Paul Edward Skeggs

This motion concerned the passing of accounts for the estate of Arturo Perlini, specifically challenging the compensation claimed by the estate trustees and the management fee claimed by the attorney under a power of attorney.

The respondent objected to the amounts as unreasonable.

The court applied the five factors from Re Toronto General Trusts and Central Ontario Railway to determine fair and reasonable compensation, finding the claimed amounts excessive due to lack of complexity, delays, and poor investment decisions.

The court reduced the estate trustee fees from 5% to 3% of the estate value and significantly reduced the power of attorney management fee.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking to relocate the parties' two children from Sault Ste.

Marie to London, Ontario, where she had moved with her new spouse.

The parties had previously shared parenting equally.

Applying the best interests of the child test from Gordon v. Goertz, the court found that the children were most closely connected to Sault Ste.

Marie, where they had lived most of their lives, attended school, and had established social and family connections.

The court dismissed the motion, ordering that the children's primary residence remain with the respondent father in Sault Ste.

Marie, with joint custody continuing.

No costs were awarded.

The applicant brought a motion for the sale of a jointly owned home following the separation of the unmarried parties.

The respondent, who resided in the home, opposed the sale but could not offer sufficient reasons or afford to keep the property.

Applying the Partition Act and the test from Davis v. Davis, the court found no exceptional circumstances to deny the sale.

The court ordered the property to be listed for sale, with the net proceeds paid into court pending resolution of the respondent's constructive trust claim.

The applicant father and respondent mother separated, and the mother sought to relocate with their two young children to Montreal, Quebec.

The father brought an urgent motion to keep the children in Sault Ste.

Marie, Ontario, and sought interim custody.

The court considered the children's best interests, noting the older child's strong ties to Sault Ste.

Marie and significant child protection concerns regarding the mother's parenting capacity.

The court ordered that the children reside in Sault Ste.

Marie and granted interim custody and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to the father.

The respondent brought a motion seeking an order to deem 100% of a previous costs award, arising from an eight-day trial, as a debt related to child support, thereby making it non-dischargeable in the applicant's bankruptcy under section 178(1)(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The applicant contended that the costs primarily stemmed from custody and access issues and should be discharged.

The court, relying on its independent recollection of the original trial, found that the child support issue was inextricably linked to the shared custody claim.

Consequently, the court apportioned 50% of the original costs award to child support, declaring that portion to be a non-dischargeable debt.

The mother brought a motion seeking the return of disputed chattels from the matrimonial home, where the father currently resides.

The father opposed the motion, arguing he needed the furniture to care for the children during his access and potential future custody, and noted he was facing domestic assault charges.

The court dismissed the mother's request for the disputed items, finding no urgent need and that the children were adequately furnished at her residence.

The court did, however, order the return of certain agreed-upon items to the mother.

The moving party sought an order under the Partition Act compelling the sale of a matrimonial home following separation.

The responding spouse opposed the sale, arguing that competing claims regarding ownership and the validity of two marriage contracts created substantial rights that could be prejudiced by an immediate sale.

Evidence suggested the responding spouse, an elderly individual residing in the home with a permanently disabled adult child, would suffer hardship if required to relocate before trial.

The court held that while co-owners have a prima facie right to partition and sale, the discretion under the Partition Act allows refusal where hardship or oppression would result.

Given unresolved issues regarding ownership and the potential prejudice to the responding spouse’s rights under family law claims, the motion for sale was dismissed.

This was a costs-only decision following a successful Rule 58.11 hearing in which the client obtained an order directing a new costs assessment because she had been denied natural justice at the initial assessment.

The court applied s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and the Rule 57.01 factors, reduced claimed counsel fees as disproportionate for a brief and straightforward matter, allowed the listed travel and other disbursements, and rejected compensation for the client's own time due to lack of evidence of opportunity cost.

The court also considered the solicitor's conduct at the earlier assessment as relevant to costs.

Costs were fixed, all-inclusive, at $6,000.

The client brought a motion to oppose the confirmation of a Report and Certificate of Assessment regarding her former solicitor's account.

The client, who was self-represented at the assessment hearing, argued she was denied natural justice because the Hearings Officer did not allow her to make closing submissions.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the Hearings Officer failed to assist the self-represented client and explicitly prevented her from making submissions on the ultimate issue, thereby violating the audi alteram partem rule.

The Report and Certificate of Assessment, along with related enforcement mechanisms, were set aside, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different Hearings Officer.

The respondent son brought a motion to disqualify the applicant's solicitor due to a conflict of interest.

The solicitor had previously acted for the respondent mother in the transfer of her property, but was now representing the applicant in an application to declare the mother incapable of managing property.

The court found that the solicitor was in a conflict of interest because he was attacking the legal work done during the first retainer and could potentially be called as a witness regarding the mother's capacity.

The motion was granted and the solicitor was removed as counsel.