Court File and Parties
COURT FILE NO.: 7638/16 DATE: 2018-11-19
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Dana Peterson, Counsel for the Crown
- and -
NICHOLAS GOODCHILD Jennifer Tremblay-Hall, Counsel for the Defendant Defendant
HEARD: September 21, 2018
GAREAU J.
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
[1] After a trial, Nicholas Goodchild was convicted of three counts of aggravated sexual assault, contrary to s. 273(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada related to three separate complainants, A.C., A.G. and N.W.
[2] The convictions were registered on November 15, 2017 for the reasons set out in a 20-page written reasons for judgment dated that day. A sentencing hearing took place on September 21, 2018 and the court reserved its decision on sentencing to today’s date, November 19, 2018.
[3] The offender had sexual intercourse with A.C., A.G. and N.W. knowing that he had the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) without disclosing to the complainants that he had that virus. Although the court found as a fact that a condom was used during all acts of sexual intercourse engaged in by Mr. Goodchild with A.C., A.G. and N.W., he was not taking antiretroviral medication at the time and his viral counts were not low resulting in a realistic possibility that the HIV virus would be transmitted, as set out in the case of R. v. Mabior, 2012 SCC 47, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 584. In the case at bar, this court held that the Mabior test still applied and that the two-part test in Mabior, namely, that the infected person have a low viral count as a result of treatment and that there be condom protection had not been satisfied and therefore there was a realistic possibility of transmission.
[4] As indicated in paragraph 98 of the Reasons for Judgment, the court made the following finding of fact as it related to Mr. Goodchild:
On the totality of the evidence before me, I am satisfied of the following facts as they relate to the complainants A.C., A.G., and N.W.:
(a) that Nicholas Goodchild was HIV-positive at the time he had sexual intercourse with A.C., A.G., and N.W.;
(b) that Nicholas Goodchild knew that he was HIV-positive at the time he had sexual intercourse with A.C., A.G., and N.W.;
(c) that Nicholas Goodchild did not disclose to A.C., A.G., or N.W. that he was HIV-positive before he had sexual intercourse with them;
(d) that A.C., A.G., and N.W. would not have engaged in sexual intercourse with Nicholas Goodchild if they had known of his positive HIV status;
(e) that Nicholas Goodchild used condom protection during each of his acts of sexual intercourse with A.C., A.G., and N.W.; and
(f) that Nicholas Goodchild did not start antiretroviral medication and treatment until April 3, 2014. Mr. Goodchild’s viral count loads were not low until May 2014, at the earliest, which was after his sexual encounters with A.C., A.G., and N.W.
[5] It is against this background of three separate findings of aggravated sexual assault by Nicholas Goodchild against three separate complainants that Mr. Goodchild is to be sentenced.
[6] In determining what is a fit and just sentence for Nicholas Goodchild, the court is guided by s. 718 of the Criminal Code of Canada, which sets out a list of principles and objectives the court must consider when determining the appropriate sentence to be imposed. Section 718 reads as follows:
- The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and to the community.
[7] A further fundamental principle in sentencing is set out in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code of Canada, which reads as follows:
A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
This principle is reiterated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. L.M., [2008] 2 S.C.R.
[8] The offender is a person of Metis heritage as is identified in both the pre-sentence report (Exhibit S-2) and the Gladue Report (Exhibit S-3) which has been prepared for the court. This Indigenous heritage played little role in the upbringing or background of the offender. Both defence counsel and Crown counsel agree that there are no Gladue factors that come into play in sentencing Mr. Goodchild, and that there are no unique circumstances due to his Metis background that played a role in bringing Mr. Goodchild before the court.
[9] With respect to the sentence to be imposed on Mr. Goodchild, the Crown is seeking a custodial sentence of 36 months consecutive related to complainants A.C. and A.G., and a 24-month consecutive sentence related to the complainant N.W. The Crown suggests that this 96-month, or 8-year sentence be reduced to a global sentence of five years to reflect the restraint principle given the fact that Nicholas Goodchild is a youthful first offender and the totality principle. The defence initially asked the court to impose a 12 to 18-month conditional sentence, but the Crown correctly pointed out that a conditional sentence was not available for the offences of aggravated sexual assault. The defence then suggested that sentence for Mr. Goodchild be suspended with him being placed on probation for a period of 12 to 18 months on strict conditions which would amount to house arrest and reflect the provisions that would be seen in a conditional sentence.
