A. Duncan Grace

The offender, Ashlyn Chrisjohn, pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and failing to stop after an accident causing death.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the offender's significant responsibility, and mitigating factors including a Gladue report detailing her personal circumstances and efforts towards rehabilitation.

The Crown sought concurrent five-year terms, while the defence sought time served or a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence as primary sentencing goals, finding that a sentence of time served or a conditional sentence would be inappropriate given the egregious nature of the offences and the high blameworthiness.

A four-year custodial sentence was imposed for dangerous driving causing death, with a concurrent three-year sentence for failing to stop, along with a driving prohibition and DNA order.

The applicants, Mejo Varghese and Bincy Joseph, brought an application seeking the return of their $60,000 deposit after refusing to close on the purchase of a new home constructed by the respondent, Hogg Construction Ltd. The applicants alleged a material breach of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) due to a significant reduction in the living room size (approximately 3'6" shorter than planned), which they argued was not a "minor change" permitted by the contract.

The respondent contended the applicants misinterpreted the plans and that any changes were minor.

Applying the principle from Stefanovska v. Kok, the court found the reduction in the living room's length was objectively significant, affecting the property's use and enjoyment, and thus constituted a major change and a repudiation of the APS.

The applicants were not obligated to complete the transaction.

This decision addresses a motion and application for approval of a global settlement of tort and statutory accident benefit claims for a person under disability, Donald Orr, pursuant to Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The judge critically reviews a prior endorsement from another judge, which mandated oral hearings for Rule 7.08(3) applications, citing *Leonard v. Saint-Vincent Hospital*.

Justice Grace respectfully disagrees with this interpretation, arguing it is overly technical, impractical, and inconsistent with Rule 1.04(1), especially for unopposed matters with voluminous documentation.

The judge emphasizes that written hearings promote judicial economy and allow for more thorough consideration.

The court ultimately approves the settlements, finding them fair and reasonable, including the proposed legal fees and disbursements.

This endorsement concerns the approval of a class action settlement and class counsel fees in two consolidated proceedings (Johnson et al. v. Ontario and Sabourin v. Ontario) alleging deplorable conditions at the Elgin-Middlesex Detention Centre.

The court approved a settlement of $32,795,400 and class counsel fees of $9,388,207.92, finding the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, given the significant litigation risks, the protracted nature of the actions, and the desire for a certain outcome for the thousands of affected class members.

The contingency fee agreements and the requested fees were also deemed fair and reasonable.

The accused, Michael Wilford, was charged with two counts of sexual assault.

The first count involved choking during consensual sexual intercourse, and the second involved non-consensual sexual activity while the complainant was feigning sleep.

The court applied principles of reasonable doubt and consent, including the "honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent" defence.

The court found the accused guilty of the first count, concluding that the choking was a sexual assault and that the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

For the second count, the court found the complainant's testimony lacked credibility and believed the accused's denial, resulting in an acquittal.

This endorsement addresses a defendant's urgent motion seeking compliance with a prior court order compelling the plaintiff to attend a neuropsychological assessment.

The plaintiff's counsel advised that the plaintiff would not attend the assessment, citing a desire to seek leave to appeal the prior order, despite the assessment being tentatively scheduled and the order being released in advance.

The court emphasized that court orders are not optional and must be obeyed unless stayed or overridden.

The motion judge granted the defendant's requested relief, compelling the plaintiff's attendance at the assessment and awarding costs to the defendant for the necessity of bringing the motion.

The defendant, Christopher Noonan, pleaded guilty to four counts: child luring, unlawful possession of child pornography, unlawfully accessing child pornography, and unlawfully distributing child pornography.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the nature and quantity of child pornography, the young age of depicted children, and the attempt to groom a 13-year-old, alongside mitigating factors such as a guilty plea, no prior criminal record, heartfelt remorse, and commencement of sex offender counselling.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for child abuse offences, the court imposed a global custodial sentence of three years.

Ancillary orders included DNA analysis, 20 years of Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, and 5-year prohibitions on attending public places where children are present, seeking employment/volunteer positions with minors, contact with minors (unless supervised), and using anonymous internet programs.

