Charles Michael Gibson

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a noting in default and a default judgment.

The self-represented defendant had attempted to file a Statement of Defence and Notice of Intent to Defend but failed due to procedural errors and a misunderstanding of the court's administrative dismissal process.

The court found the defendant had a plausible excuse for the default, moved promptly upon learning of the judgment, and had an arguable defence on the merits.

The motion was granted, the noting in default and default judgment were set aside, and the defendant was granted leave to file a Statement of Defence.

Following a defamation judgment awarding general and aggravated damages, the plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs of $80,724.36.

The court applied the factors in rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and held the time claimed was excessive, the damages recovered were significantly lower than the amounts claimed, and the proceeding was a short uncontested trial by default.

The court gave very little weight to the plaintiffs' expert evidence and disallowed amounts for the expert report and an unexplained Westlaw disbursement.

Costs were fixed at $34,288 all-inclusive.

In an uncontested defamation trial arising from anonymous postings on an online investment bulletin board, the court found that statements accusing the chief executive officer of lying, defrauding shareholders, stealing ownership interests, and misusing corporate funds were defamatory of both the individual plaintiff and the corporate plaintiff.

The court held that publication and reference were established, but rejected the corporate plaintiff's claim for special damages based on alleged market capitalization loss because the expert evidence was unreliable and causation was not proven.

The individual plaintiff received $30,000 in general damages and $10,000 in aggravated damages.

The corporate plaintiff received $25,000 in general damages.

Punitive damages were refused.

The defendant sought costs after successfully setting aside an ex parte interim interlocutory Mareva injunction obtained by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs argued that costs should be determined after trial or awarded in the cause.

Applying the factors under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered success, the complexity of Mareva injunction proceedings, and the plaintiffs’ decision to proceed without notice despite the absence of urgency.

While the defendant sought substantial indemnity costs, the court held that the plaintiffs’ motion was not entirely groundless and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Costs of $17,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST were ordered payable in any event of the cause to preserve the plaintiffs’ access to justice.

The plaintiffs sought to continue an interim ex parte Mareva injunction freezing the defendant father’s assets in a civil action alleging long‑term physical and emotional abuse and seeking $7.65 million in damages.

The defendant moved to set aside the injunction, denying the allegations and disputing claims that he intended to dissipate assets.

The court applied the test for Mareva injunctions requiring a strong prima facie case, assets within the jurisdiction, and a real risk of asset dissipation.

The evidence supporting the abuse allegations consisted largely of contradictory affidavits and lacked independent corroboration, raising credibility issues that could only be resolved at trial.

The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case and therefore set aside the interim Mareva injunction.

The respondent property owner brought a motion to stay an earlier order requiring an engineer to provide the municipality with a draft structural heritage engineering report concerning an unsafe heritage building.

Applying the test for a stay from RJR‑MacDonald, the court accepted that there was a serious issue regarding the municipality’s jurisdiction to require disclosure of the report.

However, the court found that disclosure would not cause irreparable harm because the report was not privileged and any harm would be limited to the respondent’s financial interests if remediation rather than demolition were considered.

The balance of convenience favoured the municipality and the public interest, as the city required all available information to assess safety and potential preservation of the heritage structure.

The motion for a stay was therefore refused.

Following a successful motion for declaratory and injunctive relief concerning a mutual driveway right-of-way, the successful party sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the effect of settlement offers under Rule 49.10.

The evidence showed repeated reasonable settlement attempts by the successful party and an inflexible litigation position by the opposing party, which contributed to the need for the motion.

The court found that the result obtained was at least as favourable as the formal offer to settle and awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Costs were fixed at $20,336.52 plus HST.

The accused was acquitted at trial on a charge of indecent assault allegedly committed in 1975.

The provincial appellate court set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Court held that the trial judge had acquitted on the basis of reasonable doubt and had made no fatal error of law by not relying on collateral evidence said to bolster the complainant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the new-trial order was set aside, and the acquittal was restored.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking declarations confirming a registered right-of-way over a mutual driveway between neighbouring properties and an injunction preventing interference with that right-of-way.

