Cronk

An employee of the respondent perpetrated a large-scale fraud by requisitioning cheques payable to six entities and depositing them into accounts he controlled.

Two of the entities were invented, and four were customers not owed money.

The respondent sued the appellant banks for conversion.

The Court of Appeal allowed the banks' appeal, finding they had a valid defence under s. 20(5) of the Bills of Exchange Act.

The court held that the two invented payees were non-existing, and all six payees were fictitious because the respondent's directing minds never formed an intention to pay them.

The appellant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received income replacement benefits until returning to work.

The insurer sent a letter discontinuing benefits and warning of a two-year limitation period to dispute the refusal.

The appellant later stopped working due to her injuries and sought reinstatement of benefits, which the insurer denied as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action, confirming that the limitation period began running upon the valid refusal of benefits, and was not delayed by the temporary return to work provision in the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The appellant appealed his convictions for manslaughter and assault in respect of the death of his infant son, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence of civilian witnesses and a medical expert.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no material error in the trial judge's appreciation of the evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed to grant enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody at a ratio of 1.5:1, reducing the residual sentence to 5.25 years' imprisonment.

The appellants, students in a post-graduate program, brought a class action against the respondent college for a misleading statement in its course calendar regarding the opportunity to complete industry designations.

At the damages trial, the judge awarded aggregate damages under the Consumer Protection Act but excluded the third cohort of students from the class.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, reinstating the third cohort into the class, finding that reliance is not required for a Consumer Protection Act claim.

The Court dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal, upholding the trial judge's award of aggregate damages.

The appellant's home was damaged during exterior restoration work when the contractor failed to properly seal areas against water.

The appellant's insurer denied coverage based on a 'faulty workmanship' exclusion.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding the exclusion precluded claims for both direct and resulting damage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the 'faulty workmanship' exclusion must be interpreted narrowly to exclude only direct damage, preserving coverage for resulting damage under the all-risks policy.

The parties separated after a 27-year marriage.

At trial, the judge ordered the wife to pay an equalization payment, ordered the husband to pay indefinite spousal support based on imputed incomes, and awarded full indemnity costs to the husband.

The wife appealed the spousal support, equalization, and costs orders.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge failed to explain the basis for imputing $484,356 in annual income to the wife, precluding meaningful appellate review.

The court also set aside the costs award, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the husband's settlement offer and his degree of success at trial.

The spousal support and costs issues were remitted to the trial judge, while the equalization payment was upheld.

The appellant was successful in an oppression action against the respondents.

The respondents had served an offer to settle nine calendar days before trial, which technically amounted to fewer than seven days under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The trial judge treated the offer as a valid Rule 49 offer and awarded costs accordingly.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the 'no near miss' policy applies to the timing requirement under rule 49.03, meaning the offer was not a valid Rule 49 offer.

However, the Court upheld the costs award, finding that the trial judge was entitled to take the offer into account under his residual discretion pursuant to rule 49.13.

The respondent acted as an agent to assist a client in collecting insurance proceeds, agreeing to a percentage fee.

To resolve issues with clearing cheques, the appellant solicitor agreed to have the insurance cheques made payable to his firm in trust and provided an undertaking to protect the respondent's fee.

The appellants argued the undertaking applied only to a single payment and was given on behalf of the client, not personally.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the undertaking extended to future payments and was a personal promise of the solicitor, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order regarding child support, spousal support, and custody arrangements.

The father had declared bankruptcy after failing to pay an equalization payment and costs to the respondent mother.

The motion judge had ordered the father to pay lump sum spousal support equal to the unpaid equalization payment and imposed a charging order on his assets.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the lump sum spousal support and charging order because the motion judge failed to properly consider the implications of the father's bankruptcy and the principles governing lump sum support.

The Court also ordered the mother to pay prospective child support for the daughter residing with the father.

The appellants purchased a home and acquired a title insurance policy from the respondent.

Years later, they discovered a previous owner had removed load-bearing walls without a building permit, resulting in a municipal order to remedy an unsafe building.

