Ellen B. Murray

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual interference involving a child complainant.

The appeal alleged errors including improper admission of spousal communications obtained through cross‑examination of the accused’s spouse without advising her of spousal privilege, improper admission of similar fact evidence involving unrelated sexual conduct with an adult several years earlier, and ineffective assistance of counsel related to disclosure of a letter written by the accused.

The court held that spousal privilege under s. 4(3) of the Canada Evidence Act required the spouse to be informed of the privilege before waiving it, and the failure to do so resulted in improperly admitted evidence that materially affected the credibility findings against the accused.

The court further found that the similar fact evidence lacked probative value and created significant prejudice.

Because these errors could have affected the verdict, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

A child protection agency sought to reopen a trial after evidence had concluded and submissions had been made, but before judgment was rendered.

The agency wished to introduce a psychological assessment of the child conducted by an expert who had not testified during the trial.

The respondent mother opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence could have been adduced during the agency's case-in-chief, that reopening would cause significant delay in a matter where timely permanency planning was critical, and that the timing of the motion suggested the agency only sought to introduce the evidence after confirming it would support their case.

The court found that allowing the motion would be unfair to the respondent and contrary to the child's best interests.

The respondent father sought an order to change the child's registered surname from the mother's maiden name to a hyphenated surname including his name.

The child was born during the parties' brief marriage and registered by the mother alone under the Vital Statistics Act.

The father argued that the mother's refusal to acknowledge him for registration purposes was unreasonable and that the court should exercise parens patriae jurisdiction to order the change.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Ontario Court of Justice lacks parens patriae jurisdiction and that even if it possessed such jurisdiction, the evidence supported the mother's decision not to acknowledge the father for registration purposes.

A protection application brought by the Catholic Children's Aid Society of Toronto concerning a child (D.R.) born in 2004.

The child's parents, M.R. (mother) and C.R. (father), had not communicated since two months after the child's birth.

The society sought a finding that the child was in need of protection pursuant to clauses 37(2)(f) and (g) of the Child and Family Services Act, alleging that the mother had consistently failed to support the child's relationship with the father and had caused emotional harm through her actions.

The court found that the child was in need of protection due to emotional harm caused by the mother's interference with the father-child relationship and her rigid belief that the father had abused the child, despite investigations finding no evidence of abuse.

The court ordered that the child be placed in the father's care subject to society supervision for 12 months, with the mother's access to be at the society's discretion.

The court emphasized the need for therapeutic intervention with the mother to address her dysfunctional beliefs about the father.

Two young persons charged with robbery with a firearm and disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence in relation to a jewellery store robbery brought a motion alleging violation of their right to trial within a reasonable time under Section 11(b) of the Charter.

The defendants sought a stay of charges.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the defendants' Section 11(b) application, finding that the total delay from charge to trial was reasonable when properly allocated between Crown delay, institutional delay, and inherent time requirements of the case.

The court also adjourned the defendants' application grounded in Section 7 and Section 11(d) of the Charter to the trial dates.

The applicant mother sought permission to relocate her son from Toronto to Surrey, British Columbia, and to vary the access order accordingly.

The respondent father opposed the relocation.

The court found that the mother had established a material change in circumstances (a 25% reduction in her income) that affected her ability to meet the child's needs.

Applying the two-part test from Gordon v. Goertz, the court conducted a fresh inquiry into the child's best interests and found that the proposed move would not materially alter the father's ability to exercise access.

The court granted the mother's application to relocate, finding that her views as the custodial parent were entitled to great respect and that the move was made in good faith for legitimate financial and personal reasons.

The appellant appealed the imposition of a peace bond following an acquittal on a charge of breach of recognizance.

The trial judge imposed the peace bond without giving notice that such an order was being contemplated and without allowing the accused to make submissions or call evidence on whether it should be imposed.

The appeal court held that imposing a peace bond without affording the accused an opportunity to be heard breached principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.

The court also found there was no evidentiary basis for the peace bond, as the trial judge relied on speculation and irrelevant considerations rather than evidence establishing a risk of future breach of the peace.

The peace bond was quashed.

This is a status review application under the Child and Family Services Act concerning two children found to be in need of protection due to domestic violence between their parents and lack of supports for the mother.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order of Crown wardship with a plan for adoption.

The mother sought custody under supervision, while the father sought placement with his grandparents.

The court rejected both the Society's plan for Crown wardship and the mother's plan for return to her care, finding instead that placement with the paternal grandparents under Society supervision best served the children's interests while maintaining family connections and protecting them from the risks posed by their parents' conflicted relationship.

A motion by a maternal grandfather to be added as a party to child protection proceedings, or alternatively to have specified rights to participate.

The child, a 15½-year-old girl, had been in the temporary care of the Children's Aid Society for one year following allegations of physical and emotional abuse by the mother and failure to protect by the father.

The grandfather proposed a plan for the child's placement in his care.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the grandfather had a legal interest in the proceedings and had proposed a carefully thought-out plan, the child's clear and consistent rejection of contact with him rendered the plan unlikely to be viable.

The court noted that the child's views and preferences are an important factor in determining best interests for a child of this age, and that the parents' counsel could adequately present the grandfather's plan without him being added as a party.

This is a child protection trial under the Child and Family Services Act involving two children, K.A.J. (born 1998) and I.C. (born 2006), who were found to be in need of protection on July 7, 2011.

The Society sought Crown wardship for both children.

The respondent mother sought return of the children under Society supervision, citing her completion of an alcohol treatment program.

The respondent father sought custody of I.C. with a plan to take the child to Angola upon his deportation.

The court found that both children should be made Crown wards, with the Society's plan for long-term care and independent living for K.A.J., and adoption for I.C. The court granted limited access orders to both parents and between the siblings.

