Edward E. Gareau

B.S. was convicted of indecent assault, a historical offense occurring almost 40 years prior.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 12 to 18 months, while the offender requested a conditional sentence or a "short, sharp" intermittent sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the escalation of abusive behavior, the significant age disparity between the offender (18-20) and the victim (10-13), the victim's vulnerability, and the profound, lasting impact on the victim as detailed in her victim impact statement.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age (56), a positive pre-sentence report, gainful employment, positive community contributions, past efforts to address depression and substance abuse, and no prior custodial sentences.

The court determined that a conditional sentence would not adequately address the principles of denunciation and general and specific deterrence, which are paramount in sexual offense cases against children.

A "short, sharp" sentence was also deemed inadequate.

The court imposed a custodial sentence of 18 months, followed by three years of probation with specific conditions, a DNA order, and a 20-year SOIRA order.

A requested order under section 161(1) of the Criminal Code was denied as unnecessary given the offender's history since the offense.

This decision concerns a review of an interim parenting order for the parties' child.

The interim order had granted the applicant father custody and the respondent mother alternate weekend parenting time.

The applicant sought to continue this arrangement with a minor abridgment of the mother's parenting time, while the respondent sought to revert to a shared care arrangement.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer supported the continuation of the existing arrangement, citing the child's expressed preferences and improved well-being.

The court found that the child's best interests required the current arrangement to continue, denying the mother's request for shared care and the father's request for abridged parenting time.

The court also ordered joint counselling between the mother and child, a suggestion made by the mother.

The accused, D.G., was charged with two counts of assault and one count of sexual assault against the complainant, C.C., arising from a volatile common-law relationship.

The court heard evidence regarding verbal and physical altercations.

The accused admitted to restraining the complainant on two occasions, claiming self-defense.

Applying the principles of R. v. W.(D.) for credibility and s. 34 of the Criminal Code for self-defense, the court found that the accused's actions of restraint for the first assault count (July 2016) were reasonable and proportionate in self-defense, leading to an acquittal.

For the second assault count (March 14, 2017), while an act of simple assault was established, the court again found the self-defense argument had an "air of reality" and the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not acting in lawful self-defense.

Regarding the alleged punch to the head on March 14, 2017, and the sexual assault count, the court found serious credibility issues with the complainant's testimony, noting inconsistencies in her statements to police and lack of medical attention for the alleged head injury.

Consequently, the court was left with reasonable doubt on these counts.

All charges were dismissed, and the accused was acquitted.

The applicant, Robert Steven Wright, charged with first-degree murder, sought judicial interim release.

The court considered the application under the reverse onus provisions of the Criminal Code, specifically focusing on the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention.

While the secondary ground (public safety/reoffending) was not met due to the applicant's lack of criminal record and stable employment, the tertiary ground (maintaining confidence in the administration of justice) was central.

The court found the Crown's case, based on DNA and fingerprint evidence, to be very strong, bordering on overwhelming.

Considering the gravity of the offence, the violent circumstances, the potential lengthy imprisonment, and concerns regarding the proposed surety and release plan, the court concluded that detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for interim judicial release was dismissed.

This criminal trial involved 16 counts against the accused, Gary Joseph Levar, including various assault-related charges and a breach of recognizance.

The court heard evidence over nine days, focusing heavily on witness credibility, particularly given the extensive drug use by the complainant, the accused, and other key witnesses during the alleged events.

Forensic evidence, including toxicology and DNA analysis, was also presented.

The court applied the principles from R. v. W.(D.) regarding reasonable doubt.

Ultimately, the court found the evidence of the complainant to be unreliable due to drug intoxication and periods of unconsciousness, and found that the testimony of defence witnesses, particularly Vanessa McKinnon, raised reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on 14 of the 16 counts, including all serious assault charges, and Count 2 was dismissed at the Crown's request.

The accused was convicted only on Count 16, a breach of recognizance, and sentenced to 60 days incarceration with credit for pre-trial custody.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a longstanding shared custody arrangement, seeking sole custody of the parties' 13-year-old child.

The respondent mother sought to maintain the status quo.

The child consistently expressed a strong desire to reside primarily with the father due to a strained relationship with the mother and the parents' high-conflict dynamic.

The court found that the parents lacked the necessary communication and cooperation for shared custody.

Given the child's age, clear wishes, and the detrimental effect of the current arrangement, the court found exceptional circumstances to vary the custody order on an interim basis, granting the father sole custody and the mother alternate weekend parenting time.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice that dismissed its application for summary judgment seeking Crown wardship of three children.

The lower court judge found a genuine issue requiring a trial, considering the children's desire to return to their mother, the mother's improved lifestyle, and the maternal aunt's position.

The Superior Court of Justice, on appeal, applied a palpable and overriding error standard of review and found no basis to interfere with the lower court's conclusion that a genuine issue for trial existed.

The appeal was dismissed, and the matter was directed to proceed to trial.

Ernest McKinnon was convicted of sexual assault, unlawful confinement, voyeurism, and a lesser included sexual assault, along with two counts of breach of recognizance.

This decision outlines the sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as breach of trust in a common-law relationship, the degrading nature of the acts, and severe victim impact, against mitigating factors including the offender's age, lack of related criminal record, and expressed remorse.

The court emphasized deterrence and denunciation as primary sentencing principles for sexual assault.

A global sentence of four years incarceration was imposed for the main offences, with concurrent sentences for related counts, and time served plus one day for the breach of recognizance charges.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, SOIRA order for life, and a lifetime firearms prohibition.

Nicholas Goodchild was convicted of three counts of aggravated sexual assault for having sexual intercourse with three complainants without disclosing his HIV-positive status.

