Chouinard

The appellant, a federal public servant, was discharged after engaging in a sustained and highly visible public campaign criticizing major government policies, including metric conversion and the Charter of Rights.

He grieved his discharge, but an adjudicator upheld it, finding his conduct impaired his ability to perform his duties and violated his duty of loyalty.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed his application for judicial review.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while public servants have some freedom of speech, it is not absolute and must be balanced against the need for an impartial and effective public service.

The Court found the adjudicator did not err in inferring impairment of effectiveness from the extreme nature of the appellant's public criticisms.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to traffic and trafficking in PCP.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in not declaring a mistrial after the Crown referred to alleged prior acts, in not deleting references to his criminal past from wiretap recordings, and that the wiretap authorization was invalid due to an overly broad 'basket clause'.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions to the jury cured any prejudice from the Crown's comments or the recordings.

Furthermore, the Court held that the invalid 'basket clause' in the wiretap authorization could be severed from the valid portions, rendering the intercepted communications admissible.

The appellant received unemployment insurance benefits to which he was not entitled, resulting in a debt to the respondent Commission.

The appellant subsequently made an assignment in bankruptcy.

During the bankruptcy, the respondent reimbursed itself for the overpayment by deducting the amount from subsequent unemployment insurance benefits payable to the appellant.

The appellant sought a declaration that this deduction was unlawful.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the deduction contravened the stay of proceedings under section 49(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, as the provision broadly covers any kind of recovery, judicial or extrajudicial, and is not limited to property divisible among creditors.

The appellant, a registered Micmac Indian, was convicted under the Nova Scotia Lands and Forests Act for possession of a rifle and shotgun cartridges.

He argued that the Treaty of 1752 and s. 88 of the Indian Act provided immunity from prosecution.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Treaty of 1752 was validly created, had not been terminated, and constituted a 'treaty' under s. 88 of the Indian Act.

The Court found that the treaty right to hunt included the incidental right to possess a firearm and ammunition safely.

As provincial legislation cannot restrict native treaty rights under s. 88, the appellant was exempt from prosecution.

The appeal was allowed and acquittals entered.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder but successfully appealed, resulting in an order for a new trial.

At the second trial, the Crown introduced the appellant's testimony from the first trial as part of its case-in-chief.

The appellant objected, arguing this violated his right against self-incrimination under s. 13 of the Charter.

The trial judge and Court of Appeal allowed the evidence, holding that a retrial was not 'any other proceedings'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 13 precludes the Crown from using an accused's previous testimony as part of its case in a retrial, as a retrial constitutes 'any other proceedings' and allowing such evidence would indirectly compel the accused to testify.

The appellant, a non-treaty Indian, was convicted of killing a deer out of season contrary to the British Columbia Wildlife Act.

He argued that the Act impaired his status and capacity as an Indian and thus invaded federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Wildlife Act is a law of general application and applies to the appellant either of its own force or by referential incorporation under s. 88 of the Indian Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision regarding the applicable tax rate for the respondent corporation, which depended on whether it was controlled by another company, Validor Limited, under s. 39(4) of the Income Tax Act.

Following a corporate reorganization, voting rights were split equally between Validor and a minority shareholder group, but Validor retained the right to wind up the company and receive the majority of the assets.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that control in the real sense was not surrendered by Validor, as it retained the critical right to terminate the corporate existence and distribute the assets in its favour.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal which allowed the Crown's appeal from the acquittal of the accused on a charge of fraud.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the conclusion and reasons of the Court of Appeal for Ontario regarding the admissibility of computer-produced bank statements under the Canada Evidence Act.

The appellant operated a telephone sales 'boiler room' in Toronto, fraudulently inducing United States residents to purchase worthless shares in Central American mining companies.

The victims sent their money to Central America, and the appellant brought a portion of the proceeds back to Canada.

The appellant challenged his committal for trial on the basis that the essential element of the fraud (the deprivation) occurred outside Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, establishing that Canadian courts have jurisdiction over transnational offences if there is a 'real and substantial link' between the offence and Canada, which was satisfied by the scheme being devised and operated in Toronto.

The appellant was convicted of gross indecency.

