Benjamin T. Glustein

The requestors brought a motion to summon the former Chief Adjudicator of the Indian Residential Schools Adjudication Secretariat to provide evidence at an upcoming hearing of a Request for Directions (RFD) brought by Canada.

Canada's RFD sought to strike the requestors' own RFD regarding compliance with ancillary orders.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the former Chief Adjudicator's evidence regarding his conduct or failure to bring an RFD was not relevant to the narrow interpretation and procedural issues raised in Canada's RFD.

The requestors brought a motion seeking answers to 142 questions refused by Canada during an out-of-court cross-examination of a government affiant.

The cross-examination arose in the context of Canada's request for directions to strike the requestors' motion regarding compliance with the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement.

The court largely upheld Canada's refusals on the bases of relevance, proportionality, privilege, and speculation, but ordered Canada to answer six specific questions of fact.

This decision addresses costs following the dismissal of a class action certification motion.

The defendant, T.E.S. Contract Services Inc. (TES), sought substantial or partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff, Ann Davidson, argued for no costs or significantly reduced costs, asserting the case was a test case, raised novel issues, or concerned public interest.

The court fixed costs on a partial indemnity scale, finding no egregious conduct by the plaintiff.

It rejected the plaintiff's arguments regarding public interest, novel issues, or test case status, and strongly criticized the suggestion that the representative plaintiff might be personally exposed to costs, emphasizing class counsel's duty to indemnify.

The court found TES's requested partial indemnity costs reasonable but deducted amounts related to the plaintiff's successful production motion and the defendant's abandoned motion to strike expert reports.

The plaintiffs sought court approval of a class action settlement agreement with the defendants, General Motors LLC and General Motors of Canada Limited, for $12 million to resolve claims related to alleged defects in automobile ignition switches.

They also sought approval of counsel fees of $4,397,500.

The court approved both the settlement, finding it fair and reasonable given the litigation risks and the absence of objections, and the counsel fees, noting they were negotiated separately and represented a reasonable contingency fee.

This decision addresses two motions: the plaintiff's motion for a stay of a proposed class action against Apple Canada Inc. pending an appeal in an unrelated case (Lewis v. Uber Canada Inc. et al.), and Apple's scheduling motion for summary judgment to be heard before certification.

The plaintiff's class action alleges Apple overcharged consumers on sales tax in its trade-in program, contrary to the Excise Tax Act and other statutes.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's stay motion, finding no certainty the Lewis appeal would resolve the jurisdictional issue, and that a stay is inappropriate merely because a similar legal issue is being decided in an unrelated case.

The court granted Apple's scheduling motion, affirming the strong presumption under s. 4.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, that merits-based motions should be heard before certification, especially when they could dispose of the entire case.

Costs were awarded to Apple.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against Canada on behalf of immigration detainees who were incarcerated in provincial prisons.

The plaintiffs alleged that the practice of detaining immigration detainees in provincial prisons, where they are subjected to penal conditions such as co-mingling with criminal inmates, strip searches, and the use of restraints, violates sections 7, 9, 12, and 15 of the Charter and constitutes systemic negligence.

The court dismissed all of Canada's objections, finding that the pleadings disclosed reasonable causes of action, the class was identifiable, the common issues could be determined in common, a class action was the preferable procedure, and the representative plaintiffs were adequate.

The motion for certification was granted.

The plaintiff, Ann Davidson, brought a motion for certification of a proposed class action against T.E.S. Contract Services Inc. (TES), alleging misclassification of workers as independent contractors instead of employees, and seeking benefits under the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding no basis in fact for commonality regarding whether a s. 74.3 agreement (temporary help agency assignment) existed between TES and the putative class members, or whether a common law or s. 1(1) employment relationship could be determined on a class-wide basis.

The court concluded that individual inquiries would be required to determine employment status for each class member, as the evidence did not establish systemic commonality.

The defendants in a class action brought a motion seeking the production of class counsel's redacted dockets to respond to the plaintiffs' costs submissions following certification.

The plaintiffs opposed the production.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that the production of dockets to support costs submissions on a motion is only ordered in exceptional cases to protect solicitor-client privilege.

The court found that the substantial amount of costs claimed, the disparity between the parties' costs, and alleged incongruities in the costs outline did not constitute exceptional circumstances warranting production.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against Ticketmaster regarding its secondary ticket market practices.

The plaintiffs alleged that Ticketmaster knowingly facilitated or turned a blind eye to professional resellers using bots and multiple accounts to bypass primary market ticket limits, contrary to its Terms of Use and Purchase Policy.

The court certified the class action for claims of breach of contract, breach of ticketing legislation, unlawful means conspiracy, negligence, and unjust enrichment.

However, the court found that the claims under the Competition Act and consumer protection legislation did not disclose a cause of action because the plaintiffs failed to plead a sufficient causal connection between the alleged misrepresentations and their damages.

The court also dismissed Ticketmaster's motion to strike the plaintiffs' expert reports, finding them admissible and relevant to establishing a methodology for calculating aggregate damages.

