Elizabeth Nadeau

A young person, T.G., was found guilty of kidnapping with a firearm, firearm possession, possession of heroin (laced with fentanyl) for trafficking, possession of cocaine for trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought an adult sentence, arguing that a youth sentence would be insufficient for accountability.

The defence argued for the maximum youth sentence.

The court found that the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness was rebutted due to T.G.'s leadership role in the serious and prolonged kidnapping, his active participation in violence, and his established criminal lifestyle.

The court determined that a youth sentence would not adequately hold T.G. accountable.

Consequently, T.G. was sentenced as an adult to a global sentence of 9 years, with credit for time served, resulting in 4 years and 5 months remaining to be served in a federal penitentiary.

The court ruled on the Crown's request to instruct the jury on an alternative theory of first-degree murder under s. 231(6.1)(a) of the Criminal Code, which pertains to murders committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle and Jermaine Dunkley, were charged with first-degree murder in the shooting death of Neeko Mitchell.

The Crown alleged that Dunkley ordered the killing and Tingle lured the victim.

The court determined that the "substantial cause" standard, established in R. v. Harbottle for s. 231(5) of the Code, also applies to s. 231(6.1)(a) due to identical statutory language and legislative history.

Applying this high standard, which requires an "essential, substantial and integral" and usually physical role in the killing, the court found no evidentiary "air of reality" to support that the actions of Tingle or Dunkley met this threshold, as the victim was killed by a lone gunman and their alleged roles were more remote.

Consequently, the jury would not be instructed on this alternative theory of liability.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on a charge of first-degree murder at the close of the Crown's case.

The Crown alleged Tingle was a party to the planned and deliberate murder of Neeko Mitchell, having lured him from a community centre at the direction of Jermaine Dunkley, where Reshane Hayles-Wilson then shot him.

The court dismissed the application, finding that there was sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could return a verdict of guilty.

The ruling reiterated the legal standard for directed verdict motions, emphasizing that the trial judge's role is limited to determining if any evidence could support a conviction, taking the Crown's case at its highest, without assessing credibility or weighing evidence.

The court also noted that a prior Court of Appeal decision had affirmed the sufficiency of evidence for committal to trial, applying the same legal standard.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, sought to admit the jury verdict from the principal offender's separate trial, where the principal was acquitted of first-degree murder but convicted of second-degree murder.

The Crown objected to the admissibility of this prior verdict.

The court ruled that a jury verdict from an earlier, separate criminal trial against a principal offender is not admissible in subsequent proceedings against alleged parties to the crime.

This is based on long-standing Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, which holds that such a verdict is irrelevant and merely represents the opinion of another jury, not binding on the current jury.

This is a mid-trial ruling on the admissibility of lay opinion evidence from David Griffith in a first-degree murder trial.

The accused, Sheldon Tingle and Jermaine Dunkley, are charged in connection with the killing of Neeko Mitchell.

Griffith, a friend of the deceased, observed a man make a gesture to Mitchell shortly before his death, which the Crown alleges was Tingle luring Mitchell outside.

Defence counsel argued the evidence was inadmissible opinion and hearsay, and highly prejudicial.

The court ruled the evidence admissible, finding it fell within the exception for non-expert opinion evidence, was not tendered for a hearsay purpose, and its probative value outweighed any potential prejudice.

Two young persons were tried for kidnapping for ransom using a firearm.

One of the accused was also charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The victim, who was uncooperative at trial, had provided a detailed video-taped statement to police shortly after his release.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay and admitted portions of the victim's statement for its truth, finding substantial corroborative evidence of the kidnapping, the use of firearms, and the first accused's identity as a perpetrator.

The first accused was found guilty of kidnapping, firearms offences, drug trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The second accused was acquitted, as the fingerprint evidence and the victim's description were insufficient to prove his identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, Reshane Hayles-Wilson, was convicted of second-degree murder after a jury trial.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility, which is mandatory life imprisonment with a discretion between 10 and 25 years.

Considering aggravating factors such as the planned nature of the murder, the use of a loaded handgun in a public place, the danger to the public, and the accused's association with a criminal gang, alongside mitigating factors like his young age, lack of prior criminal record, family support, and remorse, the court set the parole ineligibility period at 15 years.

The Crown and the accused brought pre-trial motions in a severed first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to admit circumstantial evidence, including wiretaps, rap videos, and photographs, to prove the accused's association with a gang leader who allegedly directed the murder.

The court admitted the evidence, subject to editing to remove prejudicial content, finding its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The accused brought a motion alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court dismissed the Charter motion, finding that after deducting defence delay, the net delay was below the 30-month presumptive ceiling, and the case's complexity justified the timeline.

The accused, Jason Angeles, was charged with multiple counts of possession of firearms and prohibited weapons.

The Crown argued for constructive possession based on circumstantial evidence, including video surveillance of Angeles entering an apartment where weapons were later found, and his subsequent return to the apartment after a staged break-in, where he commented, "The boss man is going to be pissed." The court found that while Angeles's actions were highly suspicious and he was likely involved in criminal activity, the evidence did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had specific knowledge of the firearms.

The court distinguished the case from other constructive possession precedents, emphasizing the lack of evidence that Angeles handled the weapons or was in close proximity to them, and the possibility that he was aware of other contraband rather than specifically firearms.

Consequently, all charges were dismissed.

The accused applied for judicial interim release following a preliminary inquiry where he conceded orders to stand trial on serious charges including possession of prohibited firearms with ammunition, careless storage of weapons, possession of prohibited weapons and over-capacity magazines, possession of firearms obtained by commission of an offence, forcible confinement, kidnapping, pointing a firearm, and drug trafficking offences.

