Bruce W. Duncan

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, with an offence date of September 27, 2015.

The Crown's case was overwhelming.

The primary issue was whether in-court identification of the defendant by Crown witnesses was necessary to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that while no Crown witness explicitly pointed out the defendant in court, identification could be established through three alternative routes: video evidence of the defendant during breath testing procedures, the "circle" of continuity from arrest through release to court appearance, and evidence of name and address identifiers.

The court found the defendant guilty of both offences and conditionally stayed the exceed 80 charge.

Sentencing was adjourned to November 18, 2016, with the court indicating that all sentencing options, including jail, would be considered given the aggravating circumstances.

The defendant appealed his conviction for careless driving, challenging the trial judge's dismissal of a Charter section 11(b) application regarding delay in trial.

The defendant was charged on August 22, 2014, and tried on October 5, 2015, approximately 13.5 months later.

The trial judge accepted an unsupported assertion by defence counsel that the defendant had attended court in person requesting a trial but was compelled to attend an early resolution meeting instead.

The appellate court found this assertion had no evidentiary foundation and was not supported by the defendant's affidavit.

The court held that the time to the resolution meeting should have been excluded from the Charter calculation, and that the remaining delay was within constitutional tolerance for a careless driving charge.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop for speeding in Brampton on February 16, 2015.

Police officers observed aberrant driving, detected alcohol on the defendant's breath, and noted red watery eyes and slurred speech.

The defendant was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings of 141 and 135.

The court found the defendant guilty of exceeding 80 but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to reasonable doubt regarding impairment.

The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine and possession of heroin following a warrantless police search of a public washroom stall.

A police officer, responding to a call about a suspicious person, observed the defendant in a bathroom stall and, suspecting drug use, opened the stall door without a warrant.

The defendant was found with drug paraphernalia and subsequently arrested.

The court found that while the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the washroom stall and the search was unreasonable and violated section 8 of the Charter, the evidence was admissible under section 24(2) after balancing the Grant factors.

The court considered the public health hazard created by drug use in public washrooms and the minimal nature of the police intrusion.

The defendant was found guilty on both charges.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine and had previously elected trial by judge and jury and requested a preliminary inquiry.

At the scheduled preliminary inquiry, the accused engaged in disruptive and obstructionist conduct, presenting a self-created identification document and repeatedly demanding the judge provide identification, claiming to be a sovereign person.

The accused refused to participate in the proceedings and declared himself the highest authority in the court.

The judge found that the accused's conduct made it impossible to conduct the preliminary inquiry and that he was effectively withdrawing his request for one.

The judge ordered the accused to stand trial pursuant to section 536(4.3) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 (impaired driving) following a RIDE checkpoint stop on November 8, 2013.

The defendant sought to contact counsel of choice (Shauna Pemberton) but was unable to reach her.

Police made reasonable efforts to contact her, left a message, waited approximately 29 minutes, and then offered duty counsel.

The defendant spoke with duty counsel and subsequently provided breath samples registering 106 and 101.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath test results, arguing his right to counsel was infringed.

The court found no breach of Charter rights and admitted the evidence.

The defendant sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain (ITO) used to obtain a search warrant at a preliminary inquiry.

The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court dismissed the Dawson application, finding that the cross-examination was not necessary to enable the defendant to make full answer and defence, and that the information provided by a confidential informant was substantially corroborated by independent police surveillance evidence.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 following a traffic stop on March 4, 2014.

While the defendant's impairment was not disputed, the case was defended on Charter grounds and the contention that the "as soon as practicable" requirement had not been met.

The court found that police violated the defendant's Charter section 7 rights by failing to provide access to toilet facilities, a change of wet clothing, adequate warmth, and food during approximately 12 hours of custody.

The court determined that the totality of this neglect amounted to a violation of the defendant's right to fair, humane, and dignified treatment.

A stay of proceedings was granted as the appropriate remedy.

The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana and possession of cocaine following a pat down search during a traffic stop.

The Crown's case rested on evidence obtained from the search.

The court found that the initial stop, while ostensibly for Highway Traffic Act violations, was a pretext to investigate bail compliance.

The detention that followed was unlawful and arbitrary.

The subsequent pat down search, characterized as a safety search, was in fact conducted to locate drugs rather than weapons.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charges.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, and resisting arrest following a motor vehicle stop on June 5, 2014.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving, physical signs of impairment, breath test results of 180 mg/100 ml, and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised multiple Charter arguments and challenged the sufficiency of evidence.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving but acquitted him of resisting arrest due to language barriers and lack of clarity regarding directions.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, exceeding 80 mg/100 mL of blood alcohol, and breach of recognizance.

She raised multiple Charter issues arising from her custody at the police station, including allegations of assault, unreasonable search, denial of right to counsel, and unreasonable video surveillance and recording while held in custody.

The court found no Charter violation regarding the alleged assault, the strip search, or the right to counsel.