At trial, the Crown conducted an improper and unfairly prejudicial cross-examination regarding the appellant's previous sexual conduct, and the trial judge misdirected the jury on the alibi defence.

The Court of Appeal found these errors but applied the proviso in s. 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code to uphold the conviction due to strong circumstantial evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's failure to limit the cross-examination was an error of mixed law and fact, not an error of law alone, and therefore the proviso could not be applied.

The unfair prejudice resulted in a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant police officer and a fellow officer were involved in an altercation with a pedestrian who subsequently died from his injuries.

The fellow officer was convicted of manslaughter, while the appellant was acquitted.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial for the appellant, finding the trial judge misdirected the jury on the justified use of force and the mental element for aiding and abetting manslaughter.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the trial judge's instructions were adequate given the appellant's distinct position regarding the power of arrest and that the jury was properly instructed on the required mental element.

The appellant operated a sex boutique and was convicted of possessing obscene articles for the purpose of sale under s. 159(2)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The police seized various sex stimulators displayed in the store, which had a 'For Adults Only' sign on the door.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the articles were 'publications' because their character was made public by the store's signs and display.

The Court also affirmed that the target audience is irrelevant in determining obscenity, and that the lower courts properly applied the community standard of tolerance.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and rape, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender and sentence of indeterminate detention.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding the verdict was not unreasonable based on the identification evidence.

The Court also found no error in the dangerous offender proceedings and dismissed the appeal from sentence.

The appellant, a former bank manager in the Bahamas, was called as a Crown witness in a Canadian income tax prosecution.

He refused to testify about specific bank customers and transactions, arguing that doing so would subject him to criminal prosecution under Bahamian bank secrecy laws and violate his rights under section 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant was a compellable witness and that section 7 of the Charter did not apply, as any deprivation of liberty would result from the operation of foreign law, not Canadian law.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was arrested while driving a recently stolen car.

She gave statements to the police admitting she knew the car was stolen, but later testified at trial that she did not know.

The trial judge convicted her, stating he could not determine whether she was telling the truth in her statements or her testimony.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law; if a judge cannot decide whether an accused's explanation under oath might reasonably be true, the accused must be acquitted.

The respondent teacher was required by her collective agreement to retire at age 65, pursuant to The Public Schools Act.

She sought a declaration that this mandatory retirement provision contravened the prohibition against age discrimination in The Human Rights Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that human rights legislation is fundamental law that prevails over conflicting general legislation unless an express exception is created.

The Court found that the re-enactment of The Public Schools Act did not implicitly repeal the human rights protections, and the mandatory retirement provision was therefore invalid.

The accused was found asleep in a sleeping bag on the front seat of a parked truck with the ignition on and stereo playing.

He was legally impaired.

The Crown appealed his acquittal on the charge of having care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the accused was not in de facto control of the vehicle and had not performed any acts involving the use of the car or its fittings that would involve a risk of putting the vehicle in motion.

The appellant applied for subdivision approval, which was denied by the municipal council because the land was considered flood-prone.

The council refused to consider any proposals to remedy the flooding problem.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while flooding was a proper consideration, the council erred by failing to consider the scope of the problem and possible solutions.

The failure to take into account a highly relevant consideration meant the council did not exercise its discretion according to law.

The appeal was allowed and the council was ordered to reconsider the application.

The accused was charged with trafficking in a narcotic after selling marijuana to an undercover police officer, allegedly due to entrapment by a police informer.

The jury found unlawful entrapment, and the trial judge directed a stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed, but the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding a stay was not an acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a trial judge has residual discretion to stay proceedings for abuse of process in the clearest of cases, and that such a stay is tantamount to a judgment or verdict of acquittal, thereby giving the Crown a right of appeal under s. 605(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The accused, a lawyer, was charged with conspiring with a police officer to obstruct justice, attempted obstruction of justice, and extortion.

The trial judge acquitted the accused on all counts, finding reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal on the conspiracy count, finding the trial judge's doubt was purely conjectural.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused's appeal and dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's doubt regarding the conspiracy and obstruction charges was based on the evidence and did not constitute an error of law.

Furthermore, the request for money without threats or violence did not amount to extortion.