C.W. Hourigan

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing he was entitled to enhanced credit (1.5 to 1) for pre-sentence custody after his bail was revoked.

He had consented to his detention without a show cause hearing.

The Court of Appeal held that an accused whose prior form of release is cancelled under s. 524(8) of the Criminal Code is 'detained in custody' under that section, regardless of whether a separate detention order is made following a show cause hearing.

Consequently, the appellant fell within the exclusion in s. 719(3.1) and was not entitled to enhanced credit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for trafficking in crack cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime, arguing the trial judge misapprehended identification evidence and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was entitled to rely on police testimony regarding the seller's location in the vehicle and physical description.

The appeal was dismissed as the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and the verdict was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following an on-ice collision during a recreational no-contact hockey game.

The trial judge rejected the defence's evidence that the collision was accidental, finding instead that it was a deliberate blindside hit.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge engaged in impermissible speculative reasoning by relying on her own personal knowledge of hockey strategy and on-ice injuries to reject the defence witnesses' testimony.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of heroin for the purposes of trafficking and breaking and entering.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal regarding the drug conviction, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the large quantity of heroin and other indicia supported trafficking.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the break and enter conviction, finding the trial judge's one-sentence reasons insufficient and failing to address the frailties of the eyewitness identification evidence.

A new trial was ordered for the break and enter count.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible (NCR) for aggravated assault after stabbing a complainant.

She appealed the NCR verdict, arguing she received ineffective assistance of counsel because she was not informed that an NCR finding could result in indefinite detention, and alternatively sought to withdraw her consent to the NCR finding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no prejudice to support the ineffective assistance claim and concluding that the appellant understood the implications of the NCR verdict when she consented to it.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the successful respondent sought costs of $800, primarily for disbursements.

The Court of Appeal found the claim reasonable and ordered the appellant to pay $800 in costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for extortion, arguing that the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, misapprehended evidence, and misapplied the principles of R. v. W.D. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole, provided a detailed assessment of the evidence and credibility.

The court also found that the trial judge's inferences were supported by the evidence and that she correctly applied the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of a firearm.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the police officer acted in good faith and in admitting the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a s. 8 breach during a vehicle search.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's good faith determination and deferring to her s. 24(2) balancing.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day for several firearm offences, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not providing a specific numerical value for the credit allowed for time spent on strict bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a sentencing judge is not required to apply a precise mathematical calculation or precisely identify the credit given for pre-sentence bail.

The sentence was found to be fit given the aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed his convictions and 12-month conditional sentence arising from his attempt to board a flight with a handgun and ammunition in his checked baggage.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended his mother's testimony that she had packed the bag without his knowledge.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge misapprehended one minor aspect of the mother's evidence, the record amply supported the conclusion that her testimony was unbelievable due to multiple inconsistencies.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court agreed that a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching of his daughter.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by engaging in a credibility contest and misapplying the burden of proof under the W.(D.) framework.

The trial judge's reasons indicated he based his decision on whose evidence he preferred rather than determining whether the evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The applicant sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his sentence appeal by the Summary Conviction Appeal Court.

He had been sentenced to 45 days of intermittent jail for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content of 192 mg/100 ml, marking his fourth drinking and driving conviction.

The Court of Appeal found no arguable error of law, noting that the lower courts properly applied sentencing principles and that a conditional sentence was manifestly inappropriate.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of over three kilograms of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 12 months' incarceration and 12 months' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge violated the parity principle because other mid-level participants received 18-month conditional sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge expressly considered the parity principle and made no error in principle.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order setting child support, permitting the respondent to move with the children, and awarding trial costs.

The appellant argued the motion judge improperly seized herself of the case and was functus officio based on the Supreme Court's decision in Doucet-Boudreau.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that active case management is permitted under the Family Law Rules and inherent jurisdiction, and that the functus officio doctrine does not prevent a judge from hearing motions to change in family cases.

The trial costs award was also upheld.

Following a successful appeal, the appellants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis of $54,456.00, arguing that the trial tactics of defence counsel warranted such an award.

The Court of Appeal found no basis in the conduct of the appeal for substantial indemnity costs.

The court fixed the costs of the appeal at $33,000 all-inclusive, payable to the appellants.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference involving two young children.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury against using evidence relating to one complainant as propensity evidence for the other, and by admitting hearsay statements.

The Court of Appeal found no error in admitting the hearsay statements but held that the failure to provide a limiting instruction on cross-count propensity reasoning was a fatal error.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to eight years in custody.

He appealed the sentence, arguing he should have received enhanced pre-trial custody credit on a 1.5 to 1 basis and that the sentence was unfit because he did not bring the gun to the scene.

The Crown conceded the pre-trial custody issue, and the Court of Appeal applied the Summers framework to increase the credit to 39 months.

However, the court dismissed the fitness of sentence appeal, finding the sentencing judge had already accounted for the fact that the appellant did not bring the gun and that the sentence was fit given the aggravating factors.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted aggravated sexual assault arising from unprotected sexual intercourse after an HIV positive diagnosis.

He argued the trial judge erred by making an unassisted handwriting comparison of a motel registration card and by failing to properly apply the W.(D.) analysis to assess credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's handwriting conclusion was reasonable and that he had properly instructed himself on the burden of proof and credibility assessment.

The appellant was terminated without cause after 34 years of employment.

He sued for damages based on a Layoff Policy and alternatively for common law wrongful dismissal.

On a motion for summary judgment, the parties requested an endorsement that the Layoff Policy would be fully applicable, which the motion judge granted.

The appellant appealed, arguing the motion judge erred by not considering his claim for common law notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge making the order requested by both parties.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited weapon, possession of a firearm knowing its possession was unauthorized, and breach of a weapons prohibition.

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge failed to properly apply the 'jump principle' given his prior global sentence of six and one-half months.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge explicitly considered the jump principle and the sentence was within the appropriate range.