Bastarache

The appellant erected a sign on his building expressing dissatisfaction with his insurance company.

He was convicted of contravening a municipal by-law that prohibited advertising signs outside industrial zones.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the by-law infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter, as consumers have a constitutional right to engage in 'counter-advertising' to criticize products or services.

The Court found the infringement was not justified under s. 1, as the by-law was arbitrary, did not minimally impair the right, and its impact was disproportionate to the goal of preventing visual pollution.

The appeal was allowed, the by-law provisions were declared invalid, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant was injured after falling on a municipal sidewalk and successfully sued the municipality for gross negligence at trial, despite failing to provide written notice within the required seven days.

The trial judge found she was physically and mentally incapable of complying due to hospitalization and medication.

The Court of Appeal overturned this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'unsound mind' in s. 47 of the Limitations Act includes a lack of mental capacity from any source to perform the requisite steps.

The Court found the Court of Appeal wrongly interfered with the trial judge's factual findings, which did not amount to a palpable and overriding error.

The appellant confessed to a murder to an undercover police officer.

The conversation was surreptitiously recorded pursuant to a judicial authorization.

At trial, the judge found the authorization invalid and excluded the tape and transcript under s. 24(2) of the Charter, but allowed the officer to testify about the conversation using the transcript to refresh his memory.

The officer's testimony was essentially a verbatim recitation of the transcript.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the officer's recitation of the transcript violated s. 8 of the Charter, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) because its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, as the confession was freely volunteered and the police acted in good faith.

The appellant was severely injured in a car accident and treated by the respondent orthopaedic surgeon.

The respondent failed to diagnose a spinal fracture, leading to delayed immobilization, and the appellant was eventually diagnosed with paraparesis.

The trial judge found no fault and no causation.

The Court of Appeal found the respondent committed a fault by failing to conduct proper neurological tests and immobilize the patient, but upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the accident itself, not the medical fault, caused the paraparesis.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, affirming the Court of Appeal's intervention on the standard of care and its factual findings on causation, and declined to apply a presumption of causation.

The appellant, a former Premier of Nova Scotia, was charged with numerous historic sex-related offences.

He sought a stay of proceedings, alleging abuse of process due to police prematurely identifying him as a suspect, a Crown attorney engaging in 'judge shopping', and the Crown conducting pre-charge interviews of complainants which allegedly compromised their objectivity.

The trial judge granted a partial stay of nine counts.

The Court of Appeal overturned the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the conduct did not amount to an abuse of process warranting a stay.

The Court clarified that pre-charge Crown interviews are not inherently abusive and that a stay of proceedings is a prospective remedy reserved for the clearest of cases where prejudice will be perpetuated and no other remedy is capable of removing it.

The respondent, a Provincial Court judge, made derogatory comments about the residents of the Acadian Peninsula during a sentencing hearing.

A Judicial Council inquiry panel found her comments constituted misconduct but recommended a reprimand, concluding she was still able to perform her duties.

The Judicial Council, however, concluded her remarks created a reasonable apprehension of bias and recommended her removal from office.

The reviewing judge and the Court of Appeal quashed the Council's decision, finding breaches of natural justice and jurisdictional error.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Council's decision was entitled to a high degree of deference, it did not exceed its jurisdiction, and there was no breach of procedural fairness.

The appellant Bank was a secured creditor of a bankrupt corporation.

The trustee in bankruptcy sought to sell the corporation's oil and gas properties.

The respondents held overriding royalties arising from the corporation's working interest and claimed priority over the Bank, arguing their royalties were interests in land.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the common law prohibition against creating an interest in land from an incorporeal hereditament is inapplicable to the oil and gas industry.

An overriding royalty can be an interest in land if that is the intention of the parties.

During a lawful strike and lockout, the union engaged in secondary picketing at retail outlets and other locations.

The employer obtained an interlocutory injunction prohibiting picketing at secondary locations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that secondary picketing is generally lawful unless it involves tortious or criminal conduct.

The Court rejected the 'illegal per se' doctrine, finding that the wrongful action model best balances the interests of free expression under section 2(b) of the Charter with the protection of third parties from undue economic harm.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was acquitted of second degree murder after the trial judge ruled his statements to police were involuntary and inadmissible.

The Crown appealed, and the New Brunswick Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the voluntariness test by considering all circumstances, including oppressive conditions and inducements, and that the Crown's appeal did not raise a question of law alone.

The Crown appealed a decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal that quashed a direct indictment against the accused.

The accused had already been committed for trial after a preliminary inquiry.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Attorney General can prefer a direct indictment under s. 577 of the Criminal Code against an accused who could have been indicted through the ordinary process under s. 574(1)(a), which permitted his inclusion in a direct indictment with his co-accused.

The judgment of the Court of Appeal was set aside and the indictment reinstated.

The appellant, a permanent resident, was ordered removed from Canada for misrepresenting his marital status on his application.