[10] Although not technically a young offender, Nicholas Goodchild comes to the court as a youthful offender. He is only 28 years of age. He is a first offender. He has no criminal record. These are mitigating factors.
[11] Also a mitigating factor is the positive pre-sentence report (Exhibit S-2) and Gladue Report (Exhibit S-3) received by the court with respect to Mr. Goodchild. Indicated in the pre-sentence report, at page 9, is the comment that “the offender has expressed remorse for his actions and the impact it has had on the victims”. From this statement and from the statement made by Mr. Goodchild to the court prior to his sentencing, I am satisfied that his feeling of remorse is genuine and sincere. Mr. Goodchild’s remorse is a positive mitigating factor to be taken into account in the consideration of a just and fit sentence to be imposed on him.
[12] It is true that Mr. Goodchild did not disclose his HIV status to the complainants thereby vitiating their consent. It is also true that he took some responsible steps in his dealing with the complainants in using a condom for protection when he had sexual intercourse with them. I agree with the suggestion that this shows some degree of responsibility on the part of Mr. Goodchild which must be reflected in the sentence to be imposed on him. The conduct engaged in by Mr. Goodchild was less of a high risk endeavor than would be the case if he were engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse or anal intercourse. Balanced against this is Mr. Goodchild’s lengthy and persistent refusal to take direction from public health officials as to the treatment of his HIV condition, precautions to be taken and advising past partners and future partners. It was only one year after he received his HIV diagnosis did Nicholas Goodchild make any effort to disclose his HIV status to the people he had been with. The complainants in the case at bar only knew about Mr. Goodchild’s condition and that they were potentially at risk by reading a notice in Soo Today media publication on October 31, 2014.
[13] There are a number of aggravating factors in this case. This is a case where the consent of the complainants to have sexual relations with the offender was vitiated by his lack of disclosure of his condition to them. Mr. Goodchild violated the trust of the complainants. Mr. Goodchild exploited the complainants and was dishonest with them to satisfy his own sexual interests and desires. I repeat paragraph 97 of my reasons in which I stated,
In offences of sexual assault it is useful to reflect upon Chief Justice McLachlin’s comments at para. 48 in Mabior:
In keeping with the Charter values of equality and autonomy, we now see sexual assault not only as a crime associated with emotional and physical harm to the victim, but as the wrongful exploitation of another human being. To engage in sexual acts without the consent of another person is to treat him or her as an object and negate his or her human dignity [...]
[14] The acts of Mr. Goodchild have had a devastating effect on the complainants. Although the complainants A.C. and N.W. did not provide victim impact statements to the court, the ruinous result in their lives their involvement with Mr. Goodchild was readily apparent when they gave evidence to the court. The actions of Mr. Goodchild brought devastation to their lives. The complainant A.G. did provide a victim impact statement to the court (Exhibit S-1) which she read to the court with difficult. The emotional pain suffered by A.G. was apparent as she read her victim impact to the court. Portions of A.G.’s victim impact statement read as follows:
That night I went to the police station, gave my statement and then to the hospital, to get tested. I saw a counsellor that night as well. Shock had taken over. I was in disbelief. I was distraught, thinking about telling my then-husband the truth. But I knew I had to. I owed him that much. The next day, I told my children I had hurt their father. I wanted to prepare them as best as I could for the fallout. That night, I told him everything. Of course, it was devastating. I had hurt the person I had loved the most. 22 year relationship, destroyed. It was of course, brutal.
During the next 3 months, I was in a grieving period I would say. I was not myself. I was in despair. I was suicidal. I had long time friends tell me they didn’t know who I was anymore. Neither did I. I contemplated suicide many times during that time, fearing I had infected the love of my life and possibly ruining my children’s life by endangering both of their parents by my decisions. I couldn’t deal with the fear that my children would grow up thinking their mother was a selfish, lying, woman as I imagined I would be portrayed if I had decided to take my own life. I had experienced many difficult losses in my life, including my father. His death took a toll on my whole family and we were never the same after that. I didn’t want to put my own children through the same trauma I had grown up with. That motherly instinct, ultimately, saved my life.
