Dragi Zekavica

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing bodily harm, failing to stop at the scene of an accident knowing bodily harm was caused, driving while disqualified, and possession of a counterfeit mark.

The offences arose from a motor vehicle accident on April 12, 2017, at the intersection of Dundas Street West and McQuay Boulevard in Whitby, Ontario, where the accused drove at excessive speeds through city streets during lunch hour, ran a red light, and struck another vehicle, causing serious injuries to the driver.

The accused had an extensive criminal record spanning 20 years with 51 convictions, including numerous driving-related offences and breaches of court orders.

The court imposed a global sentence of 10 years in the penitentiary, with sentences for each offence imposed consecutively, less pre-trial custody credit and enhanced credit for assault in custody.

The accused, charged with drug offences, brought a motion for production of information relating to a confidential informant and the Information to Obtain a search warrant, ahead of a planned Garofoli application.

The accused sought source handler notes and other documents, and requested to cross-examine the affiant.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the request to cross-examine premature and holding that the accused failed to provide any factual foundation to justify disclosure of materials outside the investigative file.

The defendant pleaded guilty to four counts of breaching a section 810.2 recognizance: failing to report to police, failing to report a change of address, failing to carry a copy of the recognizance, and failing to abstain from alcohol consumption.

The defendant had been released from a 15-year federal sentence for manslaughter, forcible confinement, and breaking and entering.

Psychological assessments indicated he posed a high to moderate-high risk for violent recidivism.

The defendant breached the recognizance by failing to report for 5.5 months, relocating to Ottawa without notification, and consuming alcohol while committing theft.

The court sentenced him to 20 months less 2 months and 1 week time served, resulting in 17 months and 3 weeks incarceration, followed by a 2-year probation order with conditions identical to the section 810.2 recognizance.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction acquittal on multiple counts of possession and making available child pornography.

The trial judge had excluded computer evidence after finding that police breached s. 489.1 of the Criminal Code by failing to file a return of seized items as soon as practicable, concluding the breach violated s. 8 of the Charter and warranted exclusion under s. 24(2).

The appeal court held the trial judge committed reversible error by misapprehending the evidence regarding the seriousness and systemic nature of the breach and by misapplying the second stage of the Grant analysis.

The trial judge also erred by excluding the accused’s statement under s. 10(b) without notice to the Crown.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The accused was convicted by a jury of sexual assault arising from non‑consensual intercourse following an initial period of consensual sexual activity.

The court assessed aggravating factors including anal intercourse, the accused continuing despite the complainant’s repeated objections, and significant psychological harm to the complainant.

Mitigating considerations included the absence of gratuitous violence and the offender’s personal circumstances.

The court held that the appropriate sentencing range for sexual assault involving intercourse without additional violence is generally two to four years’ imprisonment.

A custodial sentence of three years was imposed together with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, sex offender registration, and a no‑contact order.

Following a jury conviction for sexual assault, the accused applied for a mistrial based on alleged inconsistencies between the complainant’s trial testimony and her victim impact statement, arguing the differences supported an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court first considered whether it had jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after a jury verdict and the discharge of the jury.

Relying on appellate authority, the court held that a trial judge is generally functus after a jury verdict and may only intervene in very narrow circumstances, such as where the jury did not deliver the verdict it intended or where the defence of entrapment arises.

Neither exception applied.

The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to declare a mistrial and dismissed the application.

The applicant sought a bail review after a justice of the peace revoked his prior bail and ordered his detention.

The justice of the peace had found the applicant 'releasable' but ordered detention because the proposed sureties were deemed unsuitable.

The Superior Court found this was an error in law, as the test for release was conflated with the adequacy of the proposed plan.

The court upheld the finding that the applicant was releasable on the secondary ground and, having approved three new sureties, ordered the applicant's release on a recognizance with conditions.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after 75 individually packaged bags of cocaine were found in a BlackBerry box in the freezer of an apartment she had recently rented.

The Crown conceded identity, the nature of the substance, and the trafficking quantity, but the accused denied knowledge and control of the drugs.

Applying the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.), the court found the accused’s testimony to be forthright and consistent with surrounding circumstances, including ongoing repairs to the unit, instructions not to use appliances, and the fact that multiple individuals had access to the apartment before the discovery.

