Civil Litigation - Plaintiff

The plaintiff, a 61-year-old commission salesperson with 19.5 months of service, was terminated without cause shortly before the COVID-19 pandemic.

He brought a motion seeking 10 months of reasonable notice, while the defendant employer argued for two months.

The court assessed the relevant factors, noting the plaintiff's short tenure, non-managerial role, and the lack of evidence that his age or the pandemic significantly hindered his job search during the applicable notice period.

The court awarded a reasonable notice period of 2.5 months.

The plaintiff rented his high-performance vehicle to the defendant for a weekend.

The vehicle suffered catastrophic engine failure while in the defendant's possession.

The plaintiff sued for breach of contract, alleging the defendant over-revved the engine and drove beyond legal limits, evidenced by a depleted methanol tank.

The court found the defendant breached the agreement to use utmost care and return the vehicle in substantially the same condition.

The plaintiff was awarded $53,535.30 in damages for the engine replacement.

Claims for punitive damages, the defendant's counterclaim for the rental fee, and a third-party claim were dismissed.

The plaintiff, an insurance broker, brought an action for wrongful and constructive dismissal against his former employer.

The defendant employer argued that the plaintiff had voluntarily retired and was an independent contractor.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence to be less credible than the defendant's and a third-party witness, concluding that the plaintiff had indeed voluntarily retired as he had previously announced.

The court also determined that the plaintiff was an employee, not an independent contractor, but dismissed the action entirely based on the finding of voluntary retirement.

The defendant, a criminal defence lawyer, brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's civil action for professional negligence as an abuse of process.

The plaintiff had been convicted of criminal offences, and his appeals, which included allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel against the defendant, were dismissed.

The court found that allowing the civil action to proceed would require re-litigating the criminal convictions and finding them incorrect, constituting an impermissible collateral attack.

However, noting the plaintiff's new evidence, the court stayed the action rather than dismissing it, pending a successful review of the convictions under the Criminal Code.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar's administrative dismissal of his personal injury action.

The plaintiff argued he was under a disability at the time of the dismissal and, alternatively, that the dismissal should be set aside based on the Reid factors.

The court found the plaintiff did not meet the strict definition of disability under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, applying the Reid factors, the court exercised its discretion to set aside the dismissal, noting the plaintiff's mental health struggles, his self-represented status at the time, the shared responsibility for delay, and the lack of significant prejudice to the defendants.

The defendant insurer brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to answer undertakings given during examinations for discovery.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion seeking production of the police investigation file related to an arson charge against her that was later withdrawn.

The court ordered the defendant to produce the police file and its investigator's file, as they were relevant to the plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.

The court also ordered the plaintiff to answer undertakings regarding the sale price of her home and the name of a doctor who treated her for a brain injury, but found other requested information irrelevant.

Costs of $3,000 were awarded to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sued for unpaid costs and a management fee related to a home renovation project.

The Master found a cost-plus contract existed but denied the management fee, awarding the plaintiff $31,556.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 54.09 opposing the confirmation of the Master's report.

The Superior Court found the Master made a palpable and overriding error in concluding a contract existed, as there was no meeting of the minds on essential terms.

The court set aside the Master's report and awarded the plaintiff $106,060.19 on a quantum meruit basis for services rendered.

In a trial concerning art authentication, the intervenors brought a mid-trial motion to qualify an expert in graphoanalysis and forensic analysis of handwriting.

The plaintiff objected due to the late service of the expert report.

The court granted the motion, noting that while the late service violated the Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff had prior access to the report online and was not unduly prejudiced.

Applying Rule 1.04(1), the court prioritized the merits of the case over procedural formality and qualified the expert.

During a trial concerning the authenticity of a Norval Morrisseau painting, the intervenors brought a motion to qualify an art appraiser as an expert witness.

The plaintiff objected based on the proposed expert's lack of academic credentials, past business dealings with an intervenor, and the inadequacy of his expert report.

The court found that the appraiser's 43 years of industry experience was sufficient for qualification and that his past business dealings did not undermine his impartiality.

However, the court refused to qualify the expert because his one-page report was merely a conclusory certificate lacking methodology or reasoning, and it was served the day before his testimony, which would cause unfair surprise and prejudice to the plaintiff under Rule 53.03.

The defendant brought a motion for an extension of time to deliver a jury notice after the close of pleadings in an action arising from a denial of travel insurance coverage.

The failure to deliver the notice was due to the inadvertence of the defendant's original counsel.

The court granted the motion, finding that the delay was not unconscionable and that the plaintiff suffered no prejudice, as discoveries are fact-finding and no trial preparation had yet taken place.