He appealed to the Immigration Appeal Division (I.A.D.) under s. 70(1)(b) of the Immigration Act, arguing that the I.A.D. should consider the potential foreign hardship he would face if removed to Cambodia.

The I.A.D. and lower courts held that foreign hardship could not be considered because the Minister had not yet determined the country of removal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the I.A.D. is entitled to consider potential foreign hardship under s. 70(1)(b) when deciding whether to quash or stay a removal order, provided that a likely country of removal has been established by the individual facing removal.

The appellant, a Convention refugee from Sri Lanka, faced deportation on security grounds due to alleged membership in a terrorist organization.

The Minister issued an opinion declaring him a danger to the security of Canada without providing him a copy of the immigration officer's memorandum or an opportunity to respond.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that deporting a refugee to face a substantial risk of torture generally violates section 7 of the Charter.

The Court found that the appellant had established a prima facie case of a risk of torture and was denied the required procedural safeguards.

The appeal was allowed and the case remanded to the Minister for reconsideration.

The appellant, a Convention refugee from Iran, was suspected of being an assassin for the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security.

The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration issued an opinion under s. 53(1)(b) of the Immigration Act that the appellant constituted a danger to the security of Canada and faced only a minimal risk of harm if deported.

The appellant challenged the decision and the constitutionality of the deportation provisions.

Applying the framework from the companion case of Suresh, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the appellant did not make out a prima facie case of a substantial risk of torture.

The Court found the Minister's decision was not patently unreasonable and that the appellant was provided with adequate procedural protections consistent with the principles of fundamental justice.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a permanent resident, was ordered removed from Canada due to criminal convictions.

He appealed to the Immigration Appeal Division on equitable grounds under s. 70(1)(b) of the Immigration Act.

The IAD dismissed the appeal, concluding it could not consider the extreme hardship the appellant would face if returned to Iraq.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the IAD can consider potential foreign hardship when a likely country of removal has been established.

The matter was returned to the IAD for a new hearing.

The Crown appealed as of right to the Supreme Court of Canada under s. 693(1)(a) of the Criminal Code after the Quebec Court of Appeal set aside the accused's conviction for driving while disqualified.

The Supreme Court quashed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeal was based on a mixed question of fact and law, rather than a question of law alone.

A Belgian ship was arrested in Halifax by a U.S. creditor claiming a maritime lien for stevedoring services.

The ship's owner was subsequently adjudged bankrupt in Belgium, and the Belgian trustees sought a stay of the Canadian maritime proceedings in favour of the Belgian bankruptcy court.

The Federal Court refused the stay, recognizing the U.S. creditor's maritime lien as a secured claim under Canadian maritime law.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the trustees' appeal, holding that the Federal Court did not err in exercising its discretion to refuse the stay, balancing international comity against the rights of secured creditors under maritime law.

The respondent commenced an in rem action in the Federal Court to enforce a maritime lien against a Belgian ship, which was subsequently arrested.

The shipowner was then adjudged bankrupt in Belgium, and the appellant trustees obtained an order from the Quebec Superior Court recognizing the bankruptcy.

Despite this, the Federal Court granted default judgment and ordered the ship's sale.

The trustees then obtained a Quebec Superior Court order directing the sale proceeds to be paid to them, conflicting with the Federal Court's orders.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Quebec Superior Court had no authority to enjoin the Federal Court from exercising its maritime jurisdiction or to dispose of a ship already captured by the Federal Court's process.

The appellants challenged Ontario legislation repealing agricultural labour protections and excluding agricultural workers from the statutory labour relations regime.

The majority held that, in the labour relations context, freedom of association under s. 2(d) may impose a positive obligation where exclusion from protective legislation substantially interferes with the ability of a vulnerable group to organize.

The Court found that the exclusion of agricultural workers from the LRA substantially impeded their capacity to form and maintain employee associations and created a chilling effect on associational activity.

The infringement was not justified under s. 1 because the wholesale exclusion was overly broad and failed minimum impairment.

The appeal was allowed and the declarations of invalidity were suspended for 18 months.

The appellant's late husband, a chartered accountant, committed a professional error in calculating the balance of a selling price owed to the respondent's late father.

This error led to the signing of a discharge that extinguished the debt and its sureties for a lesser amount.

The respondent sued the accountant and the purchasers.

The trial judge found the accountant professionally liable and held all debtors jointly and severally liable.

The Court of Appeal varied the judgment, declaring the debt indivisible.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that the accountant's professional liability was established and the damage was actual, but the obligations of the accountant and the purchaser were not indivisible.

Instead, they were obligations in solidum, making the accountant liable for the amount of his error, with subrogation rights against the purchaser.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the disclosure of customs information on travellers by Revenue Canada to the Canada Employment Insurance Commission.

The program aimed to identify individuals receiving employment insurance benefits while outside Canada.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal that the disclosure was authorized under the Privacy Act and the Customs Act.