Emtiaz Bala

The plaintiffs, who were arrested multiple times during counter-protests at the Caledonia native occupation, brought a motion to amend their statements of claim to add new allegations of wrongful arrest, Charter violations, conspiracy, and harassment.

The defendant Crown brought a cross-motion to strike portions of the amended claims.

The court held that several of the new claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as they constituted separate events rather than a continuing tort.

The court also struck the conspiracy and harassment claims for lack of particulars, but granted leave to amend.

The Crown's motion to strike the defamation claim was dismissed, as the court found the impugned remarks were capable of referring to the plaintiff despite not naming him specifically.

The applicant, a payday lender, brought an application for judicial review challenging the validity of amendments to a regulation under the Payday Loans Act, 2008.

The amendments redefined the total cost of borrowing to include directly or indirectly connected amounts, required lenders to provide cash for unused balances on devices, and prohibited the sale of third-party services in connection with payday loans.

The applicant argued that the government breached its legitimate expectations by failing to provide a 45-day consultation period and that the amendments were ultra vires.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not apply to the exercise of legislative powers and that the amendments were intra vires as they aligned with the consumer protection purpose of the Act.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the applicants' judicial review application for delay, or alternatively, to strike a recent amendment to the application.

The applicants had commenced the application to challenge regulations under the Payday Loans Act, 2008, but delayed advancing it while monitoring a related case and negotiating with government officials.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the applicants provided an adequate explanation for the delay and the respondents suffered no prejudice.

The court also allowed the amendment to stand, noting the broader public interest issues involved, and appointed a case management judge to prevent further delay.

The plaintiff commenced a civil action alleging malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance in public office, conspiracy, and related torts arising from withdrawn murder charges.

The Crown defendants moved under Rule 21.01 to strike the claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action or, alternatively, as an abuse of process.

The court held that witness immunity protected the police officers for statements connected to prior proceedings and that the officers neither initiated the prosecution nor owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.

The pleadings contained bald allegations of malice and collusion without the material facts required by the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court also found the claim barred by a prior consent dismissal involving the Crown and concluded that allowing the action to proceed would constitute an abuse of process.

The applicant, an unrepresented accused charged with robbery, aggravated assault, and uttering threats, sought the appointment of amicus curiae to represent his interests at a preliminary inquiry.

The applicant's Legal Aid certificate was denied after his previous counsel withdrew due to a conflict of interest.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to appoint amicus curiae and whether such an appointment was necessary to prevent a failure of justice.

The court found that the Ontario Court of Justice has jurisdiction to appoint amicus curiae in limited circumstances where necessary to prevent a failure of justice, and that the imminent preliminary inquiry with one co-accused in custody for eight months necessitated the appointment.

The court appointed counsel as amicus curiae at a rate of $180 per hour.

The applicant filed a human rights application against the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO), one of its Vice-chairs, and the Ministry of the Attorney General, alleging discrimination and reprisal in the handling of her ongoing human rights complaint against a school board.

The applicant alleged the Vice-chair showed bias during mediation and the HRTO improperly denied interim relief.

The HRTO determined it had jurisdiction to assess whether the application was properly before it without creating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The adjudicator dismissed the application, finding it was an abuse of process and a collateral attack on an ongoing proceeding.

The adjudicator also noted that the allegations related to adjudicative functions, which are protected by adjudicative immunity and do not constitute 'services' under the Code.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Provincial Schools Admission Committee denying her admission to a provincial school for the deaf.

The applicant, who has a developmental brain malformation and severe language delays, communicates primarily using American Sign Language.

The Committee denied admission based on audiological reports showing normal peripheral hearing, concluding she did not have an auditory handicap.

The Divisional Court allowed the application for judicial review, finding the Committee breached procedural fairness by excluding relevant documents and hearing from a Ministry witness without the applicant's knowledge.

The Court also found the Committee failed to properly consider all medical evidence regarding the applicant's central auditory processing disorder.

The decision was set aside and remitted to a newly constituted committee.