In June 2015, I couldn’t navigate a failing marriage and this trial. My life as I knew it, was over. The dream of raising a family together, was over. It was devastating. I had lost all family members on his side and my own were not supportive either. They blamed me for everything. I took on this responsibility completely. I moved out on my own, with the help of friends, penniless. I don’t know how I managed, but I did. I had a part time business supporting special needs adults. My business has suffered, because I wasn’t emotionally stable. I couldn’t complete simple tasks, because I felt so much shame and regret. I could barely pay my bills, never mind feed my children. I had to get another job, to make ends meet, which I did. Things seemed to stabilize. But hiding my shame was eating me alive. I cried every day at my daycare job, for the next 2 years. No one knew.
Recently, someone called me a mother in trauma. It is accurate. I can no longer function this way. My children need their mother, to be healthy, happy and free. I am a firm believer in taking personal responsibility. I took responsibility for my actions. I paid dearly. I lost a marriage, a whole side of family I will never be in contact with again. I nearly lost some of my oldest friends. I lost myself. But taking responsibility is the only way to move forward. Jail won’t make this better. It won’t take any of the pain away. But it would make me feel better, knowing that the victims, aren’t the only ones shouldering this burden. The defendant needs jail time. A decision needs to be made. I can’t move on, none of us can move on. I never thought that we would still be here nearly 4 years later. Other crimes have been committed, arrests made, concluded. Yet, here we still are, dragging out this case.
The victim impact statement read into the court record by A.G. was powerful and a clear demonstration of the devastating and negative impact that the actions of Mr. Goodchild has had on the victims in this case.
[15] In his actions involving A.C., Nicholas Goodchild was particularly cruel and cavalier. A.C. was medically vulnerable and Mr. Goodchild knew it. Yet he took no steps to disclose his HIV status to a vulnerable person. As set out in paragraphs 40 and 41 of my reasons for judgment:
A.C. disclosed her health history to Nicholas Goodchild. She disclosed to Mr. Goodchild that she had cancer in the nature of leukemia and that she had chemotherapy and a stem cell transplant. It was the evidence of A.C. that despite sharing her health history with him, Nicholas Goodchild never shared his health history with A.C. As A.C. put it, “I didn’t know that he had any health issues at all.” A.C. did not ask Mr. Goodchild if he had any sexually transmitted disease, indicating “I didn’t think I would have to ask, oddly enough.”
A.C. had no idea that Nicholas Goodchild had tested positively for the HIV virus. It was her evidence, most emphatically, that had she known “I would not have had a sexual relationship. I would have had to walk away.” As A.C. indicated, given her health history, she would not have wanted to take the risk. This is entirely reasonable and sensible given the fact that A.C. had cancer in the past which involved a blood disease, which would have caused her immune system to be in a compromised state.
The complainant A.C. had a vulnerable immune system but yet no disclosure is made by Nicholas Goodchild to A.C. of his condition. This sets A.C. apart from the other complainants and, in my view, is an aggravating factor of some significance.
[16] Both counsel provided the court with numerous cases setting out the principles to be applied in the sentencing of offenders for aggravated sexual assault. It is fair to say that the summary of those cases indicate that the principle of denunciation and deterrence is the paramount principle to be considered and a period of incarceration is an appropriate sentence although courts have differed on the ranges of sentences to be imposed. The Ontario Court of Appeal makes it clear in R. v. McGregor, 2008 ONCA 831, 240 C.C.C. (3d) 102 that denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing objectives in cases involving aggravated sexual assault when the accused is HIV positive. As noted in paragraph 25 of that decision,
Denunciation and deterrence
[25] As the sentencing judge correctly noted, denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing objectives in this case. In R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371, [1998] S.C.J. No. 64, Cory J., writing for a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, emphasized the importance of denunciation and deterrence in "HIV-assault" cases. He put it this way, at paras. 141-42:
[T]he criminal law does have a role to play both in deterring those infected with HIV from putting the lives of others at risk and in protecting the public from irresponsible individuals who refuse to comply with public health orders to abstain from high-risk activities.
