Frances P. Kiteley

The Applicant brought an urgent motion for temporary child and spousal support.

The court determined the motion was urgent given the Applicant's need for accommodation.

The primary issue was the Respondent's income for support calculations.

The court rejected the Respondent's lower estimate for 2020 due to insufficient explanation and belated disclosure, instead relying on his 2018 Line 150 income of $2,256,040.

Based on this income, the court ordered the Respondent to pay $43,437 per month in temporary spousal support and $16,663 per month in temporary child support for one child, adopting the low end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines range due to potential pandemic financial impacts.

The Applicant sought an urgent motion to impose strict COVID-19 physical distancing measures on the Respondent and to suspend his parenting time, citing concerns about his adherence to protocols.

The Respondent brought a cross-motion for an immediate 50/50 parenting schedule.

The court dismissed both the Applicant's motion for specific protocols and the Respondent's cross-motion for a new schedule, finding neither urgent nor justified.

The court emphasized the presumption of continuing existing parenting arrangements and ordered the parties to follow government health directives and agree on make-up parenting time for the Respondent.

The parties, Adam and Amanda Rothschild, sought an urgent case conference to resolve disputes arising from their Minutes of Settlement concerning the sale of the matrimonial home.

Key issues included the selection of a listing agent, the listing date, necessary repairs, and the applicant's access to the home, all complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court addressed the interpretation and enforcement of the Minutes of Settlement in light of these unforeseen circumstances.

This case involved a motion and cross-motion concerning interim parenting arrangements for two children, O. (almost 9) and T. (12), following the parents' separation.

The mother (applicant) had unilaterally relocated with O. and changed her school, while the father (respondent) sought O.'s return to her former school and residence.

The court addressed the children's residence, school, and parenting time, considering the best interests of the children, the impact of the mother's unilateral actions, and the special needs of T. The court also had to consider the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and its effect on school operations and parenting schedules.

The mother was granted interim parenting time and decision-making for O. (excluding the September 2020 school decision), and the father for T. O.'s current school placement in Markham was maintained temporarily.

A specific interim parenting schedule was set, accounting for school closures due to COVID-19.

Neither party was awarded costs.

A case conference was ordered for June 2020 to address O.'s school for September 2020 and the OCL's position.

The applicant brought an urgent motion for temporary parenting and child/spousal support.

The respondent initially opposed the urgency but later agreed to an expedited hearing for both the applicant's motion and an anticipated cross-motion.

The court found both parenting and support issues to be urgent, particularly given the children's living arrangements and the applicant's need for income to secure permanent accommodation.

The court scheduled the motions, set deadlines for material filing, and ordered the initialization of the parties' names in the style of cause.

The court also provided guidance on the s. 30 assessment and encouraged mediation.

The appellant lawyer appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding him professionally negligent in his representation of the respondent in a condominium application.

The appellant argued the Deputy Judge erred in statutory interpretation, failed to draw adverse inferences from uncalled witnesses, and failed to consider mitigation and apportionment of liability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors.

The court also awarded costs to the successful respondent, who was represented by pro bono counsel, on the condition that the respondent provide a written direction that the costs be paid directly to the law firm.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their motion to certify a class action against the manufacturer of the drug Celexa, alleging a failure to warn that the drug is a teratogen.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors by concluding the appellants had abandoned general causation as a common issue and by analyzing the duty to warn in isolation from general causation.

The appeal was allowed, the decision set aside, and the certification motion was remitted to be heard afresh by another judge.

The self-represented tenants appealed two Landlord and Tenant Board decisions that dismissed their applications for substantial interference with reasonable enjoyment.

The Board had found the tenants deliberately used the wrong form (T2 instead of T6) to characterize maintenance issues as substantial interference.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the Board's findings regarding the forms and its procedural decisions were questions of mixed fact and law, which are not appealable under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The Court also found no breach of procedural fairness in the Board's decision to convert an oral hearing into a written one to accommodate the tenants' language barriers.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's proceeding, the respondent sought costs.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a partial indemnity basis, finding the hours and billable rates claimed to be reasonable.

