A. Duncan Grace

The Stevens defendants brought a motion seeking leave to compel the plaintiff, Emanuel Ismail, to undergo an independent psychiatric examination.

The plaintiff had previously submitted a psychologist's report and initially agreed to a psychiatric assessment but later refused, citing concerns about location, number of visits, and the necessity of a psychiatrist to respond to a psychologist.

The court granted leave for the motion and ordered the plaintiff to attend the psychiatric examination, emphasizing the systemic issue of late expert reports and the need for trial fairness.

The court found that a psychiatric assessment was necessary given the plaintiff's use of anti-depressant medication and the claim for future care costs related to it, distinguishing this case from others where such examinations were deemed unnecessary.

The defendant pleaded guilty to disposing of a child's dead body with intent to conceal the birth, contrary to s. 243 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown and defence agreed that a custodial sentence was not appropriate.

The defence sought a conditional discharge, arguing it was in the defendant's best interests due to mental health issues and profound remorse.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with probation.

The court found that while a conditional discharge was in the defendant's best interests, it would be contrary to the public interest given the seriousness of the offence and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with a two-year probation order, including conditions for counselling and a victim surcharge.

The defendant, Darryl Ryan Bloomfield, pleaded guilty to break, enter, and theft of a dwelling-house.

The court considered the circumstances of the offence, the offender's troubled history including substance abuse and a lengthy criminal record, and victim impact.

The Crown sought a 12-month custodial sentence followed by two years probation, while the defence requested a suspended sentence with a three-year probation order including a curfew and electronic monitoring.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the serious nature of the offence and the offender's history of non-compliance with community supervision, while also acknowledging mitigating factors like the guilty plea and efforts towards rehabilitation.

A custodial sentence of nine months was imposed, followed by two years of probation with strict conditions, a DNA order, and a victim surcharge.

Danforth (London) Ltd. ("Danforth") sued the City of London ("City") for $53 million in damages, alleging negligence and failure to act fairly and in good faith regarding a proposed development and rapid transit (RT) routing.

Danforth's related company had applied for a zoning by-law amendment in 2015, but withdrew it after City staff requested significant street dedications for a then-proposed RT route.

In 2017, the City approved a different RT route that did not require these dedications.

Danforth claimed that an earlier routing decision would have allowed its development to proceed.

The City moved for summary judgment, arguing no duty of care was owed in negligence and that Danforth could not complain about the exercise of discretionary power as the application was withdrawn before a council decision.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the City's RT routing decisions and the pre-approval process were "core policy" decisions, immune from negligence claims, and that no private law duty of care was owed.

The claim of unfairness or bad faith also failed because no final decision was made by City council, and there was no evidence of bad faith in staff's earlier requests.

The court also noted statutory protection under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The defendant, Karen Pacey, brought a motion to stay a proceeding initiated by Allied Accounting & Tax Services Limited and Allied Associates LLP, arguing that the dispute fell under an arbitration clause in a Shareholders’ Agreement (SA).

The plaintiffs alleged breaches of confidentiality and non-competition provisions in both the SA and a Representative’s Contract, the latter lacking an arbitration clause.

The court found that the SA's arbitration clause was qualified by other provisions explicitly referring to "court" for equitable relief, indicating an exclusion for such disputes from arbitration.

Additionally, the court found that the defendant unduly delayed in bringing the motion for a stay, which would have been a separate ground for refusal.

The motion to stay the proceeding was dismissed.

Candice McFadden appealed her conviction for assaulting her common law spouse with a weapon.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the appellant's account of the incident, failed to conduct a full R. v. W.(D.) analysis by focusing too narrowly on the final moments of the confrontation, and applied a different standard of review to the evidence of the victim and the accused.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiff corporation brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that an associate dentist breached an Associate Agreement and a permanent injunction.

The dispute arose from the termination of the associate's arrangement with the plaintiff and another principal dentist at a dental clinic, and the associate's subsequent agreement to purchase the other principal dentist's practice.

The responding parties argued that the Associate Agreement was subject to an overarching Practice Agreement and that the plaintiff's termination was not in good faith.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding the common law duty of honest performance in contracts and the advisability of partial summary judgment in the context of the litigation as a whole.

The applicant, Myriam Michail, sought leave from the Superior Court of Justice to bring an application for judicial review of an arbitration award and an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision, along with a constitutional challenge.

Ordinarily, such applications are heard by the Divisional Court.

The applicant argued urgency due to protracted proceedings, health issues, inability to travel, and lack of income.

The court, while acknowledging the applicant's subjective distress, found that the objective criteria for urgency and a likely failure of justice under s. 6(2) of the Judicial Review Procedure Act were not met.

