Frances P. Kiteley

In a family law proceeding, the applicant sought a vesting order granting sole title to the former matrimonial home in order to refinance the property and resolve ongoing financial issues between the parties.

The respondent had failed to comply with financial disclosure obligations and remained in arrears of child support, spousal support, and unpaid costs, and was prohibited from bringing motions while the arrears remained outstanding.

The court concluded that the objective of an earlier refinancing order had not been achieved and that granting a vesting order was necessary to break the impasse.

The court vested title to the matrimonial home in the applicant and authorized her to refinance the property without the respondent’s consent subject to conditions.

The order also addressed discharge of encumbrances, payments to the respondent, and preserved the respondent’s right to pursue equalization and sale remedies at trial.

A father appealed an Ontario Court of Justice order dismissing his motion for leave to bring a further status review application regarding Crown ward children and access.

The lower court had applied the test for granting leave under the Child and Family Services Act and found no unusual circumstances, no prima facie case, and that further litigation would undermine the children’s need for stability and permanence.

The appellant argued procedural unfairness and misapprehension of evidence, including medical evidence explaining his absence and a parenting program letter.

The court held the motion judge committed no palpable and overriding error and properly applied the governing legal test.

The appeal was dismissed.

In a high‑income family law proceeding, the applicant sought temporary child and spousal support following separation.

The respondent argued his income had fallen significantly due to banking restrictions and business challenges and urged the court to base support on a projected income of approximately $1.6 million rather than his prior line 150 income exceeding $5 million.

The court held that, on an interim motion without oral evidence or credibility findings, the respondent had not established that his proposed lower income fairly reflected the money available for support under the Child Support Guidelines.

The court therefore relied on the respondent’s 2014 line 150 income to calculate temporary support.

Temporary child support and spousal support were ordered accordingly.

The applicant brought a motion for temporary child and spousal support.

The key issue was determining the respondent's income, as he had recently lost his high-paying job and was managing significant debt.

The applicant sought to impute the respondent's 2014 income of $377,763, while the respondent argued his 2015 income was $229,721.

The court declined to impute the higher income, finding the job loss was involuntary.

Due to the unusual circumstances of job loss and significant debt, the court departed from the guidelines and applied a needs-based approach, ordering the respondent to pay $1,500 in child support and $4,500 in spousal support monthly, plus child care expenses.

The applicant sought continuation of an ex parte order preserving a property owned by her in-laws and requiring discharge of a collateral mortgage registered shortly before trial in a family property dispute involving claims of constructive and resulting trust.

The court considered the interlocutory injunction test from RJR‑MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General).

While the court found serious issues to be tried and a risk of irreparable harm if the mortgage fully encumbered the property, it determined that the balance of convenience favoured permitting the mortgage to remain in place subject to limits.

The court ordered that the respondents could draw no more than $250,000 on the secured line of credit pending trial and continued the certificate of pending litigation.

The preservation and mortgage discharge aspects of the prior ex parte order were set aside and no costs were awarded.

During a multi-day family and civil trial involving claims for divorce, spousal support, equalization of net family property, and tort and contract allegations, counsel for the plaintiff/respondent sought to withdraw due to sudden illness.

The plaintiff requested leave under Rule 4 of the Family Law Rules for an articling student to represent her.

The court reviewed authorities requiring special circumstances to permit representation by a non-lawyer and considered the student's status, including an unresolved Law Society good character issue and the absence of an articling principal.

The court concluded that permitting the student to conduct a complex ten‑day trial would be unfair to the opposing party and the court.

The request for leave was denied.

Following an earlier endorsement deciding a family law motion, the court addressed costs.

The successful party sought full recovery costs of $20,800, while the opposing party argued that no costs should be awarded or that they should be reduced.

The court dismissed a request for leave to file reply submissions on costs and held that settlement discussions during mediation were protected by privilege and should not be referenced.

Finding that the unsuccessful party had behaved unreasonably in the underlying proceedings, the court ordered costs above partial indemnity but reduced the requested amount as disproportionate.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded, payable by set-off against any amounts owing or otherwise at final judgment or settlement.

The applicant brought a 14B motion seeking, among other things, abridgment of service time, validation of service, substituted service by email and courier to a respondent residing in the People’s Republic of China, and permission to bring further motions before a case conference.

The court considered the requirements of the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters and relevant appellate authority emphasizing compliance with international service procedures.

Although evidence suggested the respondent had actual knowledge of the proceeding, the court held that where the Hague Convention applies, its service requirements must be respected.

The applicant failed to establish a basis for validating service or permitting substituted service inconsistent with the Convention.

The motion was dismissed without prejudice to renewal with further evidence and a factum.

The respondent husband brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the applicant wife's claims to set aside their separation agreement.

The wife alleged that the husband failed to provide adequate financial disclosure regarding his business interests and income, and that she signed the agreement under duress.

Applying the framework from Hryniak and the amended Family Law Rule 16, the court found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial regarding both the adequacy of the husband's financial disclosure and the wife's allegations of duress.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

The respondent father brought a motion to retroactively vary a temporary child support order and to vacate accumulated arrears, asserting reduced income after losing his business position and working lower-paying jobs.

The applicant mother opposed the motion and sought a retroactive increase in child support, alleging the father remained connected to the business and was underemployed.