Where public health endeavours fail to provide adequate protection to individuals like the complainants, the criminal law can be effective. It provides a needed measure of protection in the form of deterrence and reflects society's abhorrence of the self-centered recklessness and the callous insensitivity of the actions of the respondent and those who have acted in a similar manner. The risk of infection and death of partners of HIV-positive individuals is a cruel and ever present reality. Indeed the potentially fatal consequences are far more invidious and graver than many other actions prohibited by the Criminal Code. The risks of infection are so devastating that there is a real and urgent need to provide a measure of protection for those in the position of the complainants. If ever there was a place for the deterrence provided by criminal sanctions it is present in these circumstances. It may well have the desired effect of ensuring that there is disclosure of the risk and that appropriate precautions are taken.
It is of course to be noted that the McGregor case involved two instances of unprotected sexual intercourse.
[17] The principle of specific and general deterrence as the paramount consideration in these types of cases has been applied in numerous cases following McGregor. (See: R. v. Felix, 2013 ONCA 415, 298 C.C.C. (3d) 121 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Ralph, [2014] O.J. No. 2790 (S.C.J.); R. v. Nyoni, [2014] B.C.J. No. 1276 (BCSC))
[18] Although the jurisprudence has been consistently clear that the court must bear in mind the principles of denunciation and deterrence in sentencing offenders with the HIV virus for offences of aggravated sexual assault, there has been a disparity and divergence in the sentences that have been imposed by the court. Although a period of imprisonment has been imposed, the length of the term of incarceration has varied greatly from case to case. For example in R. v. Felix, 2013 ONCA 415, [2013] O.J. No. 2857 (Ont. C.A.), a five-year global sentence was imposed. In R. v. McGregor, [2008] O.J. No. 4939 (Ont. C.A.), an 18-month sentence was imposed. In R. v. Smith, [2004] B.C.J. No. 3736 (BCCA), a 42-month sentence was imposed. I could go on with similar examples but the point is that although incarceration is the accepted penalty, the length of incarceration has varied greatly from case to case due to the unique factors, both mitigating and aggravating that have existed in each case. This is not difficult to understand since sentencing an offender is an individualized process where the court attempts to find an appropriate sentence for that offender and to fit the offence which he or she has committed. As noted in paragraph 62 of R. v. Ralph, Spies J. wrote the following:
Justice Gans referred with approval to what was then a recent decision of M. Green J. of the Ontario Court of Justice in R. v. Williams, 2006 ONCJ 484, [2006] O.J. No. 5037, where the court concluded that the range of sentences for cases involving HIV unprotected intercourse run from a low of one year to a high of 11 years. He noted that the court in Williams also found that the broad range of sentence reflects a variety of aggravating and mitigating factors, “...including the number of partners involved, the frequency of exposure, the criminal antecedence and contrition, if any of the defendant, and the impact on the complainants, particularly whether or not there was HIV transmission.” (Williams at paras. 19-24; Walkem at para. 22) Although as I will come to the range of sentence may even be broader than that identified by Justice Green, the factors he noted are clearly among those to be considered.
[19] The position of the defence is that the aforementioned cases pre-date the policy statement from the Federal Government as to the approach to be taken in HIV cases. The defence suggests that we are now in a new criminal law environment as a result of this new approach and the cases that pre-dated this new approach must be read in that light, particularly when it comes to the imposition of lengthy custodial sentences. Entered as Exhibit S-4 is the “Criminal Justice System’s Response to Non-Disclosure of HIV”, which is a publication of the Department of Justice, Government of Canada. In the section of that publication titled “Summary of the Evidence and Conclusions”, it is noted that “the public health and criminal justice systems have very different objectives”. It goes on to say,
Because the criminal law is a blunt instrument, it should be engaged only when other means of social control are inadequate or inappropriate. As the SCC stated in its 1998 Cuerrier decision, the criminal law has a role to play in cases involving sexual activity and non-disclosure of HIV, where public interventions have failed and the sexual activity at issue poses a risk of serious harm.