The defendant, Dr. Sheldon Victor Pollack, brought a motion to dismiss a certified class action for delay under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The class action, initiated in 2003 by the representative plaintiff Anna Barbiero, alleged medical negligence and battery related to Dr. Pollack's injection of Injectable Grade Liquid Silicone (IGLS) for lip augmentation.

The court found the 21-year delay inordinate and inexcusable, with significant periods of unexplained inactivity.

The plaintiff failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice, and actual prejudice was established due to the loss of the IGLS sample, which was crucial for the defendant's ability to test its composition and defend against liability and causation claims.

The court granted the motion, dismissing the class action for delay, and ordered that notice be provided to class members.

The plaintiff, Ann Davidson, brought a pre-certification motion under s. 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, seeking production of the defendant T.E.S. Contract Services Inc.'s (TES) application for a temporary help agency (THA) licence, along with accompanying documents.

Davidson argued these documents were relevant to the certification motion's common issue of whether class members were misclassified as independent contractors rather than employees, particularly under s. 74.3 of the Employment Standards Act, 2000, which deems workers assigned by THAs as employees.

TES opposed, arguing the application was irrelevant and that s. 74.3 only applies to existing employees.

The court ordered production of the application, subject to redactions for irrelevant parts, finding it relevant to whether TES operated or sought to operate as a THA and the nature of its relationship with workers.

This motion concerned the substitution of a representative plaintiff in a class action alleging underpayment of vacation and public holiday pay on variable compensation by RBC General Insurance Company and Aviva General Insurance Company.

The original proposed representative plaintiff, Deval Trivedi, was found to be statute-barred against Aviva General.

The plaintiff sought to substitute Binay Saroop as the representative plaintiff against Aviva General and to amend the statement of claim.

The court found that Saroop met the 'some basis in fact' test to rebut the statutory presumption regarding the limitation period and did not have a disqualifying conflict of interest, thus being an adequate representative plaintiff.

The motion to substitute Saroop and amend the claim was granted.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the Attorney General of Canada on behalf of inmates in federal penitentiaries who were subjected to suspicionless strip searches.

The plaintiffs alleged that the regulations authorizing these searches in certain situations were ultra vires the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, breached sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, and constituted torts including trespass to the person and intrusion upon seclusion.

The court dismissed all of Canada's objections and granted the motion for certification, finding that the pleadings disclosed causes of action, the class definition was appropriate, the proposed common issues were valid, a class action was the preferable procedure, and the litigation plan was workable.

The proposed representative plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action against RBC Insurance Agency Ltd. and Aviva General Insurance Company for alleged failure to pay vacation and public holiday pay on variable compensation to Property & Casualty Insurance Advisors.

The court granted certification against RBC IA, finding some basis in fact for the claims and that a class action was the preferable procedure.

However, the court found the proposed representative plaintiff's claim against Aviva General was presumptively statute-barred and conditionally certified the action against Aviva General, allowing 100 days to find a new representative plaintiff.

The City of Toronto and the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation appealed a decision holding that 'Air Parcels'—stratified parcels starting above the ground—are not 'land' under the Assessment Act until fixed to the ground.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that at common law, real property includes the air space above the ground.

The court held that the statutory definition of 'land' in the Assessment Act expanded upon, rather than restricted, the common law definition.

Consequently, the severed air parcels qualify as 'land' and are subject to assessment and taxation even before any structures are built.

The College of Early Childhood Educators appealed a penalty order imposing a four-month suspension and conditions on an early childhood educator for failing to supervise a child and breaching professional standards.

The College sought revocation of the educator's license, arguing the penalty was clearly unfit and inconsistent with the misconduct findings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Discipline Committee properly considered mitigating factors, including a five-year period where the educator could not work due to unproven abuse allegations, and did not err in applying the principle of proportionality.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion for leave to appeal an order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and lifted the stay of the order.

Costs of $3,000 were awarded to one respondent and $3,000 to two other respondents.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the manufacturers of the antidepressant Celexa, alleging it is a teratogen that causes congenital malformations.

The plaintiffs proposed common issues regarding general causation (whether Celexa is or may be teratogenic) and duty to warn.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the proposed common issues failed to satisfy the commonality requirement under s. 5(1)(c) of the Class Proceedings Act, as they would not advance the litigation without individual trials for each specific congenital malformation.

The court also found that a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure due to the overwhelming number of complex individual issues.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion to defer filing its statement of defence until after the certification motion in a proposed class proceeding regarding immigration detention.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the presumption that a defendant must file a statement of defence before certification unless special circumstances justify a deferral.

The court found that the legal issues were well-defined and the defendant's concerns about the complexity and resources required to prepare the defence conflated pleading preparation with discovery or trial preparation.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims arising from the birth of a child with spina bifida.

The defendants argued the mother's wrongful birth claim was statute-barred and the child's wrongful life claim disclosed no cause of action.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the wrongful birth claim, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the limitation period was tolled due to the mother's reliance on the doctor's alleged misrepresentation that the ultrasound was clear.

The court granted the motion to dismiss the wrongful life claim, confirming settled law that a physician does not owe a duty of care to a future child for a lack of informed consent to the mother.