Ontario Court of Justice Provincial Offences Act matters

The appellant appealed his conviction for speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act and driving with a hand-held communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty based on evidence from a police officer who observed the appellant driving at 130 km/h in a 100 km/h zone and using an electronic device.

The appellant testified he was holding a business card and that his cell phone was inoperable.

The appellate court found that the trial justice erred in applying the credibility assessment principles from R. v. W.(D.), applying a different standard to the appellant's testimony than to the officer's testimony, and effectively reversing the burden of proof.

The appeal was granted and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered under default proceedings for improperly using a blue flashing light contrary to section 62(32) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The certificate of offence listed an incorrect set fine of $85.00 when the correct fine for a commercial motor vehicle should have been $200.00.

The court found that the certificate was not complete and regular on its face and therefore could not support a conviction under the default proceedings.

The appeal was allowed and the conviction was quashed.

This regulatory prosecution concerned allegations that electrical contractors and their principals breached Ontario’s Consumer Protection Act, 2002 in home-service transactions.

The court considered whether the consumer contracts were direct agreements, whether required contract terms and cancellation rights were provided, whether refunds were owed, and whether misleading representations were made.

After a lengthy trial, the court found the prosecution had proved offences against some or all of the defendants under the consumer protection regime.

The decision interprets the Act broadly as consumer-protection legislation applying to in-home electrical service agreements.

The accused was charged with driving a motor vehicle carelessly contrary to Section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The charge arose from a fatal collision on June 11, 2015, between the accused's vehicle and a mobility scooter operated by the deceased on a residential street in Blenheim.

The Crown's case relied on the assertion that the deceased was visible on the roadway for six seconds prior to impact and that the accused's failure to see or take evasive action demonstrated careless driving.

The Defence challenged the Crown's reconstruction evidence, particularly the assumption of an unobstructed view.

The Court found the accused not guilty, determining that the Crown had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to stop at a red light contrary to section 144.18.1 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The evidence consisted solely of red light camera photographs and encoded data.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: (1) no photograph showed the vehicle in the intersection during the red light; (2) the court referred to outside knowledge not in evidence; (3) the prosecutor gave evidence via submissions; and (4) there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds and upheld the conviction, finding that the circumstantial evidence from the photographs reasonably supported the inference that the vehicle entered the intersection on the red light.

The appellant appealed his conviction on the grounds that his trial was unfair.

The Justice of the Peace improperly terminated the appellant's cross-examination of the officer after only one question, before the witness could answer the appellant's second question regarding photographs of the scene.

The court found the trial was indeed unfair due to this procedural irregularity and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

The accused was convicted of careless driving and pleaded guilty to driving while licence suspended.

On April 29, 2015, the accused drove a van with six passengers on Highway 3 in Leamington when a bee entered the driver's window.

The accused became distracted by the bee and failed to maintain attention on the road despite warnings from passengers.

This resulted in multiple overcorrections, the van rolling over, and two passengers being fatally injured.

The court imposed a sentence of 30 days incarceration, a two-year driving prohibition, and a $1,000 fine.

The court found that the accused's status as both never-licenced and suspended made non-custodial sanctions ineffective as deterrents.

The defendant brought a preliminary motion objecting to the officer's reliance on his notes to refresh his memory, arguing that the notes were created from a template in advance of the incident and could have been altered.

The court considered whether the officer met the three conditions precedent for using notes to refresh memory: (1) notes made at or shortly after the incident; (2) no changes, additions, alterations, or deletions since creation; and (3) independent recollection with need to refresh memory.

The court found that the officer satisfied all three conditions and permitted the use of the notes as an aid to refresh memory, while clarifying that the notes themselves are not evidence and that contemporaneity now goes to weight rather than admissibility.

The appellant appealed her conviction for speeding contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The central issue was whether the Crown established sufficient evidence regarding the testing and reliability of the radar device used to measure the appellant's speed.

The appellant also challenged the officer's qualifications, the proof of the posted speed limit, and the trial justice's limitation of cross-examination.

The appellate court affirmed the conviction, finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish the device's reliability, the officer's qualifications, and the posted speed limit.

The limitation on cross-examination did not significantly impact the trial.

A corporation charged with regulatory offences arising from a critical workplace injury brought a motion for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The defendant argued that the delay from charge to trial exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that although the delay exceeded the ceiling, transitional provisions applied because both parties had relied on the previous legal framework requiring proof of prejudice.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the defendant had failed to actively pursue expedited proceedings, had only once raised Charter rights, and had consented to all adjournments.

The court also found the matter was complex and serious, involving a severe workplace injury and six days of trial time with competing expert evidence.

The defendant, a subcontractor specializing in underground construction and grouting, was charged with three counts under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) following the death of a worker and serious injury to another when a drill rig collapsed at a Toronto Transit Commission subway extension project at York University.

The charges alleged failures to provide an adequate work platform for the drill rig, to ensure the platform could support loads in accordance with good engineering practice, and to operate the machine in accordance with the manufacturer's manual.

The court found the defendant guilty of Count 5 (failure to design an adequate work platform by failing to identify soil bearing capacity as required by manufacturer specifications) but acquitted on Counts 6 and 7.