The applicants, engaged in combating government corruption in Malaysia, sought a Norwich Pharmacal order to compel financial institutions to produce confidential information about a Canadian real estate group.

The applicants suspected the group was funded by proceeds of foreign corruption and contemplated a private criminal prosecution for money laundering and receipt of proceeds of crime.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the applicants lacked reasonable grounds to believe an indictable offence had been committed, and that it would be inappropriate to use the court's inherent civil jurisdiction to bypass the careful balance struck by Parliament in the Criminal Code for criminal investigations and private prosecutions.

The plaintiffs obtained an ex parte Mareva injunction freezing the defendants' assets based on allegations of unpaid loans and fraudulent conveyance of proceeds from the sale of a house.

On the motion to continue the injunction, the plaintiffs sought to introduce new evidence obtained through the ex parte order.

The court refused to admit the new evidence, holding that a motion to continue is a hearing de novo where the responding party can test the original record.

The court found the original record insufficient to establish a strong prima facie case or a serious risk of dissipation against the defendant daughters, and terminated the injunction against them.

The defendants sought costs of two motions on a partial indemnity scale against the plaintiff, and also sought costs personally against the plaintiff's former legal counsel under Rule 57.07(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court awarded costs to the defendants against the plaintiff, finding the amounts claimed reasonable.

However, the court dismissed the claim for costs against the plaintiff's former lawyers, finding their conduct did not meet the high threshold for personal liability.

The defendants were ordered to pay $1,500 in costs to the plaintiff's former lawyers for successfully defending the claim against them.

The defendant moved to set aside a $6 million default judgment entered against her.

The plaintiffs had sued the defendant and others for misconduct related to the purchase of life insurance policies.

The court found that while the defendant did not bring the motion promptly and lacked a good explanation for her default, she had an arguable defence on the merits regarding her personal liability as a corporate officer.

Balancing the factors, the court set aside the default judgment on terms, requiring the defendant to pay costs thrown away and the costs of the motion, and allowing the writ of execution to remain on title.

At the opening of a scheduled 7-week trial, the defendant insurer brought a motion for an adjournment due to the plaintiff's late disclosure of physical evidence and additional documents.

The plaintiff had disclosed the existence of particles and other physical evidence relevant to the cause of the equipment failure just weeks before trial.

The court found that it would be unjust to force the defendant to proceed without an opportunity to obtain expert advice and conduct further discovery on the newly disclosed evidence.

The motion for an adjournment was granted.

The plaintiff religious corporation sought repayment of funds raised by its congregation that were used by the defendants to purchase and renovate a new, larger place of worship under a newly incorporated entity.

The plaintiff also sought repayment for a mortgage placed on its original property to fund its conversion into a funeral home.

The court dismissed both the plaintiff's claims for breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, and conversion, as well as the defendants' counterclaim for the value of improvements.

The court found that the fundraising and property transition were done with the knowledge and support of the original directors, and both parties ultimately benefited from the respective properties.

The plaintiff parents brought a motion for summary judgment against their defendant son for defaulting on a 1992 farm transfer agreement.

The son had agreed to purchase the family farm and related assets via promissory notes payable over 20 years, but ceased making payments in 2010.

The son raised defenses of contractual ambiguity, lack of understanding, and the expiry of the limitation period.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the contract unambiguous, noting the son had independent legal advice, and ruling that the limitation period for the delayed-demand promissory notes only began when the parents made a formal demand in 2013.

The plaintiffs were awarded $532,337.16.

The appellant appealed a Master's order requiring her to post $40,000 in security for costs in her solicitor's negligence action.

The respondents brought a preliminary motion to strike a ground of appeal as an impermissible collateral attack on a prior unappealed order, which the court granted.

On the main appeal, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the Master's findings that the appellant was ordinarily resident outside Ontario and had failed to establish impecuniosity with robust particularity.

The court held the Master correctly applied the law in assessing the merits of the action and balancing the parties' interests.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiff, having been wholly successful at trial and awarded damages including punitive damages, sought costs.

The plaintiff had served two Rule 49 offers to settle, both of which were beaten at trial.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs up to the date of the first offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, noting that the 2005 Costs Subcommittee guidelines for counsel fees are outdated.

Total costs of $140,360.11 were awarded.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was an abuse of process due to a prior default judgment.

The court declined to strike the entire action, finding the prior action involved a sublease while the current action involved the purchase and sale of a business.

However, the court struck several claims, including inducing breach of contract against a corporate director without leave to amend, and claims for unjust enrichment and conspiracy with leave to amend.

The moving parties were awarded partial indemnity costs.