The absence of trafficking paraphernalia and the accused’s conduct when giving the superintendent access to the unit further supported her denial of knowledge.

The court held that the Crown failed to prove knowledge and control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with possession of methamphetamine and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking following a police search of her apartment.

She argued the search violated s. 8 of the Charter because the search warrants failed to properly describe the premises and were issued without reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found the warrants were invalid due to an inadequate and misleading description of the targeted premises in a multi‑unit mixed residential and commercial building.

Police continued searching after realizing they had entered the wrong unit and remained in the residence while obtaining a second warrant, conduct the court characterized as reckless and later approaching flagrant disregard of Charter rights.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis from Grant, the court held that the seriousness of the Charter breaches and the profound intrusion into the accused’s home outweighed society’s interest in adjudication on the merits.

The seized drugs were excluded from evidence.

The appellant appealed a conviction for failing or refusing to provide a suitable breath sample contrary to s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing contradictions in the evidence regarding alcohol consumption, improperly accepted the officer’s testimony that he refused to provide a breath sample, failed to consider the mens rea element, and imposed a harsh sentence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge was entitled to prefer the officer’s evidence and that credibility findings are owed deference on appeal unless unsupported by the evidence.

The court found the trial judge had an evidential basis to conclude the appellant intentionally failed or refused to provide a proper sample despite multiple opportunities.

The $1,500 fine was slightly above the statutory minimum and not demonstrably unfit.

Extradition hearing concerning a request from the Federal Republic of Germany for surrender of the respondent to face charges of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery.

The respondent conceded that the Record of the Case and supplemental materials contained sufficient evidence to meet the prima facie threshold for committal but argued that procedural defects invalidated the process, including that the request did not originate from the German Minister of Justice, that the Canadian Minister’s Authority to Proceed was improperly delegated to a departmental lawyer, and that the arrest lacked a valid Interpol warrant.

The court held that certifications by a German public prosecutor satisfied the Extradition Act requirement that the Record of the Case be certified by a judicial or prosecuting authority, that the Minister’s authority to issue an Authority to Proceed may be delegated, and that the extradition judge lacked jurisdiction to review ministerial conduct absent evidence of bad faith or impropriety.

Finding the evidentiary and identity requirements met and no procedural defects, the court ordered committal for extradition.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a driving offence involving excessive speed and racing.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the evidence and failing to strictly follow the W.(D.) framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge fairly considered all evidence and that the sentence was entirely fit given the finding that the appellant was racing.

The respondent pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The sentencing judge rejected a joint submission for a conditional sentence and imposed a $5,000 fine.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the fine manifestly unfit and holding that the sentencing judge misunderstood the principles of conditional sentencing and failed to justify departing from the joint submission.

The sentence was varied to add an 18-month conditional sentence to the fine.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary because it was entered as a result of death threats against him and his wife.

The appellant filed fresh evidence, including an email containing a death threat.

The Court of Appeal found that the record raised a serious issue about the voluntariness of the plea and that the appellant had satisfied the burden of proving the plea was involuntary on a balance of probabilities.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty pleas struck out, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 18 years imprisonment (effectively 20.5 years) for extremely serious offences.

The Court of Appeal found that while a substantial penitentiary sentence was warranted given the appellant's background, the sentence imposed was outside the range for like offenders in like circumstances.

The court granted leave to appeal and varied the sentence to 13.5 years, representing a total sentence of 16 years less 2.5 years for time served.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence for breach of probation arising from the issuance and service of civil court proceedings against the complainants.

The court held that, given the substance of the statement of claim and the surrounding background, the proceedings were a communication with the complainants intended to further harass them, and therefore constituted a breach of the probation order.

The court also rejected an abuse of process argument based on the re-laying of the charge after a simple mistake, finding the procedure entirely appropriate.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an inmate, was disciplined with solitary confinement for assaulting another inmate.

He was subsequently charged under the Criminal Code for the same assault.

The appellant argued that the criminal trial violated his right against double jeopardy under s. 11(h) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the prison disciplinary proceedings were not criminal in nature and did not impose true penal consequences.

Therefore, the criminal prosecution did not violate s. 11(h) of the Charter.