A custody dispute between the biological father and the deceased mother's partner over two children, ages 12 and 11.

The father sought custody following the mother's death in July 2012, while the partner, designated as guardian in the mother's will, also claimed custody.

The court awarded custody to the partner, finding that despite the father's biological relationship to the children, the partner had provided stable care, the children consistently wished to remain with him, and the father had demonstrated insensitivity to the children's emotional needs by denigrating their deceased mother and the partner in their presence.

The father retained Saturday access as previously ordered.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order of Crown wardship for a child who had been in temporary Society care for over 30 months, exceeding the statutory 12-month limit.

The respondent parents sought return of the child under supervision or, alternatively, a 6-month extension of Society wardship.

The court found that despite the Society's arguments regarding serious protection concerns—including the mother's seizure disorder, the father's substance abuse and criminal history, domestic violence, and both parents' mental health issues—there remained genuine issues of material fact requiring trial.

The court noted significant developments, particularly the mother's successful brain surgery resulting in seizure freedom and improved mental health.

The motion was dismissed and the matter was directed to trial.

The Family Responsibility Office sought enforcement of substantial child and spousal support arrears totalling $509,516.09 against a self-employed dentist.

The payor's prior support orders had been based on an imputed income of $380,000 annually, but he claimed his income had declined significantly to approximately $92,400 annually.

The court found the payor had not rebutted the presumption of ability to pay and was underemployed by choice.

The court ordered immediate incarceration of 15 days or payment of $25,000 for breach of a temporary default order, and imposed a final default order requiring payment of $175,000 within 30 days (in default of which 120 days incarceration) plus ongoing monthly payments of $2,500 increasing to $3,250 (with 5-day incarceration for each default).

A costs decision following a six-day family law trial concerning custody and access arrangements for a child.

The mother sought costs of $55,234.87 on a full recovery basis, arguing she was significantly more successful on the key issues and made reasonable settlement offers.

The father, a self-represented lawyer, argued success was divided and that his litigation conduct was reasonable.

The court found the mother was more successful on the primary issues (sole custody versus parallel parenting, and access schedule) but reduced her costs award due to her failure to serve a formal offer to settle.

The court awarded costs of $30,000 to the mother.

This is a costs decision following a successful motion by the respondent father under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

The father sought and obtained an order that the child be returned to New York State and that a non-removal order obtained by the mother be rescinded.

The father claimed costs at full recovery of $14,956.61.

The court awarded costs of $13,000, finding the father was entitled to costs as the successful party, but reducing the award due to the unnecessary attendance of two counsel at argument and considering the overall reasonableness of the costs incurred.

The accused was charged with threatening to kill the complainant on December 14, 2012.

The trial took place in Toronto's Integrated Domestic Violence Court.

The complainant and accused had a former romantic relationship and were engaged in a contentious family court proceeding regarding custody and access to their child.

The complainant alleged that the accused threatened to kill her, that she would explode like a balloon, that he would break her, and that he sent a threatening email.

The court found the complainant's credibility was substantially damaged by her prior false affidavit recanting allegations of assault, the suspicious timing of her allegations coinciding with an unfavorable custody recommendation, and her demonstrated determination to obtain sole custody.

The court found the accused not guilty, holding that the Crown failed to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

A youth was convicted of robbery and use of an imitation firearm to commit robbery.

The Crown sought a serious violent offence (SVO) designation and a custodial sentence of 6-8 months.

The defence argued for open custody with substantial credit for pre-sentence custody.

The court found the SVO threshold met and imposed a sentence of 90 days custody followed by 45 days community supervision and 18 months probation, with the custody to be served in an open facility.

The court considered the offender's significant mental health issues, history of instability, lack of remorse, and the serious psychological harm to the victim, balanced against the offender's youth and the rehabilitation plan developed by his support team.

In a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, the court considered a motion by the child's lawyer seeking judicial notice of documents regarding conditions in Angola, including UN Human Development Index data, UNICEF reports, and documents from the Immigration and Refugee Board's national documentation package.

The father, subject to a deportation order to Angola, sought to have the children placed in his care with a plan to relocate them to Angola.

The court rejected the motion for judicial notice, finding that the proposed facts were adjudicative in nature and closely approached the central dispositive issue in the case, requiring strict application of the Morgan standard for judicial notice.

The applicant mother sought a stand-alone order for financial disclosure from the respondent father, who is obligated to pay child support under a domestic contract.

The parties had agreed that future disputes concerning child support would be dealt with by arbitration.

The applicant sought the respondent's tax returns, notices of assessment, and financial statements from his company to assist in determining whether to claim a change in child support due to material change in circumstances.

The respondent refused disclosure, arguing it was irrelevant because the support amount was not determined by reference to his income and the parties agreed support would not be varied before January 2016.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that section 25 of the Child Support Guidelines applies only to court orders for child support, not to domestic agreements, even when registered with the court.

The court noted that the applicant could seek disclosure through the pending arbitration process.

Two competing applications concerned whether a municipal site alteration by-law regulating the dumping of fill applied to an aerodrome.

The municipality sought declarations that its by-law requiring a permit and environmental safeguards for fill operations applied to the airport’s grading activities, while the airport operator argued that such regulation intruded on exclusive federal jurisdiction over aeronautics.

Applying the constitutional doctrines governing division of powers and interjurisdictional immunity, the court held that the by-law’s pith and substance concerned environmental protection and land use regulation, matters within provincial jurisdiction.

The by-law did not impair the protected core of federal aeronautics power because it regulated only the quality and management of fill, not the design or operation of runways or airport facilities.

The municipal application was granted and the airport operator’s application was dismissed.