However, the court found a section 8 breach regarding video recording of the defendant in holding cells while using the toilet.

Despite the breach, the court declined to grant a stay of proceedings or exclude evidence, finding that neither remedy was appropriate in the circumstances.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time.

The charges were laid on October 5, 2013, with trial scheduled for March 25, 2015, a delay of approximately 17.5 months.

The applicant also sought costs.

The court found that while there was institutional delay, the applicant had not satisfied the burden of demonstrating a Charter violation.

The court attributed responsibility for the adjournment of the first trial dates to the defence rather than the Crown, and found minimal prejudice to the applicant.

Both the stay application and the costs application were dismissed.

The applicants sought termination of their conditional supervision orders approximately two years before their scheduled expiry date.

They had been sentenced to the maximum youth sentence of 10 years (6 years custody and 4 years conditional supervision) for first degree murder in 2006.

The court addressed the threshold issue of jurisdiction to terminate conditional supervision orders under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, finding that such jurisdiction exists either by implication from the statutory language or through the court's inherent authority.

On the merits, the court balanced the principles of accountability and rehabilitation, ultimately granting the application and terminating the conditional supervision orders on December 15, 2014, exactly nine years from the finding of guilt.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 (impaired driving) following a random sobriety check-stop conducted by police in a shopping plaza parking lot.

The central issue was whether police had authority to conduct random check-stops in private parking lots.

The court held that while the Highway Traffic Act does not authorize such stops in parking lots, police possess common law authority to stop vehicles in parking lots for highway safety purposes, including random stops.

The court found no Charter violation and admitted the breath test results, finding the defendant guilty as charged.

The defendant was charged with exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a RIDE check-stop.

The sole issue was whether there was a breach of the defendant's right to consult counsel and, if so, whether breath test results should be excluded.

The defendant consulted with duty counsel for 18 minutes before providing breath samples.

The defendant claimed the consultation was interrupted by the arresting officer, while the officer testified he merely peeked through the window and did not rush her.

The court found that while the officer's interjection may have led to the defendant ending the call somewhat earlier than she might otherwise have done, the 18-minute consultation provided a reasonable opportunity to receive necessary legal advice.

The court rejected the defendant's argument that a detainee has an unlimited right to consult counsel and held that the right is limited to a reasonable opportunity to obtain immediate and preliminary legal advice regarding the core issues in a drinking and driving investigation.

The defendant was charged with two counts under the Building Code Act: constructing a basement entrance without a permit and failing to comply with an Order to Comply.

She was convicted and fined $5,000 total.

On appeal, the defendant raised numerous arguments including issues regarding service of the summons, necessity, officially induced error, applicability of the Building Code, new legislation, and claims of an unfair trial.

The appellate court dismissed all arguments as lacking merit and upheld the conviction.

The sentence appeal was adjourned pending the outcome of a new permit application or Committee of Adjustment application.

The defendant was charged with exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood (exceed 80) on March 13, 2013.

The sole issue was whether the defendant's right to be free from arbitrary detention under the Charter was violated when a police officer conducting sobriety checks targeted motorists leaving a liquor store parking lot.

The court held that location-based targeting of police enforcement efforts does not constitute a Charter violation.

The court distinguished between group targeting (which requires careful scrutiny) and location targeting (which raises no Charter concerns).

The court found that even if location targeting required justification, the LCBO parking lot location had a rational connection to impaired driving concerns.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg in 100 mL of blood.

At trial, the defence argued that the Crown failed to prove the screening device was an 'approved screening device' because the officer used the acronym 'ASD' and referred to it as an 'Alcotest 6810' rather than its full regulatory name.

The defence also argued the ASD result was invalid because the officer lacked notes confirming he checked for mouth alcohol.

The court rejected both arguments, finding that the acronym 'ASD' is a commonly understood term that requires no further explanation, and accepting the officer's evidence of his invariable practice to ask about recent alcohol consumption.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample to an approved screening device (ASD) contrary to section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

After three unsuccessful attempts to provide a suitable sample over three minutes, the defendant refused to make further attempts, stating the machine was not working properly.

The Crown argued the defendant intentionally failed to provide samples and then refused.

The defendant testified he attempted to comply but the officer kept pulling the device away after a few seconds.

The court found the defendant credible regarding his intent and held that the Crown must prove the defendant intentionally failed to provide a sample, not merely that he failed.

However, the court found the defendant had no reasonable excuse for his outright refusal after only three attempts over three minutes, and convicted him as charged.

An appeal from a default conviction for "No brake lights" contrary to section 62(29) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The sole ground of appeal was that the conviction should not have been entered because the certificate of offence specified an incorrect set fine.

The certificate indicated a commercial vehicle but specified the lower non-commercial set fine of $85 instead of the correct commercial vehicle set fine of $200.

The court found that the certificate was not complete and regular on its face and therefore could not support a conviction under the Provincial Offences Act default procedure.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction was quashed.