[20] The Federal Government publication entered as Exhibit S-4 goes on to state that,
Sexual activity, regardless of condom use, with an HIV positive person who is taking HIV treatment as prescribed and has maintained a suppressed viral load (i.e., under 200 copies of HIV per ml of blood) poses a negligible risk of transmission. Certain types of sexual activity with HIV positive persons pose a low risk of transmission. These include: sex without a condom or oral sex with a person who is on treatment, but has not maintained a suppressed viral load; sex with a condom with a person who is not on treatment; and oral sex with a person who is not on treatment.
The publication goes on to note that,
In cases involving persons who are not on treatment, an isolated act of sexual intercourse with effective condom use is highly unlikely to pose a significant risk of transmission; whereas, multiple acts of sexual intercourse over a significant period of time pose higher risks, particularly where condoms are not consistently and effectively used.
[21] At the bottom of page two of the Federal Government Publication (S-4) it is noted that,
The criminal law applies to HIV positive persons where they fail to disclose, or misrepresent, their HIV status prior to sexual activity that poses a realistic possibility of transmission. The most recent medical science on HIV transmission is determinative of whether this legal test is met. These cases involve a broad range of conduct, reflecting both higher and lower levels of moral culpability.
[22] As to the conclusions that can be drawn, the Government of Canada states that,
The criminal law should generally not apply to persons living with HIV who: are on treatment; are not on treatment but use condoms; or, engage only in oral sex (unless other risk factors are present and the person living with HIV is aware of those risk), because the realistic possibility of transmission test is likely not met in these circumstances.
The report goes on to state that,
Canada’s criminal law approach to HIV transmission and exposure cases should reflect the varying levels of blameworthiness in these cases, for example:
o In HIV cases that involve lower levels of blameworthiness, such as recklessness, as opposed to intention to transmit HIV, non-sexual offences may more appropriately reflect the wrongdoing committed. In such cases, intent to place others at risk purely for sexual gratification purposes is not at play;
o HIV exposure cases may not have resulted in transmission because the person living with HIV has taken steps to prevent transmission (e.g., condom use and/or treatment). These cases must be distinguished from those involving a pattern of high risk conduct that, only by chance, did not result in transmission;
o Non-criminal responses should be considered in appropriate cases, in particular where high risk conduct is the result of lack of access to health care and other services.
[23] Although the Ontario Government’s position was not put to the court during sentencing submissions, the court can take judicial notice that on December 1, 2017 the then Attorney General of Ontario issued a response to the Federal Government’s “Criminal Justice System’s Response to Non-Disclosure of HIV” (Exhibit S-4). The Ontario Attorney General endorsed the findings of the scientific community that there is no realistic possibility of transmission of HIV if a person is on antiretroviral therapy and has maintained a suppressed viral load for six months. The Ontario Attorney General indicated that in such cases Ontario’s Crown prosecutors will no longer be proceeding with criminal prosecutions.
[24] In the case of Mr. Goodchild, he was not receiving antiretroviral medication and did not have a suppressed viral load when he engaged in sexual intercourse with the complainants A.C., A.G., and N.W. However, Mr. Goodchild did use a condom during all his acts of sexual intercourse with these individuals. This, in my view, reflects on his moral culpability and although he ignored the warnings and advice of the public health officials, his condom use places him in the category of being reckless as opposed to intentionally trying to transmit the HIV virus. This places him in a lower level of blameworthiness or moral culpability when applying the Federal Government Policy statement (S-4) and the approach to sentencing that should be taken as a result of it.
[25] The Federal Government’s “Criminal Justice System’s Response to Non-Disclosure of HIV” (Exhibit S-4) is not determinative of the sentence to be imposed on Mr. Goodchild but is a factor to be considered. This government policy does not obliterate the principles to be applied as set out in the jurisprudence earlier referred to in these reasons. In sentencing for this type of offence, the principles of denunciation and deterrence remain paramount. A period of incarceration is still required to reflect these principles. It is a matter of the length of the sentence to be imposed considering the aggravating and mitigating factors present in this case and the objectives and principles of sentencing as delineated in sec. 718 of the Criminal Code of Canada.