The court emphasized the complexity of the issues, the need for a three-justice panel (Divisional Court's expertise), and the availability of alternative arrangements like video conferencing.

The motion for leave was dismissed, and the judicial review application was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The plaintiffs, the estate and family members of Sandra Zarubiak, brought a medical negligence action against Dr. John Luce, Nurse Kathy Cull, and the Niagara Health System.

They alleged that Sandra's discharge from the hospital, despite her deconditioned state and fall risk, led to a subsequent fall, lacerations, and a fatal infection.

The court found that neither Dr. Luce nor Nurse Cull breached the standard of care, concluding that Dr. Luce's decision was a matter of professional judgment, and Nurse Cull's actions were meticulous.

Furthermore, the court determined that the plaintiffs failed to establish causation, as the source of the fatal infection could not be definitively linked to the fall or pre-existing wounds, with both theories being equally plausible.

The action was dismissed.

This trial determined the operability of a $65,298.24 credit memo issued by Architectural Millwork & Door Installations Inc. (AMDI) to Provincial Store Fixtures Ltd. (Provincial) in a construction subcontract dispute.

The court found that Provincial had induced AMDI to issue the credit memo with a promise to remit payment upon receiving funds from the general contractor, Govan Brown, a promise Provincial subsequently breached.

AMDI was deemed entitled to revoke the credit memo because Provincial failed to fulfill its undertaking and could not demonstrate reliance on the credit when it settled its own claim against Govan Brown.

Provincial was ordered to pay AMDI the full amount of the credit memo plus pre-judgment interest.

The defendants brought a motion seeking the production of the plaintiff's adverse cost insurance policy (ACP) during discovery.

The plaintiff resisted, arguing that only particulars of the policy were required and that the policy itself was not relevant to the issues in dispute.

The court, interpreting Rule 30.02(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, held that the rule mandates disclosure and production for inspection of any insurance policy that may indemnify a party for money paid in satisfaction of a judgment, including an ACP, regardless of its direct relevance to the substantive issues of the action.

The motion was granted, and the plaintiff was ordered to produce the policy.

The defendant, M.P., was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown alleged non-consensual sexual intercourse, while the defendant claimed consent.

The court considered the conflicting testimonies of the complainant, Ms. H., and the defendant, M.P., as well as a third witness, Ms. D.S. The judge noted numerous significant inconsistencies in the Crown witnesses' accounts across multiple interviews and hearings, and found the defendant's testimony problematic due to admitted lies and internal inconsistencies.

Ultimately, the court found that the totality of the conflicting evidence left a reasonable doubt as to whether the complainant consented to sexual intercourse, leading to the dismissal of the charge.

The plaintiff, London Medical and Dental Building Limited (LMDB), brought an action against Middlesex Condominium Corporation No. 83 (MCC 83) and Gannon Medicine Professional Corporation (Gannon) for trespass, nuisance, breach of contract, negligence, and unjust enrichment.

The dispute arose from access through LMDB's building (450 Central Avenue) to an elevator in an adjacent condominium building (440 Central Avenue), which was crucial for persons with mobility devices.

MCC 83 and Gannon brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss LMDB's action and, for MCC 83, to obtain declaratory relief on its counterclaim regarding access rights.

The court dismissed LMDB's action against MCC 83 entirely and dismissed most of LMDB's claims against Gannon, allowing only the unjust enrichment claim against Gannon to proceed.

The court found that the 1999 Agreement granted access rights to owners, occupants, and guests of the condominium, including patients of the commercial unit, and LMDB's purported termination of this agreement was ineffective.

The applicant, Cody McNeil, brought an application challenging the lawfulness of a search incident to his arrest for trespassing, arguing a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights and seeking exclusion of seized drugs (cannabis and methamphetamine) under s. 24(2).

Police arrested McNeil for trespassing after he re-entered a building from which he was banned.

During a search conducted in a secure police office, drugs were found.

The court found the initial search for officer safety was justified given the location's history of criminal activity and McNeil's criminal record, which included a weapons conviction.

The subsequent discovery of methamphetamine provided new grounds for arrest and justified the continuation of the search.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The representative plaintiff, Fanshawe College, sought to amend the class definition in a certified class proceeding alleging price-fixing of LCD panels.

Two amendments were proposed: a broad "all purchasers' amendment" to include all direct and indirect purchasers, and an "alternative amendment" to expand the list of named OEMs and distributors.

The court denied the "all purchasers' amendment," finding it an abuse of process as it attempted to re-litigate an issue previously abandoned and decided by the certification judge.

However, the court granted the "alternative amendment," as it was specifically contemplated by the certification judge and the claims were not found to be time-barred.