Eugenia (Gina) Papageorgiou

The applicant bank sought an order for possession and power of sale of a mortgaged condominium unit.

The respondent Singh claimed to be the beneficial owner of the property pursuant to a trust declaration with the registered owner, Andrade, and raised various defences including claims of fraud, knowing assistance to breach of trust, equitable mortgage, and equitable subordination.

The court found that Singh had failed to comply with court orders requiring him to pay the mortgage and granted the bank's application for possession and a writ of possession, stayed for 30 days to allow Singh to vacate.

The plaintiff, the registered owner of a property, sought to enforce court orders requiring the defendant to pay mortgage arrears and ongoing mortgage payments.

The defendant, a self-represented litigant, brought a motion to vary the orders, arguing she should not have to pay arrears and that carrying costs and mortgage payments should be shared equally.

The defendant also sought an order restraining the plaintiff from attending the property.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion, finding her evidence inconsistent and unpersuasive.

The court upheld the requirement for the defendant to pay all arrears and ongoing mortgage payments, and directed an in-person hearing on the restraining order issue due to conflicting evidence regarding allegations of threats and intimidation.

The plaintiff bank moved for summary judgment on two loans advanced to the corporate defendant restaurant and against the individual defendant on a personal guarantee and collateral mortgage.

The court granted summary judgment in full.

The corporate defendant had no genuine issue for trial regarding two loans (a line of credit and a $100,000 loan) and a security agreement.

The individual defendant failed to raise triable issues regarding the guarantee and mortgage, including claims of undue influence, non est factum, accommodation surety status, and material alteration of the guarantee.

The court awarded judgment against the corporate defendant for the full amounts outstanding and against the individual defendant for the maximum guaranteed amount of $30,000, along with an order for possession of the mortgaged property.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendants' Statement of Defence for failure to answer undertakings from discovery, and sought default judgment or alternatively summary judgment on loan claims.

The court granted default judgment against the individual defendant Moiz Noorani for three personal unsecured loans totaling US$219,000, but declined to grant judgment against the corporate defendants.

The court found that the individual defendant's three-and-a-half-year failure to answer undertakings, coupled with breach of court orders, justified striking the defence and entering default judgment.

However, the corporate defendants were not parties to the loan agreements and the court found insufficient basis to hold them liable on the materials presented.

The total judgment against the individual defendant was US$629,221.92, including principal and accrued interest calculated to the date of judgment.

Costs of $15,000 were awarded to the plaintiffs.

This is the penalty phase of a civil contempt proceeding.

The respondent, an unlicensed individual, was found to have breached a permanent injunction by misusing a licensed professional engineer's seal on building permit applications submitted to the City of Windsor.

The respondent misappropriated the seal on 29 of 48 pages bearing the engineer's seal, placed seals on drawings never prepared by the licensed engineer, altered dates on drawings, and resubmitted them as updated documents.

The court imposed a 14-day custodial sentence, finding the breach was knowing, deliberate, and repeated over several years.

The respondent showed no genuine remorse, continued to deny wrongdoing, and failed to comply with multiple court orders throughout the proceedings.

The court also awarded substantial indemnity costs of $21,144.85 payable in quarterly installments of $3,000 commencing January 1, 2026.

An application concerning the validity of a will executed by the deceased on May 13, 2022.

The applicant, as estate trustee under a prior will, challenges the validity of the 2022 will on grounds of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence.

The respondent propounds the 2022 will.

The court found suspicious circumstances sufficient to displace the presumption of validity, including prior findings of undue influence in a related powers of attorney proceeding, significant changes to the will's dispositive provisions, and evidence of cognitive impairment.

However, new evidence presented by the respondent and the deceased's daughter, which had not been tested through cross-examination, created conflicts requiring resolution at trial.

The court directed the matter to proceed to trial.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of a motion for an injunction.

The respondent sought costs in the amount of $116,344.59, including a claim for substantial indemnity costs based on offers to settle.

The court considered whether costs should be reserved to trial or awarded forthwith.

While the general rule is that costs on unsuccessful injunction motions should be paid forthwith, the court found that costs should be reserved to the cause based on the particular circumstances of the case, including the respondent's delivery of an undertaking that addressed the applicant's concerns and formed the basis for the dismissal.

The applicant sought directions regarding a holograph will discovered after obtaining a Certificate of Appointment of Estate Trustee without a Will.

The court validated the holograph will dated July 11, 2000, found certain revisions invalid except for the obliteration of one beneficiary, appointed the applicant as Estate Trustee with a Will, and provided detailed directions regarding the distribution of the estate among beneficiaries, including addressing the pre-deceased beneficiaries and the interpretation of ambiguous provisions.

The court awarded costs to the applicant and certain respondents.

The applicants sought a declaration that a contingency fee agreement (CFA) executed in October 2019 applied only to the trial award and not to the increased award on appeal or to a subsequent settlement.

The respondent law firm claimed entitlement to a 30% contingency on both the appeal award and settlement.

The court found that the CFA was a trial retainer only, that no valid contingency fee agreement existed for the appeal (as any alleged oral agreement failed to comply with the Solicitors Act requirement that contingency fee agreements be in writing), and that the CFA did not apply to the settlement.

The court awarded the lawyers fees on a quantum meruit basis for their appeal work.

The plaintiff, a title insurance company, brought a motion for default judgment against multiple defendants in a mortgage fraud case.

The defendants obtained fraudulent mortgage proceeds of $585,700 by falsely representing themselves as property owners.

