Eric Anthony Clear Williams

The appellant appealed a Judges' Ruling that placed four of her horses on the Judges' List due to her association with a suspended licensee.

Prior to the hearing, the appellant sold all four horses.

The Ontario Racing Commission determined that the appeal was moot because the appellant no longer owned the horses.

The Commission also clarified that the appellant, having not been found in breach of any rules, may continue to participate in the horse racing industry provided she complies with the rules of racing.

The licensee, a standardbred driver/trainer/owner, appealed a 15-day suspension for a positive random drug test for cocaine and oxycodone, and an indefinite suspension for a subsequent positive follow-up test for cocaine.

He also sought a declaration that the initial suspension caused an unnecessary delay in his return to racing.

The Ontario Racing Commission dismissed the appeals and applications, finding that the positive tests were valid and the licensee's explanations were not credible.

The Commission ordered a one-year suspension, a $1,000 fine, and imposed strict conditions for reinstatement, including completion of a substance abuse program.

The appellant, a standardbred licensee, appealed a ruling that suspended his licence pending the resolution of outstanding felony charges in Ohio.

The Ontario Racing Commission dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate why a stay would be in the best interests of racing.

The Commission ordered that the appellant must provide proper documentation that his Ohio issues have been resolved before applying for a licence, and must then satisfy the Director as to why he should be privileged to receive a licence.

The appellant, a standardbred licensee, appealed the severity of a penalty imposed by the Standardbred Judges after his horse tested positive for Class III drugs.

The penalty included a $1,500 fine and a 60-day suspension.

The Ontario Racing Commission dismissed the appeal and upheld the penalty.

However, noting the appellant's cooperation and admission of administering the drug, the Commission allowed him to enter his horses four days before the expiration of his suspension.

The licensee, a standardbred trainer, appealed a suspension for failing to provide a urine sample under the human drug testing program.

He admitted to leaving the racetrack without permission and without providing the required sample.

The Ontario Racing Commission found a violation of Rule 6.38.06.

Noting that the licensee had already served a 28-day suspension, the Commission imposed no further suspension but placed him on probation for 12 months with conditions including mandatory breath and urine testing.

The licensee, a standardbred trainer, appeared before the Ontario Racing Commission after testing positive for cannabis, violating the Rules of Standardbred Racing and a prior probation order.

The licensee admitted to the allegations and acknowledged a substance abuse problem.

The Commission ordered the licensee to complete a 90-day substance abuse treatment program, participate in a 12-month aftercare program, provide a clean urine sample prior to license renewal, and extended his probation to April 2009.

The standardbred licensee appealed to the Ontario Racing Commission after failing to provide a urine sample pursuant to the human drug testing program.

The Commission found that the licensee violated Rule 6.38.06 of the Rules of Standardbred Racing by leaving the racetrack without permission and without providing the required sample.

Noting that ignorance of the rules is not a valid defence, the Commission ordered the licensee to serve a 12-month probation period with conditions, including providing breath and urine samples upon request.

The appellant, a standardbred licensee, was suspended after a horse he trained tested positive for a Class III drug.

His request for a stay of the suspension pending a hearing was denied by the Executive Director.

On appeal, the Commission found that while the Judges and Executive Director acted within their mandate, there was a lack of disclosure and failure to provide written reasons as required by the Racing Commission Act.

The Commission granted the stay of suspension and ordered that the hearing be expedited.

The appellant, a standardbred licensee, appealed a 15-day suspension and $2,000 fine imposed after a horse he trained tested positive for the Class V drug procaine.

The appellant argued he administered the drug within prescribed guidelines and that a delayed retest showed levels within the legal limit.

The Ontario Racing Commission dismissed the appeal, finding the initial test result was accurate and above the allowable threshold, while the retest was likely affected by the deterioration of the sample over time.

As this was the appellant's second positive test within one year, the Commission varied the penalty to a 30-day suspension and a $1,500 fine in accordance with penalty guidelines.

Fourteen standardbred licensees appealed rulings finding them in violation of the Rules of Standardbred Racing for using the services of suspended veterinarians to draw blood for Coggins tests.

The appellants argued they were unaware of the suspensions.

The Ontario Racing Commission denied the appeals, holding that ignorance of the rules and directives is not an acceptable defence, as the Commission had adequately communicated the suspensions to the industry.

