Binnie

The appellant, a Lieutenant-Colonel, was convicted of assault after pushing his wife during an argument where she threw his diploma on the floor.

He argued the force was justified under s. 39(1) of the Criminal Code as defence of personal property.

The military judge found the force used was excessive and disproportionate.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the military judge properly applied the principles of reasonable doubt and correctly assessed both subjective and objective factors in determining that the force used was more than necessary.

The accused was convicted of kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and first-degree murder.

At trial, the judge rejected the accused's testimony, citing his 'very great motive to be untruthful' to secure an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding this undermined the presumption of innocence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that while such language is concerning in isolation, the trial judge's reasons, read as a whole in the context of a trial where the accused challenged every witness's credibility based on their motives to lie, did not rely on an impermissible assumption.

The appellant was charged with kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault, and first degree murder as a party to the offences committed by a co-accused.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding he lacked the requisite knowledge of the co-accused's intention to commit the crimes.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittals and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the doctrine of wilful blindness.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming that wilful blindness can substitute for actual knowledge and that the trial judge's failure to consider it constituted a legal error necessitating a new trial.

The appellants alleged they were physically and sexually abused while residing in a privately operated children's home between 1928 and 1976.

The Lieutenant Governor in Council referred questions to the Court of Appeal regarding whether the Province owed duties to the children.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the Province owed no duty of care, non-delegable duty, vicarious liability, or fiduciary duty to the children, as the home was privately operated and the Province had no statutory authority or control over its management.

The respondent, a criminal defence lawyer, sought to withdraw as counsel of record for an accused after his legal aid funding was suspended.

The Territorial Court refused her application to withdraw.

The Supreme Court of the Yukon Territory dismissed her application for certiorari.

The Court of Appeal allowed her appeal, finding the Territorial Court had no discretion to refuse withdrawal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that a court has the inherent or necessarily implied jurisdiction to refuse counsel's request to withdraw for non-payment of fees if allowing withdrawal would cause serious harm to the administration of justice.

The accused was convicted of possession of child pornography after police searched his computer pursuant to a warrant.

The warrant was obtained based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) sworn by a police officer after a computer technician reported seeing suspicious bookmarks and a webcam pointed at a child's play area.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the search violated s. 8 of the Charter because the ITO, which contained misleading and incomplete information, failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused possessed child pornography.

The Court distinguished between the offences of accessing and possessing child pornography, holding that possession requires control over the underlying data files, not merely viewing images online.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and an acquittal was entered.

During a drug trafficking investigation, police discovered a loaded firearm in a hidden compartment of the respondent's vehicle while installing listening devices.

The trial judge found the search violated section 8 of the Charter but admitted the evidence under section 24(2), leading to a conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm.

The Court of Appeal reversed the decision and excluded the evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge's section 24(2) analysis was entitled to deference and that applying the Grant framework supported admitting the evidence.

The accused was subjected to excessive force by police during his arrest for impaired driving and flight from police, resulting in broken ribs and a punctured lung.

The trial judge found breaches of the accused's Charter rights and reduced his sentences to conditional discharges under s. 24(1).

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of excessive force but substituted the mandatory minimum fine for the impaired driving offence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, holding that while state misconduct can be considered in sentencing, a sentence cannot be reduced below a statutory minimum absent a constitutional challenge to the minimum itself.

During a bitter strike at the Giant Mine, a striking miner evaded security, entered the mine, and planted a bomb that killed nine replacement miners.

The surviving family members and a first responder sued the mine's security firm, the territorial government, and the national union in negligence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the security firm and the government owed a duty of care to the miners, they did not breach the standard of care.

The Court also held that the national union and local union were separate legal entities, and the national union was not directly or vicariously liable for the criminal acts of the striking members.

The appeals were dismissed.

The Province of British Columbia issued a request for proposals (RFP) for the construction of a highway, restricting eligible bidders to six proponents.

The Province accepted a bid from an ineligible joint venture involving one of the eligible proponents and an ineligible third party.

The unsuccessful eligible bidder, the appellant, sued for breach of contract.

The Province relied on an exclusion clause in the RFP that barred claims for compensation as a result of participating in the RFP.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Province breached the tendering contract by accepting an ineligible bid.

The Court laid to rest the doctrine of fundamental breach and established a three-part test for exclusion clauses.

Applying the test, the majority found that the exclusion clause did not apply to the Province's conduct, as the appellant's claim arose from the Province's dealings with an ineligible bidder, not from the appellant's participation in the RFP process.

The respondent, a Canadian citizen, was detained by U.S. authorities at Guantanamo Bay.