The applicants, gynecologic oncologists, sought declaratory relief against the Academic Medical Organization of Southwestern Ontario (AMOSO), arguing they were wrongly deemed ineligible to receive funding for their academic services under a funding agreement.

They alleged procedural unfairness and substantive error in AMOSO's decision to discontinue their "Base Clinical Funds," claiming they were not compensated for academic services by another contract (Oncology AFP).

The court dismissed the application, primarily finding that the applicants lacked standing due to privity of contract, as they were not direct parties to the relevant agreements.

Alternatively, the court found that AMOSO's decision-making process was fair, thorough, and conducted in good faith, providing no basis for judicial intervention.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend a combined psychological and neuropsychological assessment.

The plaintiff had alleged cognitive impairment and attended an Acquired Brain Injury program, but had not obtained her own neuropsychological report.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendants had delayed in requesting the assessment and failed to demonstrate that trial fairness required the order, especially given the plaintiff's strategic decision not to focus on significant cognitive deficiency at trial.

The court emphasized the prejudice to the plaintiff in terms of cost and time, and the self-inflicted disadvantage of the defendants' delay.

The defendants brought a pre-trial application challenging the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain a Search Warrant (ITO) for the Thorndale premises, arguing a breach of their s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

They sought to exclude the seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that the ITO provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for the search warrant, concluding that the totality of circumstances, including frequent visits by the target's vehicle to the premises, its movements before and after suspected drug transactions, and counter-surveillance driving, established a credibly-based probability of evidence of a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act offence.

Therefore, no s. 8 Charter violation occurred.

Even if there had been a breach, the court determined that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the police conduct was not serious, and the real and reliable evidence was of significant probative value, outweighing the impact on the accused's interests.

The application was dismissed.

This decision reviews previous custody and access orders following a finding of parental alienation by the respondent mother.

Despite the mother's continued uncooperative and alienating behavior, which has exacerbated the children's severe anxiety and resistance to contact with the applicant father, the court declined to transfer sole custody to the father.

The court maintained shared custody with primary residence with the mother, citing the children's fragile mental health, the ongoing pandemic, and the recent birth of a new child to the applicant and his partner.

The court ordered comprehensive, long-term therapeutic interventions for the children, the mother, and the father, with a designated case manager to oversee the process, emphasizing the paramountcy of the children's best interests.

This motion for directions addresses appeals of rejected claims in a class action settlement concerning cathode ray tubes (CRT) products.

The Claims Administrator had rejected claims, often using generic reasons, for insufficient proof of purchase.

The court clarified the interpretation of the Distribution Protocol, emphasizing that while declarations alone are insufficient, "comparable verification" should be accepted.

The court also ruled that the Claims Administrator and Class Counsel do not have the authority to unilaterally amend the appeal process, which is under court control.

The appeals for certain class members were allowed and remitted for reconsideration, with directions for the Claims Administrator to provide fact-specific and instructive grounds for future decisions.

The applicant, M.P.M., sought costs on a full recovery basis after being largely successful on parenting issues in a fiercely contested trial.

The respondent, A.L.M., opposed, arguing mixed success and seeking costs in her favour.

The court found the respondent acted in bad faith regarding custody and access issues, justifying full recovery costs for those aspects.

However, the applicant's offer to settle did not meet the criteria for presumptive full recovery, and costs for earlier steps where no orders were made were disallowed.

The court also considered the respondent's impecuniosity but found it did not shield her from the consequences of her bad faith conduct.

A cost award of $70,000 for fees and $8,160.20 for disbursements plus HST was ordered in favour of the applicant.

The plaintiff, Blue Water Golf Course Inc., sued the defendants for the outstanding balance of a park model home purchase.

The defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging breach of contract due to a defective furnace and resulting smoke and odour issues.

The court found that the defendants failed to establish a breach of contract on the part of the plaintiff or prove compensable damages.

