Frances P. Kiteley

The applicant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an annulment of her marriage on three grounds: lack of mental capacity at the time of marriage, the respondent's fraudulent intent to secure sponsorship, and non-consummation due to the respondent's refusal.

The court dismissed all grounds for annulment, finding the applicant had capacity to marry, no evidence of fraudulent intent for sponsorship, and insufficient evidence to prove non-consummation due to the respondent's incapacity or inability rather than mere refusal.

The respondent's claims for equalization of net family property and loan repayment were also dismissed.

The applicant was granted leave to amend her application to claim a divorce based on separation.

The parties, parents of a nine-year-old child, engaged in a high-conflict family law trial regarding parenting and child support.

The applicant father sought sole decision-making and primary residence, alleging the respondent mother suffered from serious mental illnesses that impaired her parenting.

The mother sought sole decision-making and primary residence, arguing the father's persistent conflict caused the child's anxiety.

The court found no evidence of serious mental illness on the mother's part.

The court granted the mother primary residence and sole decision-making authority, with the father receiving parenting time three weekends out of four.

The court also ordered the father to pay table child support based on an imputed income of $25,000, and established a rigid parenting schedule and communication protocol to minimize conflict.

This endorsement addresses procedural issues arising from a prior order in a family law matter concerning child support.

The court clarifies the scope of motions, enforces strict filing limits, and dismisses numerous requests for disclosure and questioning as premature or outside the established timetable.

The judge emphasizes adherence to previous directions and the Notice to the Profession, aiming to streamline the proceedings for the temporary child support motion.

The Applicant, Jennifer Dixon, surreptitiously accessed and stored thousands of the Respondent, Peter Lindsay's, private and privileged emails after their separation.

The Respondent brought a motion seeking a declaration that the emails were improperly obtained and an order preventing their use.

The court found that Dixon deliberately accessed the emails without consent, rejecting her claims of consensual access and inadvertent storage.

The court declared the emails "stolen" and prohibited Dixon from using or referring to them in any legal proceeding.

Dixon was ordered to provide full particulars of her access, return and destroy all copies, and instruct any third parties to do the same.

The court also ordered Dixon to pay full indemnity costs to the Respondent due to her bad faith conduct.

The applicant brought a motion for financial disclosure, temporary spousal support, and costs in a family law proceeding.

The court dismissed the applicant's requests for formal pension and asset valuations, finding the respondent's existing disclosure sufficient, but ordered the respondent to provide an Equifax report.

The court awarded temporary spousal support of $387 per month, adopting the mid-range amount based on the parties' 2019 incomes.

No costs were awarded due to divided success and the respondent's unreasonable conduct regarding disclosure.

Following the dismissal of the respondent's motion for a stay of an interim relocation order, the applicant sought full recovery costs of over $12,000.

The respondent argued for a reduced quantum of $3,000 due to recent job loss and financial strain.

The court found no bad faith to justify full recovery but awarded costs at 75% of full recovery to sanction the respondent's unreasonable behaviour.

Costs were fixed at $9,600, with a direction that failure to pay would not bar the respondent from future participation in the proceeding.

The applicant was previously successful on an urgent motion for the return of her children, who were unlawfully withheld by the respondent.

The court determined the quantum and scale of costs for that motion.

Finding that the respondent acted in bad faith by withholding the children without justification, keeping them out of school, and intending to inflict financial and emotional harm, the court awarded the applicant full indemnity costs of $5,545.46 pursuant to Family Law Rule 24(8).

The respondent father sought leave to bring various motions to change a final order regarding child support and section 7 expenses, having previously been prohibited from bringing motions without leave.

The court denied leave, finding that the father had failed to comply with previous costs orders, had unilaterally reduced his child support payments, and was attempting to relitigate issues that had already been dismissed on an interim basis.

The father was ordered to pay costs of the case conference.

The parties were involved in a family law dispute over custody and access.

The applicant obtained an ex parte Anton Piller order and an order for supervised access based on evidence from a witness (C.B.W.) alleging the respondent solicited sexual services from minors.

The respondent brought a motion to question C.B.W. before filing responding evidence, citing concerns about self-incrimination in an ongoing police investigation.

The applicant brought a cross-motion to compel the respondent to file responding evidence and attend questioning.

The court dismissed the respondent's motion, finding it would be unfair to allow questioning without reply evidence.

The court granted the applicant's motion, ordering the respondent to file responding affidavits and attend questioning, holding that the best interests of the child outweighed the respondent's self-incrimination concerns.

The applicant mother and respondent father both brought motions for temporary parenting of their 3-year-old child.

The father, who was in recovery for opioid use disorder, sought extended parenting time and relied on letters from his treating professionals.

The mother sought primary care and a more restricted schedule for the father, citing his inability to care for the child for extended periods without assistance.

The court found that the father's treating professionals were 'participant experts' but excluded portions of their letters that were partisan or exceeded their expertise.