The respondent denied coverage under the title policy.

The motion judge dismissed the appellants' summary judgment motion, finding the title remained marketable and that municipal work orders must be registered on title to trigger coverage.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the standard of review for standard form insurance contracts is correctness.

The Court found the motion judge erred in his interpretation of the policy and the nature of off-title defects, concluding that the unpermitted construction rendered the title unmarketable and was covered under the policy.

The parties reached a settlement in principle regarding the bankruptcy proposal of Enroute Imports Inc. but required time to finalize specific terms.

The Court of Appeal adjourned the appeal on consent, to be restored to the list if the settlement was not finalized by December 23, 2015.

The self-represented appellant appeared for the hearing of her appeal, but the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) revealed that its materials had never been served on her.

The Court of Appeal found it would be unfair to proceed and adjourned the appeal.

Due to the late adjournment caused by the OCL's failure to serve its materials, the court ordered the OCL to pay costs thrown away of $1,000 to both the appellant and the respondent.

The appellant claimed she suffered pregnancy complications after a police officer wrongfully confiscated her car in August 2009.

She pursued a police complaint and was informed of the outcome in November 2012.

She commenced a negligence action in October 2013.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action as statute-barred.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the limitation period began to run on the date of the incident, as the appellant knew the material facts giving rise to her claim at that time.

The appellant slipped and fell on ice and snow on the driveway of a rented residential property.

He sued the landlord and later added the tenant as a co-defendant.

The motions judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action against both defendants.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the tenant, finding the claim was statute-barred because the appellant failed to rebut the presumption that he discovered his claim on the date of the accident.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the landlord, finding genuine issues for trial concerning the interplay between the lease terms, the Occupiers' Liability Act, and the landlord's maintenance obligations under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The appellant, a municipal councillor, sought a declaration that he did not have a pecuniary interest under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act regarding an appeal his son's law firm was handling.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding the son's interest was neither remote nor insignificant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the application judge erred by conflating the analyses under sections 3 and 4(k) of the Act.

Applying the reasonable elector test, the Court concluded that the appellant's deemed pecuniary interest was so remote or insignificant that it could not reasonably be regarded as likely to influence his participation in council matters.

The appellant appealed an order regarding funds held in court related to an estate.

The respondents moved to dismiss or stay the appeal, alleging the real litigant was a declared vexatious litigant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the underlying application had not been advanced for over 10 years, the beneficiaries were elderly, and the appellant's agent could not justify retaining the funds in court.

The appeal was found to be devoid of merit.

The United States sought the extradition of the appellant for child luring based on internet communications traced to an IP address.

The extradition judge committed the appellant for extradition after inferring that the appellant was the user of the IP address at the relevant time because he was the subscriber.

The Court of Appeal held that this inference was unreasonable without further evidence linking the subscriber to the actual use of the device at the time of the offence, and quashed the committal order.

The Court also dismissed a constitutional challenge to the ex parte gathering and sending provisions of the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, finding they contained adequate safeguards to satisfy procedural fairness under the Charter.

The Crown applied for a review of a bail review judge's decision to release the accused pending trial on a charge of second degree murder.

The accused had initially been denied bail, but a bail review judge later granted release based on a material change in circumstances arising from evidence at the preliminary inquiry regarding the accused's intent and level of intoxication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's application, finding no error in the bail review judge's conclusion that the new evidence materially diminished the strength of the Crown's case and that the accused's continued detention was not necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice under the tertiary ground.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's refusal to set aside his guilty plea to aggravated assault, arguing the plea was not unequivocal and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.

The trial judge had found the plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, and that trial counsel was effective.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge and finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate any prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice arising from his trial counsel's conduct.

The appellant creditor sought a declaration that the bankrupt's judgment debt survived his discharge from bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The trial judge dismissed the claim, finding that the bankrupt owed no fiduciary duty to the appellant, even though he had breached a fiduciary duty to a third party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that s. 178(1)(d) applies only if the bankrupt owed a fiduciary duty directly to the creditor seeking the declaration.