However, finding no intent to gain an unfair advantage, the Commission ruled the appellants violated Rule 1.09 but not Rule 6.20(b), and reduced their fines from $1,000 to $100 each.

The appellants, standardbred licensees, sought a stay of their one-year suspensions and fines pending their appeals.

The Executive Director had previously denied the stay.

The Commission granted the stay, noting concerns about procedural fairness and full disclosure raised by the appellants' counsel, which the Administration acknowledged.

The Commission ordered an expedited hearing de novo.

The appellant life insurance company appealed a trial judgment awarding its former agent damages for breach of fiduciary duty, punitive damages, and vested renewal commissions following his termination.

The trial judge found the appellant breached its fiduciary duty by freezing the agent's vested commission account and acted in bad faith in its post-termination conduct.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on the vested commissions, the breach of fiduciary duty, the punitive damages award, and the dismissal of the appellant's counterclaim.

However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal regarding the trial judge's award of a risk premium on costs, holding that the amended Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure does not permit a risk premium to be awarded against an unsuccessful party.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their personal injury claim.

The trial judge had found the plaintiff's evidence regarding how the accident occurred to be confusing and inconsistent due to her age and illness, and drew an adverse inference from the failure to call a witness to the accident.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding there was no prima facie case of negligence, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellants were injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by an impaired driver who had just left a BYOB house party hosted by the respondents.

The appellants sued the social hosts, arguing they owed a duty of care to third-party users of the highway.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that social hosts do not owe a duty of care to members of the public who may be injured by an intoxicated guest's conduct, unless the host's conduct implicates them in the creation or exacerbation of the risk.

The Court found that the injury was not reasonably foreseeable and that there was no positive duty to act.

The appellant lender appealed the dismissal of its claim against a law firm that acted for both sides in a loan transaction, alleging conflict of interest and failure to advise on risks.

The respondent mortgagors cross-appealed, arguing the mortgage was invalid because the law firm failed to insist the wife obtain independent legal advice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, upholding the trial judge's findings that no disqualifying conflict existed, the lender would have proceeded regardless of further advice, and the wife would have signed the mortgage even with independent legal advice because the loan benefited her family.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim for life insurance benefits.

The insurer argued that a diagnosis of cancer was made within the 90-day exclusion period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that while a diagnosis does not need to be communicated to the patient or made by a treating physician to be effective, the policy specifically defined 'cancer (life-threatening)' to exclude some cancers.

Because the doctor's report did not clearly indicate whether the cancer detected met this definition, a triable issue existed.

The summary judgment was set aside.

Following an appeal that set aside an order extending limitation periods but adjourned the issues to trial, all parties sought costs.

The Court of Appeal determined that the respondents were substantially successful because they defeated the appellants' motion for summary judgment and maintained their position that the limitation issues should be decided at trial.

The respondents were awarded costs of $15,000 on a partial indemnity basis.

The deceased was struck and killed by two motorists while walking on a highway after becoming intoxicated at a college event.

The deceased's family commenced an action under the Family Law Act more than three years after the accident.

The motion judge extended the two-year limitation period under s. 2(8) of the Family Law Act and applied the discoverability rule.

The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants' appeal, holding that the plaintiffs' unawareness of the limitation period did not postpone it, and that whether the requirements of s. 2(8) and the discoverability rule were met should be determined at trial rather than on a motion.

The appellant was seriously injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by an impaired driver who had just left a BYOB party hosted by the respondents.

The appellant sued the driver and the social hosts.

The trial judge found the driver liable but dismissed the action against the social hosts, finding they owed no duty of care for policy reasons.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the social hosts, concluding that on the specific facts of this case—where the hosts did not serve the alcohol, did not know how much the driver drank, and did not know he was impaired when he left—no duty of care was owed to third-party users of the road.

The appeal was dismissed as to liability but allowed in part regarding costs.

Mothers Against Drunk Driving Canada (MADD Canada) brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning social host liability for drunk driving.

The underlying case involved a plaintiff who was seriously injured by an intoxicated driver who had left a party hosted by the defendants.

The court granted the motion, finding that the appeal involved broad public policy considerations regarding whether to recognize a novel duty of care.

The court held that MADD Canada could make a useful contribution to the policy analysis without causing injustice to the parties, despite its alignment with the plaintiffs' position.