Canadian intelligence officials interviewed him, knowing he had been subjected to sleep deprivation, and shared the information with U.S. authorities.

The respondent sought an order requiring the Canadian government to request his repatriation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the conduct of Canadian officials violated the respondent's rights under s. 7 of the Charter.

However, the Court concluded that ordering the government to request repatriation was not an appropriate remedy, as it unduly interfered with the Crown prerogative over foreign affairs.

Instead, the Court granted a declaration that the respondent's Charter rights were violated, leaving it to the government to determine how best to respond.

MiningWatch Canada appealed a decision regarding the federal environmental assessment of a proposed copper and gold mine.

The responsible authorities had scoped the project to exclude the mine and mill, thereby conducting a screening rather than a comprehensive study.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the environmental assessment track must be determined by the project as proposed by the proponent, meaning a comprehensive study was required.

However, the Court limited the remedy to a declaration, declining to order the proponent to repeat the assessment process.

The appellants brought a defamation action against the respondent newspaper and reporter over an article concerning a proposed private golf course development and alleged political influence.

At trial, the jury found for the appellants and awarded damages.

The Court of Appeal set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial, recognizing a new defence of responsible journalism.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, formally recognizing the new defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest.

The Court held that the traditional strict liability regime for defamatory statements of fact failed to adequately protect freedom of expression under the Charter.

The new defence applies where the publication is on a matter of public interest and the publisher was diligent in trying to verify the allegations.

A new trial was ordered due to the trial judge's failure to leave this defence to the jury and errors in the fair comment instruction.

The insured engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse and contracted genital herpes, which led to transverse myelitis and resulted in paraplegia.

He claimed compensation under his group accident insurance policy, which covered bodily injuries occasioned solely through external, violent and accidental means.

The insurer denied the claim, arguing the injury was the result of a disease contracted in the ordinary course of events.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the transmission of a disease through normal sexual intercourse is not an accident within the ordinary meaning of the term, and therefore the resulting paralysis was not covered by the policy.

The accused was charged with first degree murder, kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault.

The trial judge found an air of reality to the defence of abandonment and convicted the accused of manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, agreeing with the dissenting appellate judge that the evidence was incapable of supporting the defence of abandonment.

The Court set aside the manslaughter conviction and entered a conviction for first degree murder, as the facts found by the trial judge clearly established a planned and deliberate murder involving unlawful confinement.

The appellant was charged with hybrid offences more than six months after the alleged conduct.

The Crown elected to proceed summarily, but upon discovering the limitation period had expired, sought to re-elect to proceed by indictment.

The trial judge declared the information a nullity.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that while the six-month limitation period applies when the Crown elects to proceed summarily, the failure of the accused to consent to out-of-time summary proceedings renders the Crown's initial election a nullity.

The original information remains valid, allowing the Crown to proceed by indictment absent an abuse of process.

The appellant engaged in sexually explicit online chats with a 12-year-old girl, believing her to be 13 or 14.

He was acquitted at trial of luring a child under s. 172.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code because the trial judge found he did not intend to meet the complainant or carry out the secondary offence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence is an inchoate crime that does not require an intention to meet the victim or commit the secondary offence, but only the specific purpose of facilitating its commission.

The appellants were employees at a Wal-Mart store that closed shortly after a union was certified and an arbitrator was appointed to resolve collective agreement differences.

The employees filed complaints under the Labour Code alleging they were dismissed due to union activities and sought reinstatement.

The Commission des relations du travail initially found the employer failed to prove the closure was definitive, but in a companion case, it was established that the store was permanently closed.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that since the store was permanently closed, reinstatement was impossible and the substratum of the claim no longer existed.

The appellant, a freight forwarding company with branches across Canada, consolidates and deconsolidates freight but contracts with third-party carriers for interprovincial transport.

A union applied to the Alberta Labour Relations Board for a declaration that the company's labour relations were subject to federal jurisdiction.

The Board and the Court of Appeal held the company was a federal undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that because the company does not itself perform interprovincial carriage of goods, it remains a local undertaking subject to provincial jurisdiction under s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The accused were charged with corruption, fraud, and breach of trust.

The Crown objected to disclosing unredacted documents, claiming informer privilege, and sought an ex parte, in camera hearing.

The trial judge allowed defence counsel to attend the hearing subject to undertakings.

The Crown appealed under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the trial judge's decision was a disclosure order subject to appeal, and that the trial judge erred in permitting defence counsel to attend the hearing, as doing so would inevitably reveal information protected by the informer privilege.