Cronk

The appellant was charged with impaired driving.

A police officer, certified as a Drug Recognition Expert (DRE), evaluated the appellant and concluded his ability to drive was impaired by cannabis.

The trial judge excluded the DRE's opinion evidence after a Mohan voir dire, leading to an acquittal.

The summary conviction appeal judge overturned the acquittal, finding the evidence admissible under the Criminal Code without a voir dire.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that section 254(3.1) of the Criminal Code implicitly renders DRE opinion evidence admissible to prove drug-impaired driving without the necessity of a Mohan voir dire.

The appellant advanced funds to finance the cost of repairs by third parties to an aircraft owned by the respondent.

It brought a motion for a declaration that it had a non-possessory lien under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding the appellant was not a 'repairer' under the Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that advancing funds to finance repairs does not constitute making a repair or bestowing skill, labour, or money on the aircraft.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision granting the equitable remedy of rectification to correct mistaken share redemptions that triggered unintended tax consequences.

The application judge found that the respondents had a continuing intention to carry out loan arrangements on a tax-neutral basis and that the share redemptions were a mistake.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under the binding authority of Juliar, the critical requirement for rectification is proof of a continuing specific intention to undertake a transaction on a particular tax basis, which the respondents had established.

The appellant appealed an order declaring a child to be a child of the marriage and requiring him to pay retroactive and ongoing child support, as well as spousal support.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's findings on the child's status, his income, and the respondent's ability to contribute.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle or serious misapprehension of evidence by the trial judge.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence regarding the appellant's income, noting it lacked cogency and that the trial order already provided a mechanism for adjusting support based on annual income tax returns.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued an appeal book endorsement directing that an order go as per the amended draft order filed by the parties.

This is a companion appeal to Unifund Assurance Company v. D.E. and L.E. The appellant insurance company appealed a declaration that it had a duty to defend and indemnify the respondent parents and their minor daughter in an underlying action relating to alleged bullying and harassment.

Applying the reasons from the companion appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred in interpreting the exclusion clause.

The court also held that the minor daughter was excluded from coverage as the underlying claim was strictly for intentional torts of assault and battery.

The appeal was allowed, and the court declared the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision striking his statement of claim and dismissing his action regarding two properties.

For the Fergus property, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge proceeded on an incomplete understanding of the facts regarding waiver of conditions and extension of the closing date, and that a ten-year limitation period might apply.

For the Erin property, the Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the claims were barred by res judicata as they had been or should have been resolved in prior proceedings.

The appellant appealed a formal order containing only support orders made by the trial judge, including an order for retroactive support of $53,800.

The Court of Appeal determined it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as the order fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal was transferred to the Divisional Court.

The respondent, an undischarged bankrupt, brought an application for a declaration that his professional liability insurer was required to indemnify him for a class action.

The insurer brought a motion to strike the application, arguing the respondent lacked legal capacity.

The motion judge dismissed the motion.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the order was final and that the right to receive an indemnity under an insurance contract is a chose in action that vests in the trustee in bankruptcy.

The appeal was allowed and the application dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their medical malpractice action following the death of a 22-year-old man in hospital.

The deceased had been switched from morphine to Dilaudid by the respondent physician, and the appellants alleged the dosage was excessive and caused his death by opioid overdose.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's expert evidence that the dosage met the standard of care and that the cause of death was not an opioid overdose.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to liability, standard of care, or causation.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to touch for a sexual purpose against his five-year-old great-niece, as well as possession of child pornography.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding the complainant's prior consistent statements and the use of the child pornography evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding the prior statements but held the trial judge erred by failing to expressly instruct the jury that the child pornography evidence could not be used to determine guilt on the sexual abuse charges.

The convictions for the sexual offences were quashed and a new trial ordered.

The conviction for possession of child pornography was upheld, but the sentence was reduced to time served after applying the correct pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant commenced an action in 1998 relating to a property transaction in Venezuela.

By 2014, the action had not proceeded to trial.

The motion judge dismissed the action for delay, finding the 16-year delay to be inordinate, inexcusable, and prejudicial, particularly given that two principal defendants had died.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, agreeing that the delay met the test for dismissal and that the civil justice system will no longer tolerate such inordinate and inexplicable delay.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellants defaulted on a loan secured by both a promissory note and a mortgage.

The promissory note contained a provision escalating the interest rate from 0.75% to 10% upon default, while the mortgage contained late payment and default fees.

The motion judge granted summary judgment enforcing the 10% interest rate and the fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that because the promissory note and mortgage secured the same debt, section 8 of the Interest Act applied to both instruments.

The interest escalation provision and the late fees were found to violate section 8's prohibition against penalties on arrears secured by a mortgage and were set aside.

The appellant appealed a partial summary judgment granted in a simplified proceeding under Rule 76, arguing it was not an efficient and proportionate way to deal with the issues.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that summary judgment is available in Rule 76 actions and the appellant had failed to file any responding evidentiary materials to challenge the respondent's straightforward collection claim.

The appellant, an Ontario-based multi-national enterprise, appealed a motion judge's finding that Ontario law governed its contract with the respondent, an Alberta corporation.

The contract, which lacked a choice of law clause, was for the design and sale of a fryer and oven system that allegedly caused a fire at the respondent's plant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's application of the 'closest and most real connection' test, agreeing that the nature, subject matter, and place of performance of the contract favoured Ontario, as the system was designed and its components ordered there.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for fraud and breach of contract related to a carpet supply and installation contract with a public housing corporation.

The trial judge found the appellants engaged in a deliberate scheme of falsifying invoices and supplying substandard materials, awarding compensatory damages, punitive damages, and full indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on liability, compensatory damages, and costs, confirming that a contractual stop-payment clause was not a penalty or liquidated damages provision.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the joint and several nature of the punitive damages award and the punitive damages awarded against the deceased employee's estate, leaving the principal appellant solely liable for the punitive damages.

The appellant appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside an Environmental Review Tribunal's revocation of a Renewable Energy Approval for a wind farm project.

The Tribunal had found the project would cause serious and irreversible harm to the Blanding's turtle due to increased road mortality.

The Court of Appeal held the Divisional Court erred in its standard of review application, finding the Tribunal's decision on serious and irreversible harm was reasonable despite lacking precise numerical data.

However, the Court of Appeal agreed the Tribunal erred in revoking the approval without allowing the parties to make submissions on the appropriate remedy.

The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to determine the remedy.

The appellant appealed his drug convictions, arguing they were unreasonable because there was no evidence of where in his residence the drugs were found.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions for possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking and proceeds of crime, finding sufficient evidence to support the inference of possession.

However, the court quashed the convictions relating to various pills, holding that without evidence of where the pills were discovered in the house, it was unreasonable to infer possession based solely on the appellant's residency.

The appellants were convicted of numerous fraud-related offences arising from a widespread credit and debit card skimming scheme operated through a storefront business.

Three of the appellants were also convicted of participating in and committing offences for the benefit of a criminal organization.

On appeal, they challenged the admission of wiretap evidence, the finding that they constituted a criminal organization, and various individual convictions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the wiretap authorization was properly granted and the group met the statutory definition of a criminal organization.

The sentence appeals of the two principal offenders were dismissed, while the sentences of the two lesser offenders were varied in part.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision regarding whether breath tests were administered 'as soon as practicable'.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding that the lower courts properly applied the established legal test to the specific facts of the case, which involved delay associated with allowing the detainee to contact a parent.

The court concluded the appeal did not raise a question of law alone of significance beyond the immediate case.