Gillian P. Kerr

The court determined costs following two anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The defendant broadcaster, having successfully dismissed the defamation claim against it, was awarded costs on a full indemnity basis, though the requested amount was reduced to $500,000 plus disbursements due to the motion's excessive complexity.

The plaintiff, having successfully defeated the defendant university's novel anti-SLAPP motion regarding a negligence claim, was awarded partial indemnity costs of $222,000, as the university's motion lacked the characteristics of a true SLAPP suit.

The defendants, CBC and Trent University, brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiffs' $210 million defamation and negligence action.

The action arose from a Marketplace report alleging the plaintiffs' chicken sandwiches contained only 50% chicken based on DNA tests conducted by Trent University.

The court granted CBC's motion, finding that while the defamation claim had substantial merit, CBC had a valid defence of responsible communication and the public interest in protecting investigative journalism outweighed the plaintiffs' private harm.

The court dismissed Trent University's motion, holding that the negligence claim regarding faulty laboratory testing did not arise from an expression relating to a matter of public interest and was therefore not subject to dismissal under the anti-SLAPP provisions.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action and approve a $2.25 million settlement regarding the defendants' systemic collection of credit scores during the automobile insurance claims adjusting process, which the Privacy Commissioner found breached PIPEDA.

The court certified the action for settlement purposes, finding the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The court also approved a 60-day opt-out period, a cy-près distribution to the Public Interest Advocacy Centre, the notice plan, a $15,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff, and class counsel fees of $500,000 plus disbursements.

The self-represented plaintiff, a disbarred lawyer, commenced an action against 16 defendants, including the Law Society of Ontario, the Law Society Tribunal, Legal Aid Ontario, Hamilton Police Services, and various individuals involved in his disciplinary and criminal proceedings.

Several defendants brought requests under Rule 2.1.01(1) to dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the claims against the Law Society Tribunal defendants as an improper collateral attack, against the Legal Aid Ontario defendants as duplicative of an existing action, against the Colleton defendants as barred by absolute privilege, and against the Hamilton Police defendants as frivolous and an abuse of process.

The action was allowed to continue against the remaining defendants who had not filed Rule 2.1 requests.

This document sets out a procedural timetable for an anti-SLAPP motion brought by the defendants.

It establishes deadlines for the defendants' motion records, the plaintiffs' responding record, completion of examinations, and the submission of factums and replies, culminating in a hearing scheduled for September 24-25, 2019.

The plaintiff, Jooli Park, brought a motion for certification of a class action against Samyang Foods Co. for settlement purposes, approval of a settlement agreement with Samyang, dismissal of the action against the non-settling defendants (Nongshim, Ottogi, Korea Yakult, and Paldo), approval of class counsel fees and disbursements, payment of an honorarium to Park, and cy-près distribution of remaining settlement funds.

The court granted all requested relief except for the honorarium to Park, finding that her contributions were not exceptional enough to warrant it.

The settlement with Samyang was approved, and the action against the non-settling defendants was dismissed without costs, considering the increased litigation risks after an unsuccessful jury trial in a related US class action.

The plaintiffs sought judicial approval of two settlement agreements in class actions alleging price-fixing in the automotive parts industry.

The first settlement with T.Rad was for $1,167,452, and the second with S-Y Systems was for $50,000.

The court found both settlements to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting they fell within a zone of reasonableness.

The settlements and requested legal fees were approved.

In a medical malpractice action concerning obstetrical negligence resulting in a child's severe brain damage, the jury found the defendant doctors breached the standard of care and caused the injuries.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 52.08(1) arguing there was no evidence to support the causation finding, or alternatively, that the jury's answers on causation were unresponsive.

The trial judge found there was some evidence to support causation, but held that the jury's answers on causation were fatally flawed because they merely repeated the standard of care answers (as improperly suggested by plaintiffs' counsel) and failed to explain how the negligence caused the brain damage.

As a result, the trial judge refused to enter judgment on the verdict and ordered a new trial.

The moving party, Dr. Chandra, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a jury verdict dismissing his $130 million libel and invasion of privacy action against the CBC.

The jury had found that the defamatory broadcast alleging scientific fraud was true.

The Court of Appeal denied the extension, finding that the moving party failed to form a timely intention to appeal, provided no satisfactory explanation for the delay, and that the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The court also noted the moving party's lack of candour and attempts to encumber his only Ontario asset, concluding that the justice of the case required dismissing the motion.

Following a lengthy jury trial concerning defamation and invasion of privacy claims against media defendants, the jury accepted the defence of justification and dismissed the action.

The successful defendants sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $1.6 million.

The court considered the governing principles under the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the presumption that costs are fixed by the trial judge and the factors under Rule 57.01.

Given the jury’s findings that the impugned statements were true and the plaintiff’s unsuccessful prosecution of extensive allegations of fraud, the court held that the case justified an award of substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at the defendants’ reasonable full indemnity amount due to the indemnity principle.