The court found the father's evidence of reduced income unreliable, citing failure to disclose financial information, inconsistent explanations, and indications of ongoing business activity.

The court held that the father had not established a material change in circumstances sufficient to vary the temporary order and dismissed his motion.

The mother's request to retroactively increase child support and other financial issues were adjourned to the trial judge, while the proceeding was transferred to Newmarket and a revised access schedule was ordered.

The responding parent brought a motion seeking temporary sole custody, modification of the parenting schedule, and authority to register the parties’ four‑year‑old child in junior kindergarten.

The court held that the moving party had not demonstrated a material change in circumstances since the temporary parenting order, which had created a stable and functioning time‑sharing arrangement.

Given ongoing parental conflict and logistical challenges arising from the parties living in different parts of the city, the court concluded that neither parent should be granted sole temporary custody or authority to enroll the child in school.

The court determined that attendance at junior kindergarten was not mandatory and that, in the absence of parental agreement or a final custody determination, it was preferable that the child not attend school that year.

The motion to vary custody, school registration, and the parenting schedule was dismissed.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking a stay of an Ontario family law proceeding on the basis that Ontario lacked jurisdiction over divorce and custody issues.

The court examined jurisdiction under s. 3(1) of the Divorce Act and ss. 22, 23, 25, and 40 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.

The moving party argued that the child’s habitual residence and the parties’ last common habitual residence were in British Columbia and that the other province was the more appropriate forum.

The court found the applicant had not established ordinary residence in Ontario for the required period and that the statutory criteria for exercising jurisdiction under the CLRA were not satisfied.

The proceeding was stayed and the child was ordered returned to British Columbia.

Following earlier parenting motion proceedings, the respondent sought recovery of litigation costs.

The court considered Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and the presumption that a successful party is entitled to costs.

The judge found the opposing party had acted unreasonably in the litigation, including denying access, failing to comply with court orders, and causing repeated court attendances.

The court determined that substantial indemnity costs were appropriate and awarded a reduced amount after reviewing the bill of costs and accounting for a prior “no costs” order.

In a high-conflict family law proceeding under case management, the court conducted telephone case conferences to address disputes relating to parenting scheduling, confidentiality agreements affecting disclosure, and the impending power of sale of the former matrimonial home.

The parties had previously agreed not to bring parenting motions pending completion of a s. 30 assessment, but urgent issues arose concerning mortgage arrears and potential power of sale proceedings.

The court declined to authorize several proposed motions but granted the respondent leave to bring a limited motion concerning the power of sale timeline due to the urgency of the mortgage demand.

The judge maintained strict case management control, requiring leave and a timetable before any motions could be brought and scheduling a further case conference to determine next procedural steps.

Following an earlier endorsement awarding substantial indemnity costs, the court determined the allocation and quantum of costs arising from a family law motion.

The court considered whether the respondent’s counsel should personally bear responsibility under rule 24(9) of the Family Law Rules for unnecessarily increasing litigation costs.

The judge found that both the respondent and his lawyer engaged in unreasonable conduct that created unnecessary legal work for the applicant.

The applicant’s bill of costs was accepted in full.

Responsibility for the costs was divided equally between the respondent and his counsel.

At a case conference to manage a family law proceeding, the court addressed multiple outstanding procedural issues, including financial disclosure, questioning, and a long-delayed motion for summary judgment.

Noting the lack of progress and the logjam created by the pending summary judgment motion, the case management judge prioritized the summary judgment motion and established a strict timetable for its hearing, deferring other motions.

At a case conference in a family law proceeding, the court addressed a procedural logjam.

The applicant sought to set aside a separation agreement based on lack of disclosure and duress, while the respondent had a pending motion for summary judgment to dismiss those claims.

The court prioritized the scheduling of the summary judgment motion over the applicant's motions for further disclosure and interim support, finding that resolving the summary judgment motion was necessary to advance the case.

The applicant brought a motion for declarations concerning whether portions of prior family property orders were automatically stayed by the respondent's appeal.

The court held that the provision directing equal sharing of sale proceeds from jointly owned property was not a provision for payment of money within rule 63.01, and therefore was not stayed.

However, the deductions and prior costs order were provisions for payment of money and were stayed pending appeal.

The court directed partial release of the trust funds, subject to holdbacks, and awarded motion costs to the applicant.

On a motion to set aside portions of a default final family law order, the court applied the default judgment set-aside principles and held the moving party acted promptly, provided an adequate explanation for the default, and showed arguable merit on custody and child support.

The court emphasized that sole custody had been granted on an uncontested basis without a sufficient best-interests record and that the support order may have exceeded the relief claimed and overstated income.

The interests of justice favoured allowing participation in the proceeding, particularly given the age of the children, the ongoing dispute about parenting arrangements, and the potential prejudice arising from equalization claims.

Paragraphs dealing with custody and child support were set aside, enforcement was halted, and the moving party was permitted to file responding materials.

The applicant sought costs on a full indemnity basis following successful motions regarding the respondent's breach of solicitor-client privilege.

The court reviewed the factors under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules, noting the complexity of the issues and the respondent's unreasonable behaviour.

The court reduced the applicant's claimed fees by 15% for unrelated services but ordered the respondent to pay $47,328.90 in costs immediately, rejecting his request to pay from the future sale of the matrimonial home.