Dawe

The accused was arrested for impaired driving after fleeing the scene of a serious motor vehicle collision.

The police failed to make a breath demand at the roadside and subsequently failed to advise the accused of his increased jeopardy when they learned the victim had suffered life-altering injuries.

The breath technician made a delayed breath demand at the station without providing the accused a further opportunity to consult counsel.

The court found multiple breaches of the accused's rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the cumulative impact of the breaches on the accused's protected interests warranted the exclusion of the breath test results under s. 24(2).

The applicants brought an application to pass over the respondent as the Estate Trustee of the deceased's estate.

The court granted the order, appointing one of the applicants as the new Estate Trustee without security.

The court also granted the new Estate Trustee broad powers to compel the production of the deceased's financial, legal, and medical records, waiving any applicable privileges.

Furthermore, the respondent was ordered to deliver all estate records and was restrained from dissipating or encumbering any estate property.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for partial summary judgment in an action arising from a failed $7.25 million commercial real estate transaction.

The defendants failed to close due to lack of financing but argued the agreement was invalid and the seller's closing documents were deficient.

The court found the matter appropriate for summary judgment on liability but declined to grant partial summary judgment for the deposit, as the defendants' request for relief from forfeiture was intertwined with the overall damages claim.

The court granted summary judgment on liability in favour of the corporate plaintiff, finding the defendants breached the valid agreement.

The individual plaintiffs' claims were dismissed for lack of standing as they were not parties to the contract.

The appellant appealed her conviction for 'over 80' impaired driving.

She was pulled over and the officer smelled alcohol, but delayed making an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand for 13 minutes until confirming a device was available, resulting in a total 22-minute delay before the test was administered.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred in concluding the test was administered 'forthwith' under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The delay resulted in breaches of the appellant's rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

Additionally, the police's failure to preserve in-car camera footage breached her s. 7 right to disclosure.

Applying the Grant framework, the appeal judge excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2), set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals on charges of impaired driving and 'over 80'.

The trial judge had excluded the respondent's roadside admission of driving, finding it was statutorily compelled, and subsequently excluded the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by allowing the respondent to testify only on the Charter voir dire after allegedly agreeing to a blended trial, and challenged the findings on statutory compulsion, adequacy of reasons, and the s. 24(2) analysis.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings or application of the law.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for 'over 80'.

Police officers observed a vehicle stuck in the snow in the side yard of a residence and entered the property to investigate, suspecting an accident or medical emergency.

They found the appellant, who lived at the residence, and formed grounds to arrest him for impaired driving.

The appellant argued the police entry violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the police had lawful authority to enter the property under both the implied licence doctrine and the common law ancillary powers doctrine, and had reasonable grounds for the arrest and breath demand.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated because police did not inform him he could consult duty counsel in his native language, Vietnamese, despite objective signs of his limited English comprehension.

The Superior Court of Justice found that 'special circumstances' existed, triggering an obligation for police to inform the appellant of his right to access counsel in his language of choice.

The failure to do so constituted a s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2), allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The applicant, who suffers from mental illness and auditory hallucinations, applied for a bail review after being detained on charges of attempted murder and aggravated assault of a police officer.

He presented a new bail plan with a surety.

The court found that while the applicant's dangerousness is linked to his mental illness, the proposed plan did not provide adequate supervision to ensure he would remain medicated and stable.

The application was dismissed under the secondary ground.

The plaintiff, Computron, purchased wholesale quantities of Beats headphones from the defendant Ladhani, who had sourced them from the defendant Techlogics.

Computron later ordered more headphones directly from Techlogics.

Upon discovering the headphones were counterfeit, Computron sought refunds.

Computron and Ladhani brought motions for summary judgment against Techlogics, arguing they were duped into believing the goods were authentic.

The court found the sales were 'sales by description' under the Sale of Goods Act, implying a condition of authenticity.

The court rejected Techlogics' defence that the buyers knew the goods were inauthentic 'OEM' products.

Summary judgment was granted to Computron against Ladhani and Techlogics, and to Ladhani against Techlogics for breach of contract.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their Statement of Claim to substitute a new corporate entity as the plaintiff, having mistakenly named the former property owners instead of the actual owner at the time of the fire loss.

The defendants opposed, arguing the limitation period had expired.

The court granted the amendment, finding it was a true case of misnomer and the defendants suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The court also set aside an ex parte costs order previously made against the plaintiffs, finding their counsel's failure to attend the motion was due to an honest misunderstanding.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder alongside three co-defendants, applied for a separate trial.

He argued that a joint trial would be unfair because the Crown intended to adduce intercepted conversations involving his co-defendants that were inadmissible against him but potentially prejudicial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the intercepts did not directly incriminate the applicant and that any risk of prejudice could be managed through limiting instructions.

The court concluded that the pragmatic benefits of a joint trial outweighed the potential prejudice.

The applicants, who were charged with criminal offences and elected trial by jury before the Bill C-75 amendments came into force, brought pre-trial applications seeking a ruling that the amendments eliminating peremptory challenges did not apply retrospectively to them.

The court applied the framework from Dineley and concluded that the elimination of peremptory challenges affects the substantive right to a trial by jury under s. 11(f) of the Charter.

As a result, the court held that the amendments operate only prospectively, and the applicants were entitled to exercise peremptory challenges at their upcoming trials.

The purchasers of a new home terminated their agreement of purchase and sale after the builder failed to complete construction by the outside closing date.

The builder disputed the termination, claiming the purchasers had verbally agreed to an extension, and brought an application for specific performance.

The purchasers brought a motion to stay the application and refer the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the Tarion Addendum.

The court applied the competence-competence principle and found it was at least arguable that the dispute fell within the scope of the arbitration clause.

The builder's application was stayed and the matter referred to arbitration.

The plaintiff cyclist was injured when he collided with the defendant's SUV, which was stopped in a crosswalk waiting to make a right turn.

The plaintiff's bicycle brakes failed as he approached the intersection, causing him to swerve and strike the defendant's vehicle.

The defendant moved for summary judgment to dismiss the negligence action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendant acted as a reasonable and prudent driver and was not negligent in failing to see the plaintiff approaching from a distance or in her reaction to the sudden emergency.

The applicant municipality brought a motion for an interim order prohibiting the respondents from using two semi-detached buildings as multi-unit apartments, contrary to the local zoning bylaw.

The municipality argued that the respondents had previously breached the bylaw and could easily do so again.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while a municipality need not show irreparable harm to obtain an injunction against ongoing bylaw breaches, it must demonstrate that the bylaw is currently being flouted.

The evidence indicated the respondents were making some attempt to comply with the bylaw, and the threat of statutory penalties remained an adequate sanction pending the final hearing.