C.W. Hourigan

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside the registrar's dismissal of their action for delay.

The action, related to a 2006 property purchase, was dismissed in 2011 after the appellants failed to meet a court-ordered timetable.

The motion judge found that a 14-month unexplained delay in bringing a second motion to set aside the dismissal was fatal, and that the defendants suffered actual prejudice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the motion judge's application of the Reid factors and balancing of competing principles.

The appellant appealed an order from a trial management conference judge who, on her own initiative, struck his pleadings on financial issues for failure to make disclosure.

The Court of Appeal allowed the unopposed appeal and set aside the order, finding procedural unfairness because there was no motion to strike before the judge and the parties were not given an opportunity to make submissions.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for violent offences in 2002, appealed the Ontario Review Board's refusal to grant her an absolute discharge.

The Board had ordered the continuation of her conditional discharge, finding she remained a significant threat to public safety due to her history of medication non-compliance, limited insight into her mental illness, and lack of a concrete follow-up plan.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board did not misapply the test for significant threat to public safety and that its conclusion was reasonable and supported by psychiatric evidence.

The Bank appealed a trial judgment finding it liable for knowing assistance in a breach of trust after it allowed a payroll processing company continued access to electronic banking facilities despite knowing of a deficit in a trust account.

The plaintiffs cross-appealed the dismissal of their claim for knowing receipt of trust funds regarding a transfer that reduced an overdraft.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the knowledge requirement for knowing assistance and made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the Bank had no obligation to inquire into the overdrafts.

The moving party brought a motion to quash an appeal from an order dismissing a motion for summary judgment.

The moving party conceded that the order did not preclude the responding party from advancing its arguments regarding s. 36(4) of the Competition Act or abuse of process as substantive defences at trial, and agreed not to advance an argument of res judicata.

Based on this concession that the order was interlocutory rather than final, the Court of Appeal quashed the appeal and awarded costs to the moving party.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

He was arrested during the execution of a search warrant in an apartment, holding cash and a knife, moments after being seen on a balcony where drugs were later found.

The Court of Appeal held that the drug convictions were unreasonable because the circumstantial evidence did not support guilt as the only reasonable inference.

However, the court upheld the proceeds of crime conviction, finding no other reasonable explanation for the cash.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery for his role in a home invasion and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence and introduced fresh evidence demonstrating significant rehabilitation during the five years he spent on bail pending appeal, including maintaining employment, marrying, and volunteering.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence and held that returning the appellant to custody would sacrifice his rehabilitation for general deterrence.

The custodial portion of the sentence was reduced to time served.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment granted to the respondent bank based on her default under a mortgage on a condominium property.

The appellant had stopped making principal, interest, and common element fee payments.

The appellant raised defences including that her name had been expropriated and that she was a tenant rather than an owner.

The Court of Appeal found no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application against the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by not reviewing the evidence filed in his supplementary application record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, endorsing the principle that Rule 2.1 is designed for summary dismissal based on the face of the pleadings and written submissions, and that resorting to evidence defeats the purpose of the rule.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his motion to set aside a noting in default and default judgment.

The motion judge found that while the appellant had a triable defence, he failed to move expeditiously, waiting 28 months after the noting in default to proceed with the motion.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding ample evidence to support the conclusion on delay and confirming that the motion judge properly considered the prejudice to the parties and the appellant's litigation conduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of powder cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, seeking a reduction to six months less one day to avoid immigration consequences, arguing the trial judge failed to properly consider his post-traumatic stress disorder and misapprehended the sentencing range.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully considered all relevant factors and imposed a fit sentence within the applicable range.

The appellants appealed a Superior Court order quashing their discharge at a preliminary inquiry regarding a tractor trailer robbery.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and testimony from former co-accused implicating the appellants in other robberies.

The appellants argued the motion judge improperly treated evidence from other counts as similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly identified a jurisdictional error by the preliminary inquiry judge in failing to consider the evidence as a whole, and that the similarities between the robberies supported an inference that the same group committed them.

The appellants appealed a mid-trial Rule 21 motion decision interpreting their late father's will and codicil.

The trial judge found that the trusts created by the will, which granted a life interest to the testator's widow, did not preclude her from accumulating wealth from the trust funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the interpretation, finding the testator intended to provide generously for his widow without requiring her to conserve the estate for the remainder beneficiaries.

The Court also rejected the appellants' argument that the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the mid-trial motion, noting they had consented to the procedure, though the Court cautioned against mid-trial Rule 21 motions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The arrest followed a routine traffic stop where an officer smelled fresh marijuana and found over three kilograms of marijuana and cash.

The appellant argued the search violated s. 8 of the Charter.

The trial judge had concerns about the arresting officer's credibility but accepted the evidence of a second officer, concluding there were reasonable and probable grounds for the stop.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The respondent, previously convicted of sexual interference and subject to a s. 161 prohibition order barring him from school grounds, attended a secondary school for a 'spa day' where he interacted with students.

He pleaded guilty to breaching the order and was granted an absolute discharge at trial.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the sentence failed to apply principles of denunciation and deterrence.

The absolute discharge was set aside and replaced with a six-month custodial sentence followed by three years of probation.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no merit to the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or unreasonable verdict.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed.

The Court applied a 1.5:1 credit for pre-sentence custody and reduced the sentence to the mandatory minimum of five years, emphasizing the need for restraint when sentencing a youthful first offender with excellent prospects for rehabilitation.

The appellant sought to enforce an ICC arbitral award against the State of Libya by garnishing its embassy bank accounts in Canada.

Libya moved to quash the garnishments, claiming diplomatic immunity, which the motion judge granted.

The appellant appealed, but Libya had a pending motion in the Superior Court to set aside the underlying recognition and enforcement order.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal sine die on the basis of prematurity, finding that the pending motion could render the appeal moot.

The Court also continued a stay order freezing the bank accounts, finding a real risk that the funds would be removed if the stay was lifted.

The appellant appealed an order striking her Fresh As Amended Statement of Claim against Ryerson University and Timothy Sly without leave to amend.

The claim alleged breach of contract, negligence, intentional infliction of mental distress, discrimination, and educational malpractice relating to an exam and grading.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to plead the requisite elements of the causes of action, that discrimination is not an independent tort, and that the educational malpractice claims fell within the university's internal academic decision-making discretion.

The claims against the personal respondent were also struck as they did not allege conduct outside his employment duties.

The appellant, who was found unfit to stand trial due to an intellectual disability, appealed a Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention.

He argued the Board erred in finding he remained a significant threat to the public and in failing to impose the least onerous disposition, specifically a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's finding on significant threat as reasonable, but agreed the Board erred by failing to consider whether a conditional discharge could ensure public safety.

The matter was remitted to the Review Board to consider a conditional discharge.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of invitation to sexual touching of a child and acquitted of sexual assault.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the verdicts were inconsistent because there was no evidence the child did not comply with the invitations, which would have constituted sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no necessary logical inconsistency.

The court noted the jury may have misunderstood that the appellant's participation in the physical contact amounted to an assault, but this error would have enured to the appellant's benefit and did not undermine the convictions.