N. Da Silva

The Crown brought an application to remove the defendant's counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The defendant and a co-accused were jointly charged with terrorism-related offences.

The counsel of record had previously represented or consulted with the co-accused, the defendant's family members, and potential witnesses in related matters.

The court found a realistic and significant risk of a future conflict of interest that could impair the counsel's duty of loyalty and effective assistance.

The application was granted, and the counsel was removed from the record.

The offender, an off-duty police officer, was convicted of failing to stop after an accident under s. 320.16(1) of the Criminal Code.

He had collided with a motorcyclist, causing the motorcyclist to suffer severe injuries resulting in the amputation of his leg.

The offender was acquitted of impaired and dangerous driving charges.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a non-custodial or conditional sentence.

The court found that the offender's status as a police officer and his failure to summon help were aggravating factors, but noted he was a first offender with strong community support who would likely lose his job.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence, a 30-month driving prohibition, a DNA order, and a $200 victim surcharge.

The accused, an off-duty police officer, was involved in a motor vehicle collision where his SUV crossed the centre line and struck an oncoming motorcycle, causing the rider to lose his leg.

The accused drove nearly four kilometres away from the scene before stopping and did not call 911.

At trial, the court acquitted the accused of impaired driving causing bodily harm and dangerous driving causing bodily harm, finding the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt and failed to rule out a sudden tire blowout or mechanical failure.

However, the court convicted the accused of failing to stop after an accident, rejecting the defence that a concussion rendered his actions non-volitional or negated his intent to flee.

The father brought a motion seeking sole custody and restricted access for the mother following the parties’ separation and ongoing disputes over parenting time.

The mother brought a cross‑motion seeking sole interim custody and equal parenting time after she unilaterally retained the children.

The court found no clear basis to prefer one parent over the other pending an investigation by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

An interim order for joint custody was granted with equal parenting time on a rotating weekly schedule during the summer.

Issues of child support were adjourned pending further submissions.

In a family law motion following a consent order governing parenting and financial responsibilities, the applicant sought reimbursement for expenses she paid pursuant to the prior order, including utilities, property-related expenses, line of credit payments secured against the matrimonial home, rental property shortfall, and children’s expenses.

The respondent argued the payments had been made from joint funds and that reimbursement would amount to double recovery.

The court held that the prior consent order required equal contributions to specified expenses and had not been followed by the respondent.

Accepting the applicant’s evidence that she personally paid the expenses and that the respondent failed to contribute as required, the court ordered reimbursement.

The respondent was ordered to pay $40,208.60 from funds held in trust from the sale of a jointly owned property, with other claims for extraordinary expenses adjourned to trial.