The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs fixed at $7,788.37.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the York Regional Police to include a withdrawn criminal charge in his Police Vulnerable Sector Check.

The Divisional Court set aside the decision, finding that the police breached procedural fairness by relying on undisclosed occurrence reports without giving the applicant an opportunity to respond.

The court also found the decision unreasonable for failing to justify how the applicant met the exceptional criteria for disclosing non-conviction information.

The matter was remitted for reconsideration under the newly enacted Police Record Checks Reform Act, 2015.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board denying OHIP funding for out-of-country residential psychiatric treatment at the Austen Riggs Centre.

The Board found that the appellant failed to establish that the required services were not available at an OHIP preferred provider facility.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's decision as reasonable, noting that while the chosen facility may have been preferred by the appellant's expert, the evidence did not show that the preferred providers could not provide the necessary care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party Justice of the Peace brought a motion to quash the responding party's Notice of Application for Judicial Review.

The responding party sought an order in the nature of mandamus to compel the Justice of the Peace to lay an information against a municipal prosecutor under the Provincial Offences Act.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that it lacked jurisdiction.

Under s. 142(4) of the Provincial Offences Act, the Judicial Review Procedure Act does not apply, and s. 140(1) provides that such relief must be sought in the Superior Court of Justice.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision dismissing her complaint that her former employer, a housing cooperative, engaged in reprisals against her for enforcing her rights under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Tribunal found no evidence that the employer's actions, including extending her probation and terminating her employment, were motivated by her health and safety complaints.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review and found the Tribunal's findings of fact and legal analysis were justified, transparent, and intelligible.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant sued his former solicitor for professional negligence regarding a statutory accident benefits claim.

The solicitor sought production of documents from the appellant's subsequent infant settlement, which had been sealed by court order.

The motions judge granted the solicitor standing under Rule 38.11 to vary the sealing order and access the documents.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that a sealing order does not supplant the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The proper mechanism for the solicitor to seek production of the documents, and for the appellant to assert privilege, is the documentary discovery process under Rule 30, not a motion to vary the sealing order.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment.

They argued the Deputy Judge erred by failing to inquire into the competence of their unlicensed agent under s. 26 of the Courts of Justice Act, and that they received ineffective assistance.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no duty on a Deputy Judge to conduct such an inquiry absent proper grounds, which were not present here.

The court also noted the appellants failed to give notice of the appeal to the agent, precluding the ineffective assistance argument.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal that found it breached capacity limits under the Liquor Licence Act and imposed a 15-day licence suspension.

The appellant conceded its patio was overcrowded but argued the Tribunal erred in law regarding the extent of the breach, reasons, fairness, and sanction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's decision reasonable, supported by reasons, and the 15-day suspension appropriate given previous similar infractions.

The applicant insurer sought judicial review of a preliminary decision by the Licence Appeal Tribunal that extended the limitation period for the respondent's claim for attendant care benefits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding that the insurer must first proceed to the main hearing on the merits and, if unsuccessful, pursue a reconsideration and subsequent appeal.

The court held that no exceptional circumstances existed to justify fragmenting the administrative proceedings and reviewing the interim decision.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's decision refusing her motion to amend her Statement of Claim to add a $100,000 claim for defamation against her former employer.

The proposed amendment alleged that the employer's report to the Ontario Securities Commission was defamatory, but failed to specify the defamatory words.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Master's conclusion that the pleading did not disclose a tenable cause of action because the specific defamatory words were not identified.

The appellant real estate agent appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering him to pay $4,920 for breaching an agreement to rebate 1% of his commission to the respondent purchaser.

The appellant argued he signed the agreement under duress and undue influence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility findings, which supported the conclusion that the appellant had choices and was not under duress.

The self-represented appellant appealed a case conference judge's dismissal of his Form 14 Notice of Motion, which sought to stay and vary a final order regarding child and spousal support.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to use the proper procedure (a Motion to Change) and that the Family Court had no jurisdiction to stay the final order in the absence of a proper motion or appeal.

The court noted the appellant's failure to provide an adequate record and found no error in the lower court's decision.