Brian Crothers

Jastaran Sandhu was found guilty of manslaughter as a party to a fatal shooting that resulted in the death of Gursevek Jagpal.

The jury concluded that Sandhu abetted the assault by encouraging the shooter, knowing a firearm was involved.

The court considered aggravating factors, including Sandhu's planning of the confrontation, his active encouragement of the shooting, and his post-offence conduct (lying to 911 and destroying evidence).

Mitigating factors included his youth (18 at the time of the offence), his lack of a prior criminal record, and strong family support.

The court sentenced Sandhu to nine years imprisonment, with credit for pre-sentence custody and time spent under restrictive bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 8 years and 291 days.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a victim surcharge.

This sentencing decision concerns Justin Barrett, who pleaded guilty to procuring a 16-year-old girl for sexual services.

The court considered the aggravating factors, including the planned and deliberate nature of the offence, its duration, breach of trust, the victim's vulnerability, and the profound impact on her and her family.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, positive antecedents, employment on bail, and family support.

The court rejected the defence's request for a conditional or reformatory sentence, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation.

Barrett was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment, a DNA order, and a 20-year SOIRA order.

The accused, Hamza Jama and Felix Ajayi, brought a motion for standing to challenge a CDSA search warrant.

The court considered whether they had a reasonable expectation of territorial privacy in the searched apartments, applying the factors from R. v. Edwards.

The court denied standing to both accused, finding no sufficient evidence of territorial privacy for Jama in Apartment #6, and for Ajayi in Apartment #15, especially given the allegation of home invasion.

The applicant, charged with attempted murder and witness intimidation, sought a bail review under section 520 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued that the complainant's unreliable testimony at the preliminary hearing constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the complainant's poor testimony was a predictable result of fear and intimidation, and that the Crown still had effective evidentiary tools to present a strong case.

The court held that releasing the applicant would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's decision discharging the accused on a charge of first degree murder and committing him only for second degree murder.

The accused was alleged to have committed a drive-by shooting.

The reviewing judge found that the preliminary inquiry judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the circumstantial evidence, which was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of planning and deliberation.

The application was granted, and the matter was remitted with a direction to commit the accused to stand trial for first degree murder.

The applicant, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the date of the charges to the anticipated end of the trial was 39.25 months.

After deducting 4.5 months of defence delay, the net delay was 34.75 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling set in Jordan.

However, the court found that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a discrete exceptional event.

The court deducted 14.25 months of delay caused by the pandemic, bringing the remaining delay to 20.5 months, well below the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused were charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and other offences following a traffic stop.

The driver threw a brick of cocaine out the window while the passenger resisted arrest.

The court rejected the driver's exculpatory testimony, finding him guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, but acquitted him of simple possession and dangerous driving.

The passenger was found guilty of possession of proceeds of crime and resisting arrest, but acquitted of the drug charges as there was insufficient evidence he knew the cocaine was in the vehicle.

During a joint criminal trial, one co-accused testified and implicated the other.

The implicated co-accused sought to cross-examine the testifying co-accused on a previously struck guilty plea and subsequently applied for severance.

The court ruled that cross-examination on a struck guilty plea is legally impermissible, as a struck plea must be treated as if it never happened to protect the presumption of innocence.

The court also dismissed the severance application, finding that a joint trial would not cause an injustice and that the implicated co-accused could still mount a full answer and defence without referencing the struck plea.

The applicant, Brandon Rego, sought a bail review under Section 520 of the Criminal Code, arguing a material change of circumstances due to the weakening of the Crown's intimidation case and a significant COVID-19 outbreak at his correctional facility.

The court found that both developments constituted a material change, opening the door for a full review of the bail decision.

However, despite these changes and the health risks posed by the pandemic, the court ultimately dismissed the application, ordering continued detention on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The judge emphasized the egregious nature of the alleged witness tampering and the applicant's extensive criminal history, concluding that his release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice.

The accused were charged with robbery, pointing and discharging a firearm, and in one case, breaching bail conditions, arising from an incident at a bar in Mississauga on October 9, 2019.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the identification evidence of the victim, who gave inconsistent statements to police and at trial.

The court admitted the victim's prior police statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule based on procedural reliability.

However, the court found that the victim's evidence contained significant inconsistencies regarding the timing and circumstances of the alleged shooting, and that video evidence did not support her account.

The court concluded that the victim's evidence could not safely carry the whole weight of the Crown's case and acquitted both accused on all charges.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from the execution of a tracking warrant and subsequent search warrants.

The warrants were based on information from a confidential informer indicating the accused was trafficking cocaine and possessed firearms.

The court found that the tracking warrant and search warrants were validly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds, despite minor inadvertent omissions regarding the informer's criminal record.

The court also held that the accused had standing to challenge the search of an apartment where he kept a locked safe, but ultimately dismissed the application to exclude the evidence.

The Crown applied under section 521 of the Criminal Code to reverse a bail review decision that released the accused on a surety bail with conditions.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and later with witness intimidation and kidnapping after the complainant was found chained to a bed.

The original bail judge detained the accused on secondary and tertiary grounds, finding him un-releasable regardless of the bail plan.