The court granted primary care to the mother and ordered her proposed parenting schedule, finding it was in the child's best interests given the father's ongoing recovery and demonstrated difficulties in caring for the child independently.

The applicant brought a motion under the Partition Act for the sale of the jointly owned matrimonial home and for an order requiring the respondent to vacate the property to facilitate repairs and staging.

The respondent consented to the sale but opposed vacating the home, citing financial hardship and the need to accommodate her adult son.

The court granted the motion, ordering the respondent to vacate by a specified date, finding that vacant possession was necessary to maximize the sale price and that the respondent had sufficient notice to find alternative accommodation.

The net proceeds were ordered to be divided equally on closing, with the respondent's share subject to deductions for her portion of repair costs and any registered liens.

The Children's Aid Society appealed an order granting a mother access to her child, who had been placed in extended society care.

The Society argued the trial judge erred in his application of the best interests test under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, specifically regarding whether access would impair the child's opportunities for adoption.

The appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the new, broader best-interests approach to access and made findings grounded in the evidence.

A motion by the Society to admit fresh evidence was also dismissed.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision dismissing a grievance over a school principal's search of a classroom laptop.

Two teachers had maintained a private log documenting their complaints about colleagues on a personal Google account accessed via the school computer.

The principal discovered the log when he touched the mousepad of the open laptop after hours.

The arbitrator found the teachers had a diminished expectation of privacy and the principal had reasonable cause to search under his duty to maintain order under the Education Act.

The Divisional Court (majority) dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's decision reasonable.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the application, finding the search disproportionately impaired the teachers' section 8 Charter rights.

The applicant father brought a motion for an uncontested trial and divorce after the respondent mother abducted their child to South Korea without notice or consent.

The court granted the applicant sole custody of the child, ordered the respondent to pay child support based on imputed income, issued restraining orders preventing the respondent from communicating directly with the child or approaching the applicant's residence or the child's school, and granted the divorce.

Due to the respondent's unreasonable conduct and bad faith, the court awarded the applicant full recovery costs.

The Applicant sought orders to vary a previous order to allow virtual showings and videographer access for the sale of the matrimonial home, and for carriage of sale if the Respondent did not comply.

The Respondent opposed these requests and sought to appoint co-agents for the sale.

The court granted the Applicant's request for virtual showings and videographer access with modifications, dismissing the request for carriage of sale.

The Respondent's request for co-agents was dismissed.

The court emphasized adapting marketing strategies to the COVID-19 pandemic while ensuring safety.

The father, R.W., appealed a summary judgment that placed his children in the extended care of the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto.

R.W. failed to perfect his appeal by the court-ordered deadline, leading the Society to bring a motion to dismiss it.

The court dismissed R.W.'s appeal, noting that he would benefit from any order made in a companion appeal brought by the mother, O.P., effectively making his separate appeal redundant.

The mother (O.P.) appealed a summary judgment decision that placed her children in extended society care for adoption planning with discretionary access.

The motion judge had applied an incorrect summary judgment test.

The appellate court, applying the correct legal framework under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA), found no palpable and overriding errors in the factual findings regarding parental neglect, lack of insight, and failure to follow recommendations.

The court affirmed that extended society care was in the children's best interests, considering their stability with the kin caregiver and their mature understanding of their needs versus their wishes.

The appeal was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses parenting issues arising from a motion and cross-motion between separated parents.

The Respondent sought temporary parenting orders for their two children, R. and B., including primary residence arrangements and specific visiting schedules.

The Applicant opposed these orders.

The court dismissed the Respondent's motion, finding that, despite the urgency, it was not possible to make specific orders in the children's best interests given the high level of parental conflict, contradictory evidence, and the pending s. 30 assessment.

The court noted the children's giftedness and anxiety, and the lack of a safe, structured environment for inter-sibling visits.

The parties were urged to pursue mediation and communicate to resolve parenting and financial issues.

The applicant, an OPP Sergeant, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Civilian Police Commission upholding findings of misconduct for writing a letter to a newspaper criticizing a helicopter relocation.

The applicant argued the Hearing Officer was biased and erred in denying a disclosure motion, which prevented him from establishing a whistleblower defence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias and agreeing with the Commission that the whistleblower defence failed because the applicant did not first raise his concerns internally with his chain of command.

The applicant, an off-duty police officer, spoke at a conference in favour of cannabis legalization despite being ordered not to attend or speak.

He was convicted of insubordination and discreditable conduct.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission revoked the discreditable conduct conviction but upheld the insubordination conviction, finding the order was lawful under s. 49 of the Police Services Act.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court found the Commission's decision unreasonable because it failed to consider s. 80(2) of the Act, which requires a connection between off-duty conduct and the occupational requirements or reputation of the police force.

Given the Commission's findings on the discreditable conduct charge, the court concluded the s. 80(2) test could not be met and revoked the insubordination conviction.