[26] Counsel for Mr. Goodchild has urged the court to take into account the terms of Mr. Goodchild’s pre-trial release in view of the decision in R. v. Downes, 205 C.C.C. (3d) 488. In that decision the court held that very strict bail conditions may be treated as akin to custody in calculating a sentence. In other words, the terms of release on bail pending trial may be so strict that they should be taken into account by way of a credit toward any custodial sentence imposed. In the case of Mr. Goodchild, his pre-trial release was never a situation of house arrest, as it was in the Downes case. Mr. Goodchild initially had a curfew imposed but by January 2016, the curfew condition was deleted, and by April 2016, Mr Goodchild could be away from his residence at any time with the written permission of his surety. In my view, the pre-trial release conditions imposed on Mr Goodchild do not amount to a house arrest situation and are not so onerous to justify a reduction in the sentence to be imposed on him or a credit for the time he was on bail.
[27] There is authority for the imposition of concurrent rather than consecutive sentences in offences involving aggravated sexual assault (See: R. v. Williams 2006 ONCJ 219). Defence counsel urges the court to impose concurrent sentences on each of the three offences set out in the indictment which the court has made findings of guilt against Nicholas Goodchild. In my view, the criminal acts by Mr. Goodchild involve multiple victims and a consecutive sentence is appropriate. I adopt the approach taken in R. v. Berry, 2014 BCCA 7, [2014] 349 BCAC 76, where the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that even when offences are proximate and relate to the same legally protected interest, consecutive sentences are appropriate where the offences are committed against multiple victims. In applying consecutive sentences to Mr. Goodchild, I have kept in mind the provisions of s. 718.2 (c) of the Criminal Code of Canada which states that, “Where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh.”
[28] The principle of restraint must also be kept in mind given Mr. Goodchild’s relatively young age and the fact that this is the first term of imprisonment which he will experience. The court should be cautious and moderate in the sentence it imposes on Nicholas Goodchild. The principle of totality and proportionality should also be considered. The cumulative sentence imposed on Mr. Goodchild should not exceed his overall culpability. As I indicated earlier in my reasons, both Crown counsel and defence counsel agree that Mr. Goodchild’s aboriginal status plays little role and should have little effect in the sentence that I impose on him. Accordingly, I have considered the provisions of s. 718.2 (e) of the Criminal Code of Canada with those comments from counsel in mind.
[29] As indicated in s. 718 (e) of the Criminal Code of Canada, one of the purposes of sentencing is, where possible, to “provide reparation for harm done to victims or to the community”. As required by s. 722(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada, in sentencing Mr. Goodchild, I have given due weight to the victim impact statement read to the court by the complainant A.C. (Exhibit S-1) and the comments made by the other two complainants about the effect that Mr. Goodchild’s conduct had upon them when they gave evidence to the court.
[30] The fundamental duty of the court is to impose a sentence that is just for the offender and the offences. I have taken into account all the pertinent factors which I have commented upon in my reasons; including the age of Nicholas Goodchild; the fact that he is a first time offender; his background, including a favourable pre-sentence report; the aggravating and mitigating factors; the principle of restraint in sentencing a youthful first offender; the guidance provided by the jurisprudence; and the principles of sentencing as set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code of Canada in arriving at a sentence that I believe is fit and just.
[31] In my view, consecutive sentences of incarceration are called for in this case to reflect the general principles of deterrence and denunciation. My view is that count 2 involving A.C. calls for an elevated sentence given the aggravating circumstances particular to that complainant who disclosed her compromised health situation to Mr. Goodchild. On count 2, the offender is sentenced to incarceration for a period of 18 months. On count 3, the offender is sentenced to incarceration for a period of 12 months, consecutive to the sentence imposed on count 2. On count 4, the offender is sentenced to incarceration for a period of 12 months consecutive to the sentence imposed on counts 2 and 3. In summary, the total sentence imposed is 42 months or 3.5 years.
[32] The Crown has requested, and I am imposing the following ancillary orders:
(a) a DNA order;
(b) a SOIRA order for life;
(c) a mandatory firearms prohibition for 10 years, pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code of Canada;
(d) an order pursuant to s. 743.2(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada that the offender not have any contact with any of the complainants while he is serving his custodial sentence.
Gareau J.
Released: November 19, 2018
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN – and – NICHOLAS GOODCHILD REASONS FOR SENTENCE Gareau J.