The court determined that while the defendant transmitted manufacturer specifications to the general contractor, it failed to follow up and verify that the soil's bearing capacity had been adequately assessed before operating the rig.

The appellant appealed his convictions for improper right turn and failing to surrender his driving licence under the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant's primary ground of appeal was that he did not receive fair disclosure of the audio portion of the arresting officer's dash-camera recording.

The trial judge found that the Crown had provided full disclosure of the in-car recording on DVD, but the audio had not been recorded due to the officer's failure to activate the audio pack.

The appellant refused to participate in his trial after his requests for the missing audio and an adjournment were denied.

The appeal court upheld the convictions, finding that the appellant received a fair opportunity to make full answer and defence but chose not to participate, and that the trial judge properly handled the disclosure issue and the adjournment request.

The appellant appealed a conviction for speeding 62 kilometres per hour in a 40 kilometre zone under section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The grounds of appeal concerned the alleged failure of the prosecution to disclose information respecting the testing of the laser speed-measuring device used by the police officer.

The appellant argued that the failure to disclose testing times and the officer's testimony about testing without corresponding notes in his notebook resulted in an unfair trial and brought the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant municipality sought an order to have provincial offences matters involving charges against a ride-sharing company and individual drivers tried by a judge of the Ontario Court of Justice rather than by a justice of the peace, as would ordinarily occur.

The applicant argued that the matters involved complex legal issues including Charter challenges, challenges to the validity of municipal by-laws, and issues of significant precedential value and broader public interest.

The court dismissed the application, finding that justices of the peace possess sufficient education and training to handle Charter applications and by-law challenges, and that the matters did not meet the threshold for judicial assignment.

The court emphasized the importance of managing judicial resources and avoiding delays to serious criminal matters.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle on a highway while his driver's licence was suspended, contrary to section 53(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The trial proceeded in the defendant's absence.

The Crown proved the actus reus of the strict liability offence beyond a reasonable doubt: that the defendant was driving a motor vehicle on a highway while his licence was suspended for medical reasons.

The defendant failed to establish the due diligence defence on a balance of probabilities.

Although the defendant claimed to possess a doctor's letter permitting him to drive, he took no steps to verify his obligations regarding licence reinstatement and remained passively ignorant of the administrative requirements.

The court found the defendant guilty.

The City of Kenora appealed a conviction for speeding entered by a Justice of the Peace.

The respondent was charged with speeding 105 km/h in a 90 km/h zone, but the Crown sought to amend the certificate to reflect evidence of 130 km/h.

The Justice of the Peace declined to amend the certificate upwards and imposed a fine consistent with the original offence notice.

The appeal court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding that the Justice of the Peace properly exercised discretion under Section 34.1(4) of the Provincial Offences Act by considering the circumstances, including the dynamics of the situation (passing zone on a hill) and the respondent's lack of prejudice.

The Crown charged the defendant with knowingly giving a false statement to a conservation officer contrary to section 96(a) of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act.

The defendant was alleged to have falsely stated that no second bull moose was shot by members of the hunting party during opening weekend, when in fact Kevin Cain had shot a second bull moose unlawfully.

The trial turned on the credibility of the officer's account of the interview conducted at the defendant's home versus the defendant's account.

The court found reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was asked about Kevin Cain or Rick Cain, and whether the defendant's responses were as alleged by the Crown.

The defendant was acquitted.

A trial concerning occupational health and safety violations arising from a serious mining accident at the Cochenour Mine in Red Lake, Ontario on August 4, 2013, where a worker suffered severe injuries when rocks fell onto a Mechanized Raise Climber.

The Crown charged the employer and two supervisors with multiple violations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act and Regulation 854.

The court convicted the corporate defendant on counts relating to failure to provide training, supervision, and job task observations, and convicted the supervisors on counts relating to failure to ensure use of safety equipment and supervision.

The court dismissed charges relating to geology, loading of drill holes with ANFO, and notification of appropriate officials.

The defendant was charged with three Highway Traffic Act offences: driving while his Ontario driver's licence was suspended, using a driver's licence from another jurisdiction while suspended in Ontario, and driving without current validation on the number plate.

The defendant claimed he had been advised by a Ministry of Transportation customer service representative that he could legally drive using his Nigerian International Driver's Permit despite his suspended Ontario licence.

The court rejected the defence of officially induced error of law, finding that the defendant failed to establish all necessary elements on a balance of probabilities.

The court convicted the defendant on all three counts.

The defendant was charged with nine counts of wilfully collecting and using personal health information without authority under the Personal Health Information Protection Act, 2004.

The defendant brought Charter applications under section 11(b) for unreasonable delay and under section 7 for abuse of process and selective prosecution.

The court found a violation of section 11(b) due to Crown delay of 16 months and 10 days, which exceeded the Morin guidelines by 6 months and 10 days.

The court found actual and inferred prejudice to the defendant.

The court rejected the section 7 application, finding no abuse of process.

A stay of proceedings was granted pursuant to section 11(b) and section 24(1) of the Charter.