent father denied the allegations and sought a return to previous unsupervised arrangements, later proposing a transitional supervised schedule.

The court, relying on independent evidence from the Voice of the Child Report and Children's Aid Society, found the father's alcohol use to be a significant concern impacting his parenting ability.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making authority and ordered supervised daytime parenting time for the father, along with alcohol prohibition and drug/alcohol screening.

The parties were encouraged to cooperatively expand parenting time as the father demonstrates abstinence, with a right for the father to seek court review after four months if no agreement is reached.

The Applicant brought a motion for an interim parenting order.

The Respondent challenged the Ontario court's jurisdiction, asserting that British Columbia was the proper forum after she moved there with the children.

The court determined that the children's habitual residence remained in Ontario at the commencement of the application, as their removal was without the Applicant's consent or acquiescence, and there was no undue delay in commencing proceedings.

The court rejected the Respondent's argument that a British Columbia protection order established habitual residence there.

Applying the balance of convenience test under the Children's Law Reform Act, the court concluded that Ontario was the more appropriate forum to exercise jurisdiction.

This case involved a motion and cross-motion for interim custody of a child.

The applicant father sought sole or shared custody, while the respondent mother sought sole custody with supervised access for the father.

The court considered the father's extensive criminal record, history of drug involvement, and relapse, as well as his derogatory comments about the mother to the child.

Given the child had been in the mother's primary care for approximately five years, the court found it in the child's best interests to maintain the status quo.

The mother was awarded interim primary parenting time and sole decision-making responsibility.

The father was granted supervised parenting time on alternate weekends at his parents' residence, with his parents acting as supervisors to ensure the child's safety and prevent emotional harm.

Child support was also ordered based on the father's imputed income.

The court determined costs following two motions regarding custody and access.

Although the applicant succeeded in setting aside a previous temporary order, he did not succeed in his main goal of returning to 50/50 residence, and the respondent was overall successful.

The court awarded the respondent costs of $2,500 plus HST, finding the amount very reasonable compared to her actual legal fees.

The applicant mother brought a motion to vary child support, seeking to impute income to the respondent father who had been unemployed for over ten years.

The respondent brought a cross-motion for retroactive child support, alleging the applicant failed to disclose her increasing income and worked undisclosed jobs.

The court imputed income to both parties: to the applicant for 'under the table' restaurant work and a home business, and to the respondent at an ODSP-equivalent level.

Finding the applicant's failure to disclose her income tax returns as ordered constituted blameworthy conduct, the court ordered retroactive child support payable by the applicant from 2015.

Father sought an urgent motion for interim sole custody of the parties' young daughter, alleging serious concerns regarding mother's ability to appropriately and safely parent.

Mother sought an interim joint custody order with a shared residential schedule.

The court found that while there were verified concerns regarding mother's home maintenance and supervision practices documented by Children's Aid Society, the most recent independent evidence from the child's physician and the transferee protection agency indicated stabilization since mother's relocation to reside with her father.

The court granted an interim joint custody order with a structured shared residential arrangement, requiring both parents to complete parenting programming and mother to engage in additional supports recommended by the protection agency.

The applicant father brought a motion to set aside a temporary order that granted sole custody of the parties' child to the respondent mother, seeking to reinstate a prior shared parenting arrangement.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion for a permanent order of sole custody.

Due to high conflict between the parents, the court interviewed the 12-year-old child, who expressed a preference to live with his mother and have discretionary weekend visits with his father.

Finding that joint custody was inappropriate given the parents' inability to communicate, the court dismissed the father's motion and granted sole custody to the mother, with specified parenting time for the father in accordance with the child's wishes.

Both parents brought urgent motions during the COVID-19 pandemic seeking sole custody of their two children.

The respondent father withheld the children from the applicant mother following his access time on May 4, 2020, contrary to an interim order dated December 23, 2019.

The father alleged various concerns including the mother's alleged drug use, housing instability, poor school attendance, and the presence of a potentially dangerous individual in the mother's sister's home.

The court found that urgency was established based on the father's breach of the court order and the need for a structured arrangement to prevent further upheaval.

However, the court determined that the father failed to establish sufficient evidence of immediate risk to the children's safety to justify the change in custody.

The court ordered the children returned to the mother's primary care with an expanded and structured access schedule for the father.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a trial where the applicant successfully obtained a termination of his spousal support obligation.

The applicant sought $3,500 in costs, a reduction from his initial bill, acknowledging the respondent's financial hardship.

The respondent opposed, arguing divided success, misleading financial information from the applicant, and her own financial hardship.

The court found the applicant to be the successful party, noting his reasonable offer to settle which the respondent unreasonably rejected.

Despite the respondent's hardship, the court awarded the applicant $3,500 in costs, finding the amount reasonable and consistent with principles of indemnity, proportionality, and hardship avoidance.

The applicant sought to vary a spousal support order, terminate ongoing support, and eliminate arrears following his retirement, arguing a material change in circumstances and "double recovery" issues regarding his employment pension.

The respondent opposed, citing economic hardship and the applicant's failure to apply for other pensions.

The court found a material change due to retirement, disallowed double recovery of the pension, imputed income to the respondent for intentional underemployment, and terminated spousal support effective September 1, 2019, fixing arrears at zero.

The respondent was ordered to reimburse the applicant for payments made after August 27, 2019.

The Children's Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk sought an order for extended society care for two children, C and D, without parental access, aiming for adoption.

The respondent mother sought the children's return under a supervision order, citing improvements in her life.

The respondent father did not participate.

The court, applying the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, found that despite the mother's progress, her inconsistent access, substance use, mental health struggles, and poor problem-solving skills meant the children remained in need of protection.

The court determined that extended society care was in the children's best interests, denying parental access but ordering access between the children and their three older siblings.