The reviewing judge subsequently released the accused, finding a material change in circumstances based on a new supervision plan.

The Superior Court held that the reviewing judge erred in law because the original detention was not based on an inadequate plan, but on the accused's ungovernability.

The release order was set aside and the detention order was reinstated.

The offender was convicted of sexually assaulting his intimate partner while she was highly intoxicated and asleep.

The Crown sought a sentence of two years less a day, while the defence sought nine to twelve months.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of breach of trust and profound impact on the victim against the mitigating factors of the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, remorse, and rehabilitative prospects.

The court sentenced the offender to 12 months' imprisonment followed by 24 months of probation, along with DNA and SOIRA orders.

Malcolm Williams was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The court determined the appropriate sentence, considering aggravating factors such as the quantity of cocaine (28 grams), commercial motive, and public location, and mitigating factors including no prior criminal record, strong family support, and admission of facts.

The Crown sought 18 months, while the defence sought 9 months minus pre-trial credit.

The court imposed an 11-month sentence after applying a reduction for exceptional circumstances, including 15 months under restrictive house arrest.

A 10-year weapons prohibition and DNA order were also issued.

Malcolm Williams was charged with assault and two counts of possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He conceded the drug allegations but sought to exclude the evidence as unlawfully obtained.

The trial on the assault charge and a voir dire on the drug evidence admissibility proceeded as a blended hearing.

The court found a reasonable doubt regarding the assault charge, resulting in an acquittal.

For the drug charges, the court dismissed the motion to exclude evidence, finding that security guards were not government actors for Charter purposes and their actions, while lengthy in detention, did not render the trial unfair under common law discretion.

Consequently, Williams was found guilty of the two cocaine trafficking counts.

The offender, Barna Olvedi, was convicted after trial of importing fentanyl and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, particularly the importation of 499.5 grams of 100% pure fentanyl citrate with an estimated street value of over $14 million, and the devastating impact of fentanyl in the community.

Aggravating factors included the quantity, purity, and powder form of the drug, the financial motivation (greed), and wilful blindness.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record at the time of the offence, cooperation with police, post-conviction remorse, reluctance to accept delivery due to threats, and excellent rehabilitation potential.

The Crown sought 17 years, while the Defence proposed 8-12 years.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 years' imprisonment for importing fentanyl and a concurrent sentence of 12 years' imprisonment for possession for the purpose of trafficking, along with forfeiture of $10,759.37 and a fine in lieu of forfeiture of $34,240.63, and mandatory victim fine surcharges.

Sentencing decision following jury convictions for prostitution-related offences and assault arising from the accused's grooming of an adult complainant through an intimate relationship and exploiting her in the sex trade.

The court held denunciation and deterrence were the dominant sentencing principles, but distinguished authorities involving minors, prolonged coercion, or more complete domination.

Applying the factual findings that the complainant retained some autonomy, was not generally acting out of fear during the relationship, and that the exploitation was serious but not at the highest end, the court imposed 20 months' incarceration on the principal prostitution counts, concurrent, and a concurrent two-month sentence for assault.

The court stayed one count under the Kienapple principle, denied any credit for restrictive bail, and imposed ancillary DNA, weapons prohibition, no-contact, and probation orders.

The accused, Dinish Barnes, was sentenced for two counts of possession of a firearm and three counts of possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The police found a loaded Glock handgun and ammunition in his apartment.

Barnes had a lengthy criminal record, including prior firearm prohibitions and a conviction for robbery and forcible confinement.

The court considered aggravating factors such as his serious criminal record, breach of firearm prohibitions, and absconding from bail, and mitigating factors like family support and remorse.

The central issue was the calculation of pre-trial custody credit, particularly for time served on unrelated charges (Peel, Finch, London charges) and restrictive bail conditions.

The court rejected credit for time served on unrelated charges and for restrictive bail conditions, finding no rational connection or that the time was already consumed.

A global sentence of 6 years imprisonment was imposed, with 211 days of pre-trial credit, resulting in an actual sentence of 5 years and 5 months.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime firearm prohibition, DNA sample order, and forfeiture of the firearm and ammunition.

The defendants brought applications seeking a stay of charges under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for an alleged breach of section 11(b) Charter rights to trial within a reasonable time.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court cases.

The total delay from charge to anticipated trial was 34.5 months.

After deducting defence-waived delay of 8 months and 5 days, the remaining delay was 26 months and 1 week, exceeding the ceiling.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness.

The court found the Crown's conduct exemplified a "culture of complacency" particularly regarding delayed disclosure of the Information to Obtain.

The applications were granted and all charges were stayed.

The accused was convicted at trial of importing hypophosphorous acid, a Schedule VI controlled substance, contrary to section 6(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown sought a conditional sentence of six months or a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The defence sought a discharge with an enhanced victim fine surcharge.

The court found that the accused imported the acid for legitimate purposes (as a cleaner for tire rims) but was wilfully blind to its status as a controlled substance.

The court imposed a conditional discharge with probation, community service, and an enhanced victim fine surcharge, finding that a custodial sentence was not necessary given the accused's lack of criminal record, prosocial behaviour, and the legitimate intended use of the substance.