The defendants failed to participate in the proceedings.

The court granted default judgment, finding the defendants liable for fraud, conspiracy to defraud, unjust enrichment, and breaches of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act and Assignment and Preferences Act.

The court awarded compensatory damages, punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 2.1.01 to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action as frivolous and vexatious.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant lawyer made false and defamatory statements regarding the plaintiff's affidavit of service.

The court dismissed the action on multiple grounds: the statement was true (justification defence), it was not published to a third party (only copied to the defendant's assistant), and it was protected by absolute privilege as communications incidental to litigation.

The court also noted that the plaintiff had selectively referenced email communications out of context in the statement of claim.

The applicants sought a permanent or interlocutory injunction to prevent the respondent from interfering with their easement rights over a laneway.

The respondent, a non-profit charitable corporation, intends to construct a long-term care home and has proposed restrictions to the laneway width and temporary closures.

The court dismissed the motion for an interlocutory injunction, finding that while the applicants demonstrated a substantial issue to be tried, they failed to establish irreparable harm.

The court noted that the applicants had previously agreed to similar restrictions in a Memorandum of Understanding in exchange for removal of a restrictive covenant, and that any damages would be quantifiable.

The balance of convenience favoured the respondent's development of the long-term care facility.

The defendants and third party moved to enforce a settlement agreement reached on November 12, 2024, at an exit pre-trial conference.

The plaintiff, a self-represented litigant, sought to repudiate the settlement, alleging that her lawyer, Eli Karp, lacked authority to settle and that the settlement was procured under duress with overbroad release language.

The court found that the parties entered into a binding settlement with all essential terms agreed upon, that Karp had both actual and ostensible authority to settle, and that the settlement was not procured under duress or through misrepresentation.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments regarding the adequacy of the settlement amount and the scope of the releases, finding them to be standard and reasonable.

The motion to enforce the settlement was granted.

The court considered cross-motions for summary judgment regarding a failed assignment of a pre-construction condominium agreement.

The plaintiff sought to retain a $70,000 deposit after the defendants did not complete the assignment, while the defendants sought its return.

The court found that the plaintiff failed to seek the vendor’s consent to the assignment “forthwith” as required, and that the vendor’s consent documents imposed unreasonable new terms not contemplated by the assignment agreement.

The court held that the assignment agreement was null and void and ordered the return of the deposit to the defendants.

The court granted the motion by the defendants Mario Cortis and MediHub International Inc. for security for costs, ordering $80,000 to be posted by the plaintiff, John Davis, but stayed the order for 90 days due to evidence that Davis may imminently return to Ontario.

The decision reviews the legal test for security for costs, the relevance and admissibility of new evidence, and the balancing of interests between the parties.

The court found that Davis had not demonstrated that an order for security for costs would be unjust, and that the amount sought by the defendants was excessive, setting a lower amount.

The ruling also addresses delay, bad faith allegations, and the complexity of the case.

This costs endorsement arises from a failed real estate transaction that proceeded to a two-day summary trial under the simplified procedure.

The plaintiff, Anthony Gyimah, sought rescission and damages after the transaction with the Church failed to close due to a dispute over key delivery.

The Church counterclaimed for specific performance or damages.

The court found both parties partially successful but awarded the plaintiff the majority of his claim, with a small damages award to the Church.

The court considered the conduct of both parties in determining costs, ultimately awarding the plaintiff partial indemnity costs against the Church, and substantial indemnity costs to Mr. Lehoux, but in a reduced amount.

The court also addressed the appropriate rate and period for prejudgment interest.

The plaintiff, Lazy Dolphin Development Inc., sought and was granted default judgment against the defendant, Senthilruban Pathmanathan, for failing to close a real estate transaction.

The court reviewed the basis for liability and the calculation of damages, including the effect of an amendment to the purchase agreement, the resale of the property, and the appropriate date for interest calculation.

The court awarded damages, legal fees, commission, and interest, and clarified the principles for assessing damages and interest in the context of failed real estate transactions.

This costs endorsement follows a successful application by Figaro Dominion Ltd. and Figaro Gate Ltd. for a permanent injunction restraining the developer from obstructing a laneway and parking behind the applicants’ units.

The court awarded the applicants $33,000 in costs against the developer and awarded the Church full indemnity costs of $68,076.53, also payable by the developer.

The decision addresses the scale and quantum of costs, the effect of settlement offers, and the application of an indemnity clause in a Crane Swing Agreement.

This decision concerns an urgent case conference in which the plaintiffs, One World Logistics Group Corp. and Makstrans Logistic Ltd., sought interim injunctive relief against the defendant, Maksim Sotiri, following his termination from employment.

The plaintiffs alleged breaches of non-competition, non-solicitation, and confidentiality covenants.

The court declined to grant an interim order restraining competition, citing the breadth of the covenant and the compensability of damages.

Orders were made regarding confidentiality, provision of login codes, and a temporary restraint on further complaints to regulatory bodies pending a full hearing.

The matter was scheduled for a full injunction motion.

The court considered whether the plaintiff's claim for repayment of loans to the defendant was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff and defendant were long-time friends, and the plaintiff loaned the defendant significant sums over several years.

The defendant did not dispute the loans or the amounts but argued the claim was out of time.

The court found the loans were not demand loans, and the limitation period was not suspended by part payments or acknowledgments made after the period expired.

The court concluded the claim was statute-barred and dismissed the action, despite finding the plaintiff would have succeeded on the merits.