Expert reports indicated no significant contamination or need for replacement of the furnace or ductwork, and many claimed damages were either reimbursed by their insurer or unrelated to the alleged defect.

The court granted judgment to the plaintiff for the full outstanding amount and dismissed the defendants' counterclaim.

This motion in a negligence action addressed the defendant's request for orders compelling the plaintiff to attend medical assessments, complete questionnaires, and sign consent forms, as well as to adjourn pre-trial and trial dates.

The plaintiff had refused to comply, relying on prior case law.

The court vacated the pre-trial and trial dates due to non-compliance with Rule 53.03(2.2) regarding expert report schedules.

The court ordered the plaintiff to sign consent forms and complete questionnaires, finding that section 105(5) of the Courts of Justice Act mandates answering relevant questions and that the court has inherent jurisdiction to control the discovery process, distinguishing prior cases that suggested a complete code.

The motion for the assessments themselves was adjourned as premature.

The defendant, Ayanle Aden, was charged with multiple firearm and breach of recognizance offences following a shooting incident in London, Ontario.

The central issue was the identity of the shooter, as eyewitness accounts were inconsistent and unreliable.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including the defendant's discarded cell phone (registered to him), a backpack matching one he was seen with previously, and a hoodie found near the scene containing his DNA and gunshot residue.

The court found that the totality of circumstantial evidence established identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defence of self-defence was also considered for the charge of discharging a firearm with intent to endanger lives but was rejected due to an insufficient evidentiary basis to assess the reasonableness and proportionality of the defendant's actions.

Aden was found guilty on most counts.

The accused, Derek Denesevich, sought a bail review under s. 520 and a detention review under s. 525(1) of the Criminal Code, following his detention order by a Justice of the Peace for alleged attempts to import firearm components.

The court conducted a blended hearing, considering new evidence and the passage of time (eight months in custody).

The Crown argued for continued detention on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, citing the accused's U.S. criminal record and flight risk.

The court found that primary ground concerns were mitigated by proposed release conditions (passport surrender, police check-ins).

Regarding secondary and tertiary grounds, the court re-evaluated the U.S. criminal record, finding the alarm diminished, and emphasized the importance of the Charter right to bail and the principle that pre-trial detention is a last resort.

The court concluded that continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, especially given the elapsed time.

The accused was ordered released on a recognizance with two sureties and specific conditions.

Rassaun Services Inc. (RSI) brought a motion to renew a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the Elgin Road property, which had been initially issued without notice.

The defendants opposed the renewal, arguing that RSI lacked a reasonable claim to an interest in the land.

The court found that RSI failed to establish a triable issue regarding its claim, as the evidence presented amounted to mere suspicion rather than proof of a proprietary interest or a statutory trust under the Construction Act.

The motion to renew the CPL was dismissed, and the CPL was discharged.

Costs were reserved to the motion judge presiding over the adjourned matter.

The plaintiff, Catherine Patrick, was injured in a single-car accident in February 2014.

She initially sued Southwest Middlesex, but later sought to add The Corporation of the County of Middlesex ("Middlesex County") as a defendant.

Middlesex County moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff failed to provide timely statutory notice under s. 44(10) of the Municipal Act, 2001, and that her claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that Patrick did not establish a "reasonable excuse" for the more than two-year delay in notifying Middlesex County, particularly for the initial 16-month period of inaction before retaining counsel.

As satisfying the "reasonable excuse" prong of s. 44(12) is mandatory, the court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action against Middlesex County.

The applicant sought a declaration regarding the interpretation of a zoning by-law provision concerning the maximum gross leasable commercial floor area for a "community shopping centre" on its property.

The applicant argued that the 50,000 square foot limitation only applied if the development contained six or more separated spaces, based on the general definition of "Shopping Centre" in the by-law.

The respondent municipality argued that the limitation applied to any project irrespective of the number of units.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the definition of "Shopping Centre" did not apply to "community shopping centre" in the specific context of the by-law and Official Plan, and that the size limitation was intended to apply to the square footage of a structure accommodating a community shopping area, not based on the number of units.