The defendants brought a pre‑trial motion seeking permission to call several non‑party witnesses residing outside Canada to testify at trial by video conference.

The plaintiff opposed the request, arguing that credibility assessment, document handling, and logistical issues required in‑person testimony.

Applying Rule 1.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the proportionality principles in Rule 1.04, the court held that modern video conferencing technology can permit effective credibility assessment and efficient presentation of evidence.

Given the witnesses’ overseas residence, professional obligations, and the disproportionate cost and difficulty of travel, the court granted leave for their testimony to be given by video conference subject to procedural conditions.

During a civil jury trial for defamation arising from a televised investigative documentary, the media defendants sought a ruling that the plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy should not be put to the jury.

The defendants argued that the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act constituted a complete legislative scheme precluding a common law privacy claim and that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion did not apply to journalistic publication.

The court held that PIPEDA does not oust the development of common law privacy claims and that media defendants are not categorically immune from liability for intrusion upon seclusion.

However, the scope of such claims is limited where journalistic activity engages freedom of expression and established defamation defences.

The court concluded that a properly instructed jury could potentially find an unlawful intrusion and therefore allowed the privacy claim to proceed to the jury with limiting instructions.

The plaintiff brought a motion shortly before trial seeking a determination under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure that a televised documentary was prima facie defamatory, along with directions regarding the order of evidence and a proposed bifurcation of liability and damages.

The court held that although questions about defamatory meaning can sometimes be determined before trial, such motions must be brought promptly under Rule 21.02.

Because the action had been underway for nine years and the motion was brought only weeks before trial, the request for a Rule 21 determination was refused.

The court also declined to modify the usual order of presentation of evidence in a jury trial or to bifurcate liability and damages absent party consent.

The plaintiff was granted leave to file a DVD of the documentary as part of the record.

The moving defendants sought to strike a jury notice in a defamation and invasion of privacy action arising from a broadcast alleging scientific fraud and financial deception.

The court reviewed the governing principles respecting the substantive right to a civil jury trial, including complexity, expert evidence, trial length, legal difficulty, and the availability of a wait-and-see approach.

Although the action involved voluminous documents, anticipated expert scientific evidence, and complex defamation issues, the court held that cogent reasons had not yet been shown to displace the jury.

The preferable course was to permit the trial to begin and reconsider discharge of the jury only if the anticipated complexities materialized to a degree warranting intervention.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action against the Dow defendants for an alleged price-fixing conspiracy in the market for polyether polyol products.

The court reviewed the requirements for certification under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, in light of recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on indirect purchaser claims.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed a cause of action, there was an identifiable class, common issues existed with a plausible methodology for proving class-wide loss, a class action was the preferable procedure, and the plaintiff was a suitable representative.

The motion for certification was granted.

The parties entered into a marriage contract during an attempted reconciliation.

Due to a drafting error, the written agreement provided the appellant husband with the entire value of the matrimonial home, contrary to the respondent wife's intention of an equal division.

The trial judge set aside the contract, finding no meeting of the minds and unconscionability.

On appeal, the appellant sought rectification, which he had resisted at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not seek rectification after insisting on enforcing the erroneous written terms at trial, and found no error in the trial judge's findings on the meeting of the minds, property valuation, support, or costs.

Following a complex family law trial involving challenges to a marriage contract, equalization, support arrears, and related financial claims, the successful party sought substantial costs.

The court considered Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and found that the unsuccessful party acted in bad faith, including failing to provide disclosure, refusing reasonable settlement offers, and engaging in conduct that prolonged the litigation.

The court held that such conduct justified full recovery costs.

After deducting certain conference-related and administrative charges, the court awarded substantial costs and prejudgment interest to the successful party and costs to added respondents from the date of their settlement offer.

The parties separated after a 16-year marriage.

During a brief reconciliation attempt, they negotiated a marriage contract.

The wife intended to give the husband one-half the value of the matrimonial home, but a drafting error in the contract gave him the full value.

The husband and his lawyer noticed the error but failed to seek clarification.

At the time, the wife was suffering from undiagnosed bipolar disorder and hypomania, causing her to act recklessly.

The court found the contract void ab initio due to a lack of consensus ad idem on a fundamental term.

Alternatively, the court set aside the contract under the Family Law Act due to the wife's lack of capacity and unconscionability.

The court ordered an equalization payment, retroactive spousal support, and retroactive and ongoing child support.

The appellants commenced a medical malpractice action in 1995 following a motorcycle accident in 1994.

Fifteen years later, the respondents successfully moved to dismiss the action for delay under Rule 24.01.

The appellants appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in finding inexcusable delay and presumed prejudice, particularly given the availability of medical records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that the 15-year delay was inordinate and inexcusable, and that the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice given the potential loss of evidence from unrecorded team discussions.