The parties partially settled the issue of the existence of mutual rights-of-way.

The dispute remained regarding a barrier constructed by the defendant across the driveway which blocked access to the plaintiff’s property.

Applying the test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR‑MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), the court found that the barrier materially interfered with the plaintiff’s property rights and caused ongoing irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured protecting the plaintiff’s recognized right-of-way, and injunctive relief was granted requiring removal of the obstruction.

The applicant filed an application alleging discrimination with respect to services after being refused admission to a master's program.

The matter was scheduled for a hearing.

The applicant failed to attend the hearing and did not contact the Tribunal to explain his absence.

The Tribunal found that the applicant had abandoned the application and dismissed it.

Following the abandonment of a motion for leave to file evidence responding to a motion to strike portions of a statement of claim, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The underlying action alleged defamation and abuse of public office.

The moving party argued that its motion became unnecessary after the opposing party abandoned a ground asserting the truth of the impugned statements.

The court held the motion for leave was a reasonable response to the position originally taken, but rejected the request for substantial indemnity costs as excessive.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis and reduced after review of the bill of costs.

The appellants sued the respondents for defamation and abuse of public office after the Competition Bureau announced bid-rigging charges against them in a press release and to the media.

The motion judge struck the defamation claim under Rule 21.01(1), finding the statements were a fair characterization of the charges and incapable of bearing a defamatory meaning.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, holding that whether the statements were a fair characterization was a factual issue for trial, but struck the portion of the claim relating to Ontario media publications because the appellants failed to provide the required notice under section 5(1) of the Libel and Slander Act.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment ordering them to pay $364,266.92 in an accounting and $50,000 in punitive damages to the respondent, a creditor of a bankrupt company.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellants failed to provide a reliable accounting or preserve necessary documents.

The court also upheld the punitive damages award, noting the appellants operated the bankrupt company's business without authority and charged criminal rates of interest.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court of Justice regarding vicarious liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the issue did not need to be decided in light of the court's disposition in a companion case (C50105).

Costs were also addressed in the companion case.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that their section 7 notice was insufficient to alert the Crown to a claim of vicarious liability for persons acting under the authority of the Coroner's Office.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Master that the Crown should not be left to guess its possible liability, in accordance with the principles in Mattick Estate.

The appellant's land was unlawfully taken by the respondent's predecessor in 1989.

The parties settled the ensuing litigation in 1991, agreeing to proceed under the Expropriations Act, but the respondent failed to implement the settlement for 13 years.

The appellant commenced a new action in the Superior Court for compensation and damages.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the Ontario Municipal Board had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court has jurisdiction because the action arises from the respondent's failure to implement a settlement of a Superior Court proceeding.

The Registrar of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario issued notices of proposal to suspend the liquor licence of Touché Resto-Lounge for overcrowding and unauthorized alcohol tasting.

The parties submitted an Agreed Statement of Facts and a Joint Submission on Penalty.

The panel accepted the joint submission, finding that the licensee contravened the Liquor Licence Act and regulations.

The panel ordered a 25-day suspension of the liquor licence and added a condition requiring licensed security personnel on specific nights.

The licensee brought a motion to adjourn the hearing, arguing that the panel was not fully bilingual and therefore could not properly conduct the hearing in French as requested under the French Language Services Act.

The licensee contended that both panel members must be fluent in French to understand the nuances of the arguments.

The Registrar opposed the motion, arguing that the panel met the requirements of the Act and the government's guidelines for French language services, as one member was fluent in French and an interpreter was provided.

The panel dismissed the motion, finding that it was capable of fully understanding the proceedings and conducting the hearing in accordance with its obligations under the French Language Services Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and issued an endorsement on costs.

The respondents were collectively awarded costs of $15,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST, payable by the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CSN) and La Régie Des Rentes Du Québec.

The appellants, Confederation of National Trade Unions and La Régie Des Rentes Du Québec, appealed an order staying the obligation of Slater Steel to file an actuarial report and relieving the company and its directors from any resulting obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's reliance on evidence that further employer contributions were not due until the valuation report was filed.

The Court also noted that other parties had acted in reliance on the stay order.