Although condoms were used, he was not on antiretroviral medication, and his viral counts were not low, creating a realistic possibility of transmission.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the vitiation of consent, violation of trust, and the devastating impact on victims, particularly one who was medically vulnerable.

Mitigating factors included his youth (28), first-offender status, positive pre-sentence report, and genuine remorse.

The court also considered the Federal Government's policy on HIV non-disclosure, which suggests lower blameworthiness for condom use.

Applying principles of denunciation and deterrence, the court imposed consecutive sentences of 18 months, 12 months, and 12 months, for a total of 42 months (3.5 years) incarceration, along with ancillary orders.

This trial addressed custody, access, child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property following the respondent's non-attendance.

The court awarded sole custody to the applicant, established reasonable access for the respondent based on the children's wishes, and imputed an income of $80,000 annually to the respondent for child support purposes, including section 7 expenses.

The claim for spousal support was dismissed.

The matrimonial home was vested in the applicant, and while an equalization payment was calculated, it was offset by costs, resulting in no net payment between the parties.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, voyeurism, assault, and sexual assault with a weapon.

The trial judge found the accused guilty of sexual assault (Count 1), unlawful confinement (Count 2), and voyeurism (Count 3).

Count 4 (assault) was stayed as the act constituted sexual assault, which was not an included offence to assault simpliciter.

For Count 5 (sexual assault with a weapon), the accused was found not guilty of the weapon charge but guilty of the lesser included offence of sexual assault, as the black marker used was not deemed a "weapon" under the Criminal Code due to lack of intent to injure or actual injury.

The court assessed consent, credibility, and the "air of reality" test for mistaken belief in consent, ultimately preferring the complainant's evidence.

Criminal trial on six historical sexual offence charges arising from allegations by a complainant against her stepfather over a lengthy period from childhood into adulthood.

The case turned entirely on the complainant's evidence, as the accused called no evidence.

The court identified both indicia of truthfulness and multiple serious credibility and plausibility concerns, including inconsistencies, aspects of the narrative that defied logic, and circumstances said to strain belief.

Applying the criminal standard of proof, the court held the evidence did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and entered acquittals on all counts.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for lack of jurisdiction.

The defendant, who successfully brought the motion to dismiss, sought partial indemnity costs.

The court found that partial indemnity costs were appropriate, as there was no reprehensible conduct by the plaintiff to warrant substantial indemnity costs.

After considering the complexity, importance, time spent, hourly rates, and proportionality, the court fixed the costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendant at $7,500.00, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

Nicholas Goodchild, previously convicted of aggravated sexual assault for non-disclosure of HIV status, applied to reopen his conviction before sentencing to introduce fresh expert evidence.

The proposed evidence from Dr. John Richard Middleton Smith concerned the effectiveness of condoms in preventing HIV transmission, aiming to challenge the trial's finding of a realistic possibility of transmission.

The court applied the fresh evidence test from R. v. Palmer, as amplified by R. v. Reeve, which requires the evidence to be sufficiently cogent to reasonably affect the verdict.

The court found that Dr. Smith's evidence was not substantially new or different from the expert testimony already presented at trial by Dr. Wendy Lee Wobeser, particularly regarding the distinction between population-level effectiveness and individual efficacy of condom use.

Consequently, the court determined the proposed evidence did not meet the high cogency threshold required to reopen the conviction, and the application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a final order setting child support and section 7 extraordinary expenses, as well as the trial costs award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal regarding the imputation of income to the respondent, the reduction of the appellant's child care costs, and the trial costs award.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part regarding the proportional sharing of ongoing and retroactive section 7 expenses, finding that the trial judge erred by using earning potential rather than actual income to determine the proportionate shares.

The issue of retroactive section 7 expenses was remitted to the trial judge for recalculation.

The General Manager of OHIP appealed a decision of the Health Services Appeal and Review Board (HSARB) that granted the respondent reimbursement for non-emergency out-of-country hip surgery.

The surgery was performed before the General Manager issued a final decision denying the funding application.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the HSARB unreasonably interpreted a request for further information as a denial of services.

Furthermore, the Court held that under the Health Insurance Act regulations, prior written approval from the General Manager is a mandatory prerequisite for reimbursement of non-emergency out-of-country medical services, and neither the General Manager nor the HSARB has the authority to retroactively approve such expenses.

The appellant father appealed a final order regarding child support and extraordinary expenses, including horseback riding and university tuition.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence on appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application to introduce fresh evidence, finding it did not meet the Palmer test.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the motions judge's decisions on arrears, extraordinary expenses, university tuition, and costs.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent mother.

Carleton University sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) Adjudicator's decision ordering the University to issue an access decision regarding records related to a survey of Jewish students and faculty.

The University argued the records were excluded from the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act under the 'research' exemption in s. 65(8.1)(a).

The Divisional Court upheld the Adjudicator's decision, finding it reasonable to conclude that the internal survey, aimed at assessing the campus climate, did not constitute 'research' for academic purposes or generalizable knowledge within the meaning of the exemption.

The appellant appealed his conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter despite finding a section 8 breach, and erred by failing to consider a section 9 arbitrary detention breach.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis was entitled to deference and that the random traffic stop was authorized under the Highway Traffic Act, raising no section 9 issue.

The plaintiff, a former elected Vice President of the union, brought an action against the union alleging unlawful dismissal from his position and seeking reinstatement and damages.

The defendant union brought a motion to dismiss the action under Rule 21.01(3)(a), arguing the court lacked jurisdiction.

The court agreed, finding that the essential character of the dispute was an internal union disciplinary matter governed by the Canada Labour Code, which provides an exclusive adjudication process through the Canada Industrial Relations Board.

The action was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.