Gerard C. Borean

At a case management hearing, the applicant sought to consolidate a new minor variance appeal regarding accessory parking with an ongoing site plan approval appeal for a 30-unit mixed-use building.

The City opposed the minor variance but agreed that consolidation was efficient.

The Tribunal granted the request to consolidate the matters and scheduled a further case management conference to allow the parties to address the concerns of neighbouring property owners who were granted participant status.

The Ontario Land Tribunal issued a procedural order to govern the proceedings for an appeal by Dufcen Construction Inc. regarding the City of Vaughan's failure to adopt a requested official plan amendment and zoning by-law amendment.

The order sets out the organization of the hearing, requirements before the hearing, the list of parties, and the consolidated issues list.

The appellant was charged with failing to comply with orders under the Building Code Act requiring him to obtain building permits or remove structures.

At trial, he argued he had obtained permits for some buildings and no permits were required for others.

The appeal judge convicted him, finding these defences were impermissible collateral attacks on the orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that arguing compliance (having permits) is not a collateral attack, restoring those acquittals.

However, arguing no permits were required is an impermissible collateral attack, so those convictions were upheld.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that substituted a conviction for an acquittal on charges of failing to comply with building inspector's orders.

The moving party argued that his defence—that he had previously obtained the required permits—was not a collateral attack on the orders.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the proposed appeal raised a question of law respecting the interpretation and application of the doctrine of collateral attack, and that special grounds existed.

Following a successful application for the rescission of a contract to purchase seat licenses due to misrepresentation, the applicant sought costs on the higher end of the partial indemnity scale.

The respondent argued for a lower amount based on its own costs outline and the simplicity of the issues.

The court found the respondent's position on the merits was entirely without merit and awarded costs on the higher end of the partial indemnity scale, but reduced the applicant's claimed hours by 30% for being excessive.

Costs were fixed at $21,948.35.

The appellant was charged with violations of the Building Code Act for failing to comply with six orders to comply issued in 2013.

At trial, the appellant sought disclosure of prior charges and prosecutions, including orders to comply issued in 1995 and 1996 that had resulted in withdrawn charges.

The justice of the peace granted the disclosure order.

The respondent municipality applied for certiorari to quash the disclosure order.

The Superior Court granted certiorari, finding the earlier orders were distinct due to different compliance deadlines.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the application judge erred by failing to apply the substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice test and by prematurely determining the relevance issue mid-trial.

The Regional Municipality of York sought an order of mandamus with certiorari in aid to quash a disclosure order made by a Justice of the Peace and to compel the continuation of a trial.

The disclosure order required the prosecution to provide information on previous charges against the respondent from 1995 and 1996, which the applicant argued constituted a collateral attack on unappealed 2013 orders to comply under the Building Code Act.

The court found that the disclosure order was indeed a collateral attack on the 2013 orders, which the respondent had failed to appeal, and therefore granted the applicant's request.

Following an earlier finding that a defendant knowingly assisted in a cover-up of the truth by failing to ensure production of sales invoices required by court order, the court determined whether that conduct constituted contempt.

The court held that aiding and abetting a breach of a court order can ground contempt and applied the aiding and abetting framework to the defendant's omissions and knowledge.

Unsworn submissions about counsel conflict, lack of intent, and apology did not displace the prior factual findings.

The defendant was held in contempt, with a further hearing directed on the appropriate relief.