The Crown opposed release on secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused proposed release on a substantial recognizance secured by his parents with electronic monitoring via ankle bracelet.

The court denied the application, finding that the accused had not shown cause for release on both secondary and tertiary grounds, citing concerns about the sureties' ability to supervise, the accused's demonstrated disrespect for court orders, and the serious nature of the offences.

The accused applied for judicial interim release.

The court considered the secondary ground under the Criminal Code and concluded detention remained necessary due to risks to public safety and to the accused.

The alleged offences arose in the context of ongoing gang violence and an investigation that remained active with suspects still at large.

The proposed surety, the accused’s grandmother, was found unable to adequately control the accused’s movements or mitigate the risk of violence or interference with the administration of justice.

Bail was denied.

A 19-year-old American citizen was sentenced for his participation in the G-20 riots in Toronto on June 26, 2010.

The accused was convicted of multiple counts of mischief, including damaging police vehicles, retail stores, and financial institutions, as well as wearing a disguise with intent.

The court imposed a sentence of seven months imprisonment (less pre-trial custody) followed by two years probation, with conditions including a ban from Toronto and restitution orders.

The judgment extensively discusses sentencing principles for riot-related offences, balancing deterrence and denunciation against rehabilitation and the accused's youth and remorse.

The accused was charged with four counts of possessing explosive substances and one count of counselling mischief not committed, arising from his activities prior to the G20 Summit in Toronto.

Police found various chemicals and laboratory equipment in his home, which the Crown alleged were intended to make explosive substances.

The accused maintained the chemicals were for innocent purposes, including amateur rocketry, gardening, and testing the security system.

The court found the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to create explosive substances, accepting that his interest in rocketry and other hobbies raised a reasonable doubt.

On the counselling charge, the court found the accused's tweets about design flaws in the G20 security fence merely described how mischief could be committed but did not actively induce or advocate the commission of the offence.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused brought a global application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude all evidence obtained during the investigation, including chemicals and equipment seized from his home pursuant to valid search warrants.

The court found multiple Charter breaches throughout the investigation, including arbitrary detention, right to counsel violations, and search and seizure violations.

However, applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the police conduct was not in bad faith or part of a systemic disregard for Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused, arrested in relation to the G20 summit, was interviewed by intelligence officers before being permitted to speak to counsel, resulting in a breach of his s. 10(b) Charter rights.

He subsequently gave two videotaped statements to an investigating detective.

The court held that the first videotaped statement was not tainted by the earlier Charter breach and was voluntary, despite a breach of s. 503(1)(a) of the Criminal Code for failing to bring him before a justice within 24 hours.

However, the court found that a portion of the second videotaped statement was involuntary and inadmissible because the detective offered a quid pro quo regarding bail for the accused's wife and created oppressive circumstances by suggesting the accused was being investigated by national security forces.

In a criminal proceeding, the defence sought exclusion under section 24(2) of Charter evidence obtained through production orders for credit-card and phone records.

After Garofoli-related excisions and limited amplification, the court held the information to obtain did not support the TD Visa production order and found a section 8 breach for those records.

Applying R. v. Grant, the court found good-faith state conduct and a moderate informational-privacy impact, while emphasizing the reliability and trial importance of the records.

Balancing the Grant factors, the court declined to exclude the Visa records.

The defence exclusion application was dismissed, subject to the broader global section 24(2) ruling.

The accused brought an application under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence found on computers seized from his residence, arguing his s. 8 rights were infringed.

The search warrants authorized a search of computers for records relating to the production of explosives but did not expressly authorize the seizure of the computers.

The police seized the computers and searched the entire hard drives off-site.

The court found that the seizure of the computers violated s. 8, as the police could not rely on the plain view doctrine or s. 489 of the Criminal Code.

However, the court held that the cursory search of the entire hard drives was reasonable and not overbroad.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the Charter breaches were not serious, had little impact on the accused's protected interests, and the evidence was reliable and important to the Crown's case.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to mischief to property exceeding $5,000 and common nuisance through endangerment arising from breaking windows at Toronto Police Service headquarters during G20 protests in June 2010.

The Crown sought 6-8 months incarceration; defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed 60 days intermittent custody followed by one year probation with restitution of $2,500 and 100 hours community service, finding that while general deterrence and denunciation required imprisonment, the offender's personal circumstances, genuine contrition, first-offender status, and strict bail conditions warranted a reduced custodial sentence served intermittently rather than a conditional sentence.

The accused pleaded guilty to two counts of mischief over $5,000 committed during the G20 summit in Toronto in June 2010.

The Crown sought a jail sentence of six to nine months followed by probation, emphasizing the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The defence sought a conditional sentence of 12 to 15 months with house arrest.

The court imposed a 12-month conditional sentence of imprisonment (6 months on each count, consecutive) followed by 18 months of probation, balancing the objectives of denunciation and deterrence with the offender's status as a youthful first offender and his demonstrated rehabilitation efforts.

The accused brought a Charter s. 8 application following a Garofoli review seeking to exclude evidence obtained through search warrants executed at his residence.

The court addressed two reserved issues: whether the Information to Obtain properly supported a charge of intimidation of a justice system participant by “watching” police officers, and whether computers were properly included as items to be searched in a second warrant.

The court held that public online posts concerning dismantling G20 security fencing, combined with derogatory postings of police photographs, could reasonably support an inference that the accused intended to provoke fear in the general public.

The court further held that the discovery of chemical precursors, laboratory equipment, documents, and the accused’s extensive internet use provided reasonable grounds to search computers for records relating to the production of explosives.

The warrants were therefore properly supported.